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Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been the leading actors in the process
of globalization of the last three decades. According to UNCTAD, exports of
foreign aﬃliates of MNEs constitute about one third of total world exports of
goods and services, and one third of international trade is intra-ﬁrm trade. In
2009, foreign aﬃliates employed about 80 million people – four times more
than in 1982 – and their contribution to world GDP reached, despite the
slowdown in economic activity caused by the global crisis, a new maximum
of 11% (see UNCTAD 2010).
The phenomenal increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows came along
with a proliferation of policy instruments to protect – and attract – foreign
investors. The number of international investment agreements (IIAs), the
most important being bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double tax-
ation treaties (DTTs), grew exponentially since the early 1960s (see Sachs
and Sauvant 2009). While BITs principally aim at protecting foreign invest-
ments, DTTs deal with the allocation, between host and home countries, of
taxable capital ﬂows (dividends, interest, and royalties) generated by MNEs,
xi
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and intend to reduce investors’ costs of tax compliance. The surge of DTTs
signed not only reﬂects – as in the case of BITs – the countries’ eﬀorts to
attract FDI by avoiding double taxation; it also reﬂects the growing eﬀort
made by developed countries coordinate anti-tax-avoidance measures.
The increased mobility of capital, made possible by the liberalization of regu-
lations and the development of communication technologies, poses a challenge
to national tax systems. Moving actual or recorded activity – i.e. taxable
proﬁts – across jurisdictions became easier and less costly, increasing both
the sensitivity of real capital or paper proﬁts to tax diﬀerentials, and the
competition among jurisdictions for either of them. Attempts to relieve the
resulting jurisdictional tax conﬂicts have been made not only through bilat-
eral tax treaties but also through initiatives to coordinate tax rules within
the OECD and the EU (see Griﬃth, Hines and Sørensen 2010). While pro-
posals for partial harmonization of corporate tax rates within the EU failed,
the number of tax-related cases presented at the European Court of Justice
increased signiﬁcantly in the last years, as international companies consider
national tax rules discriminating and infringing on their fundamental free-
doms guaranteed by the EU Treaty (free movement of goods, services, capital
and persons).1
In this context, it is of great relevance to the policy maker to learn about
multinational ﬁrms’ responses to tax instruments and to quantify those re-
1See European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/common/infringements/
case law/court cases direct taxation en.pdf.
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sponses. There is now a vast literature on the responsiveness of FDI to
taxation. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) provide a survey and a meta-study
of the literature and document a big variance of the estimated proﬁt tax elas-
ticities of FDI across studies. Griﬃth, Hines and Sørensen (2010) consider
the existing empirical evidence on corporate taxation in the open economy,
and conclude that “[...] while we can say that tax policy is important, we are
unable to say precisely how strongly international real investment will react
to speciﬁc changes in national policies”.
This dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on multinational ﬁrm
behavior by using state of the art econometric methods, and an exception-
ally good data-set on foreign aﬃliates’ balance sheets, to assess the impact
of diﬀerent policy instruments on diﬀerent margins and outcomes of MNE
activity in four self-contained chapters. The data used is the Microdatabase
Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The fea-
ture of the data-set that makes it especially apt for evaluating the sensitivity
of MNE activity to policy instruments, is that reporting is mandatory above
a threshold set by law (See Lipponer, 2009, for details). In fact, MiDi com-
prises both the universe of foreign aﬃliates in Germany and the universe
of German aﬃliates abroad. In its current version, the data-set is available
as a panel over the period 1996-2009. Since Germany is not only one of the
most important home economies, but also a major recipient of foreign invest-
ments,2 we observe a signiﬁcant sample of the world’s MNEs, rendering the
estimated responses to policy instruments highly relevant for the evaluation
2In 2009, Germany ranked fourth and seventh in terms of FDI outﬂows and inﬂows
respectively (see UNCTAD 2010).
Introduction xiv
of the eﬀectiveness of such policies.3
The ﬁrst chapter is concerned with the location of foreign investments within
Germany, and their sensitivity to the local municipal business tax rate. The
main contribution of this chapter is the compilation of a panel data-set of
more than 11, 000 of the 12, 300 German municipalities, which is linked to the
location of inbound FDI in Germany to assess the impact of proﬁt taxation on
multinational ﬁrm activity in a sub-national context. Most existing empirical
evidence on the impact of proﬁt taxation on multinational ﬁrm activity is
based on cross-country data. One major drawback of such data is that coun-
tries diﬀer not only with regard to taxes but along other dimensions which
might be hard to capture by means of observable characteristics. We show
that – after controlling for other determinants of ﬁrm location decisions –
higher business tax rates have a negative eﬀect on three alternative measures
of MNE activity: the number of foreign MNEs, MNE employment, and MNE
ﬁxed assets. Our results suggest that tax competition among regional entities
for foreign investors is a game of a few. We ﬁnd that a one-percent reduction
of the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a decline by about 0.14
percentage points) leads to an increase in the number of legally independent
foreign-owned ﬁrms by about 0.45. The average municipality would have to
reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its
average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to be
3Throughout all chapters, we strive to make the least restrictions to the samples as
possible, the main reason for such restrictions being the lack of data on some control
variables. In Chapter 4, for example, we have a sample of 38,705 German foreign aﬃliates.
These represent almost 5% of the world’s foreign aﬃliates, which are estimated to amount
to 810,000 (See UNCTAD 2009).
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attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
ﬁrms at the margin.
The remaining chapters focus on the location and activity of German foreign
aﬃliates abroad. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the analysis of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs), one of the few policy instruments that are directly
intended to attract foreign investments. Previous research aimed at a quan-
tiﬁcation of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment at aggregated
levels only. We use the data at hand to deliver a detailed analysis of BITs’
eﬀects on multinational activity at the micro level, and contribute to improv-
ing our understanding of the precise channels through which BITs determine
aggregate investment. We provide descriptive evidence on changes in inten-
sive and extensive margins of multinational ﬁrm activity around the adoption
of BITs. The results of multivariate empirical models broadly support the
hypotheses derived from a parsimonious model of heterogeneous ﬁrms on the
eﬀects of BITs on diﬀerent margins of investment: BITs raise the number of
multinational ﬁrms active in a particular host country and have a positive
eﬀect on the number of plants per ﬁrm, as well as on FDI stocks and ﬁxed
assets per ﬁrm.
In Chapter 3 we turn the attention back to corporate proﬁt taxation. This
chapter analyzes the impact of statutory corporate tax rates and of double
taxation treaties (DTTs) on multinational ﬁrm activity at the micro level. It
provides an assessment of the eﬀects of these proﬁt tax instruments on the
extensive and the intensive margin of MNE activity. While we can expect
statutory corporate tax rates to have a negative eﬀect on FDI, the eﬀect
Introduction xvi
of DTTs is not a priori clear. On the one hand, DTTs typically reduce
uncertainty about after-tax proﬁts by specifying the mode of taxation relief
and by agreeing on maximum levels of withholding tax rates. At the same
time, they contain provisions for the exchange of information to limit transfer
pricing, and restrict tax evasion, which might rather discourage FDI. Our
ﬁndings suggest that while statutory tax rates aﬀect MNE activity negatively
both at the extensive and the intensive margin of investment, DTTs primarily
induce a positive eﬀect at the extensive margin.
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on the (unobserved) proﬁt-shifting activities of
MNEs. In particular, the chapter investigates the tax responsiveness of multi-
nationals’ investment decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing ﬁrms that
are able to shift proﬁts (shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters).
From a theoretical point of view, the tax responsiveness of ﬁrms crucially
depends on this distinction. Empirically, however, a ﬁrm’s ability to shift
proﬁts is inherently unobserved. To address this problem, we use a ﬁnite
mixture modeling approach which allows us to distinguish shifters from non-
shifters stochastically from a mixture of distributions of the two types of
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that shifters do not respond to host-country proﬁt taxes at
all, as expected, while taxes aﬀect the investment decision of non-shifters.
More speciﬁcally, we identify a larger group of aﬃliates with a relatively low
average investment, which is negatively aﬀected by the local corporate tax
rate on proﬁts. The estimated tax eﬀect for the latter group amounts to
1.85% less ﬁxed assets, or 68,000 Euro for the average aﬃliate per percent-
age point tax increase. A smaller group of aﬃliates is able to avoid taxation
by shifting its tax base, and shows no signiﬁcant response to corporate tax
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rates. The aﬃliates in this group have, on average, signiﬁcatively higher in-
vestments in ﬁxed assets, so that – were they to be prevented from shifting
proﬁts – the implied eﬀect in Euro of a one-percentage-point change in the
tax rate would be 42 times higher. We conclude that, to the extent that
a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign investments are carried out
by ﬁrms that shift proﬁts, the introduction of anti-tax-avoidance measures
to restrict proﬁt shifting in the pursuit to cash tax revenue will come at the
cost of entering in tax competition with other countries for that ﬁrms’ in-
vestments. In fact, the broadening of the tax base has to be accompanied
by a policy of cutting the statutory tax burden to avoid losing real economic
activity.
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How Low Business Tax Rates
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Abstract∗
Most existing empirical evidence on the impact of proﬁt taxation on multi-
national ﬁrm activity is based on cross-country data. One major drawback
of such data is that countries diﬀer not only with regard to taxes but along
other dimensions which might be hard to capture by means of observable
characteristics. We compile a database of more than 11, 000 municipalities
in Germany to analyze the sensitivity of location decisions of foreign MNEs
in Germany with respect to business tax rates which are levied directly by
the municipalities. We ﬁnd that higher business tax rates have a negative
eﬀect on three alternative measures of MNE activity, after controlling for
other determinants of ﬁrm location decisions: the number of foreign MNEs,
MNE employment, and MNE ﬁxed assets. Our results suggest that tax com-
petition among regional entities for foreign investors is a game of a few. In
cross-section instrumental-variables regressions, a one-percent reduction of
the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a decline by about 0.14 per-
centage points) leads to an increase in the number of legally independent
foreign-owned ﬁrms by about 0.45. The average municipality would have to
reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its
average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to be
attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
foreign ﬁrms at the margin.
1.1 Introduction
A sizable literature in theoretical public ﬁnance argues that the location of
capital in general and that of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in particular
reacts sensitively to proﬁt tax policy (Wilson, 1987; Janeba, 1995; Huizinga
∗This chapter is joint work with Sascha Becker and Peter Egger. It is based on our
paper “How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity: Municipality-Level Evidence
from Germany”. An earlier version is available as CESifo Working Paper No. 2517.
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and Nielsen, 1997; Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Ludema and
Wooton, 2000; Davies, 2003, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard, 2003; Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004; Raﬀ, 2004; Borck and Pﬂu¨ger, 2006; Bucovetsky and
Hauﬂer, 2008; this list is by no means exhaustive). When lumpy investment
– i.e., ﬁrm or plant location – is sensitive to proﬁt taxation, many of these
models predict a race to the bottom in proﬁt tax rates so that, in equilibrium,
countries have to oﬀer a tax rate of zero to attract investors. Otherwise, a
jurisdiction will lose the whole proﬁt tax base to its competitors. One key
reason for this outcome is that – in most of the traditional models of tax
competition – countries diﬀer only in terms of proﬁt taxes or, more precisely,
low proﬁt taxes are the only attraction governments may oﬀer to ﬁrms.
Empirically, there is hardly any evidence of a race to the bottom in proﬁt
taxes (except for the existence of a few small tax havens). Therefore, re-
cent theoretical work suggested mechanisms to avoid this knife-edge case.
The New Economic Geography literature hypothesizes that there are factors
generating agglomeration economies which, in turn, reduce the sensitivity of
location decisions of foreign MNEs with respect to proﬁt (or capital) taxa-
tion (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and
Pﬂu¨ger, 2006). More generally, taxes are only one factor aﬀecting ﬁrm lo-
cation. There is little reason for a municipality to eliminate proﬁt taxes
provided that the overall environment – e.g. available infrastructure and hu-
man capital endowment of the work force – makes it attractive enough to
locate there.
It is by now well documented in empirical research at various levels of aggre-
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gation (ﬁrms, industries, and aggregate bilateral activity) that the location
of MNE activity across countries inter alia depends on national proﬁt tax
policy (Devereux and Griﬃth, 1998; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006,
2008; Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Grubert and Mutti, 2004; Huizinga and
Nicode`me, 2006; Egger, Pfaﬀermayr, Loretz, and Winner, 2009; Overesch
and Wamser, 2009). However, two concerns may be raised with such work.
First, for some countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, or the United States,
the (unique) proﬁt tax rate is an artifact, since tax authorities at the sub-
national level may determine taxes on proﬁts in their jurisdiction. Second,
host countries diﬀer in many ways rather than only in proﬁt taxes, most im-
portantly with regard to institutional characteristics that are hard to mea-
sure. Omission of relevant institutional determinants of MNE activity is
likely in cross-country studies and may bias empirical estimates of the sen-
sitivity of MNE activity with respect to taxation and other variables. Both
problems can be avoided when considering ﬁrm location decisions at the
sub-national level. Of course, a prerequisite for this is the existence of sub-
national jurisdictions with tax authority and some heterogeneity in the proﬁt
tax rates.
There is a small literature on the nexus between ﬁrm births (national and
foreign ﬁrms) and taxation which focuses on location decisions across regions
within a country. For instance, Slemrod (1990; analyzing direct investments
in 50 U.S. states by parent country), Papke (1991; exploiting information
across 22 U.S. states), Hines (1996; analyzing foreign direct investment in
50 U.S. states by home country), List (2001; using 58 Californian counties),
Swenson (2001; considering investment decisions across U.S. states by dis-
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tinguishing investment types and industries of investment), and Bru¨hlhart,
Jametti, and Schmidheiny (2007; focusing on 213 large Swiss municipalities)
belong here. Of these studies, only Slemrod (1990), Hines (1996), List (2001),
and Swenson (2001) focus on the location decisions of foreign ﬁrms (i.e., for-
eign MNEs) explicitly and, hence, ask questions which are comparable to
ours. List (2001) analyzes the impact of the per-capita property tax rate on
MNEs rather than a proﬁt tax burden which is directly levied on businesses.
Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) are interested not only in the impact of
state-level corporate tax rates in the U.S. but also in the role of the system
of double taxation relief in the recipient countries. Swenson (2001) primarily
focuses on the diﬀerent responsiveness of alternative types of investments
in the United States.1 Apart from the diﬀerences in the research questions
posed in this paper as compared to the ones just mentioned, the number
of subnational jurisdictions (i.e., the number of host locations) available is
larger than in previous work by more than one order of magnitude.
We compile a large panel data-set on local business tax rates and other data
at the municipality level. In Germany, municipalities may independently set
a so-called Gewerbesteuer (or business tax rate). This business tax rate is
levied on proﬁts of companies and represents the most important source of
revenues accruing to policy instruments which are at a municipality’s discre-
tion. Our data-set covers more than 11, 000 German municipalities over the
period 2001 to 2005. We link it with data on the location of foreign MNEs
in Germany from Deutsche Bundesbank’s Micro-Database Direct Investment
1Already Auerbach and Hassett (1993) suggested that alternative forms of investment
should respond diﬀerently to tax policy.
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(MiDi).2 The set of locations (municipalities) considered here is much more
homogeneous than in cross-country data. For instance, in contrast to an
international setting, other tax parameters such as taxes on income are iden-
tical across German municipalities since they are levied at the national level.
The variability of the eﬀective proﬁt tax rate across municipalities is brought
about by the variability in business tax rates alone while other determinants
of the tax base (such as the method of double taxation relief, withholding
tax rates, depreciation allowances, etc.) are homogeneous across municipali-
ties. Moreover, sub-national data allow one to control for the heterogeneity
of locations within countries, which is more diﬃcult with national data.
Attracting foreign-owned ﬁrms to a municipality promises jobs and local
business tax income. There is anecdotal evidence of municipalities which
lower their tax rates so as to explicitly attract foreign ﬁrms. One well-known
example is the small town of Holzkirchen, close to Munich in Upper Bavaria,
that lowered its business tax rate to appeal to Sandoz, a big pharmaceuti-
cal ﬁrm.3 Another example constitutes the municipality of Amering which
2The work of Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) blends home country and host juris-
diction issues with corporate taxation. Unlike them, we do not distinguish foreign MNEs
according to their country of origin. We focus on the responsiveness of MNE location
(from anywhere) to host jurisdiction business tax rates for two reasons. First, we are
interested in how a given number of foreign investments to just one country (Germany)
is allocated within the country in response to tax rates. Hence, we disregard multilateral
considerations of investors – e.g., decisions related to whether to invest in Germany at all.
Second, the huge number of host jurisdictions involves a relatively large fraction of munic-
ipalities where no investment is undertaken at all. The fraction of zeros would necessarily
rise more than proportionately if we distinguished investors by their country of origin. We
discuss this issue further in section 6.3.
3See http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/10/51958/ reporting that
Holzkirchen had lowered its local business tax rate by 30 percent, making it the
second-lowest in the state of Bavaria, in its (successful) attempt to attract Sandoz.
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managed to lure Kathrein, the world leader in satellite dishes, to locate its
headquarters there, by lowering its local business tax rate.4
Although these examples illustrate that some municipalities consider the at-
traction of foreign MNEs of prime interest, it is not only the number of MNEs
that matters, but the real activity they develop. We therefore also consider
two further measures of MNE activity: MNE employment and MNE real
assets.
Econometrically, we have to deal with the fact that the majority of munic-
ipalities in Germany does not attract any foreign MNEs. Moreover, many
of the municipalities which successfully attract foreign MNEs host only a
small number of them. We use count data models (when looking at the
number of foreign MNEs) as well as linear and non-linear estimation models
(for all outcomes), to estimate the impact of business taxation on the foreign
MNE activity in a municipality, controlling for other determinants such as
population characteristics, the skill level of the work force, and geographical
characteristics. We estimate both cross-section and panel data models, where
business tax rates are treated as endogenous and instrumented by character-
istics of neighboring municipalities. Across the board, we identify a negative
impact of business tax rates on the number of MNEs in a municipality which
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
For all three measures of MNE activity, we ﬁnd that lower (simple or formula-
apportioned) business tax rates attract MNEs, conditional on other deter-
4See http://www.kathrein.de/de/presse/cont/texte2005/pi0553.htm.
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minants of MNE activity. We discuss the magnitude of the eﬀects and ﬁnd
them to be of reasonable size. For instance, in cross-section IV regressions,
a one-percent reduction of the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a
decline by about 0.14 percentage points) leads to an increase in the number
of foreign MNEs there by about 0.45. The average municipality would have
to reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from
its average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to
be attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
ﬁrms at the margin.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
most important institutional details of the German municipal business tax.
We summarize the literature on determinants of MNE location in section
1.3. Section 1.4 describes features of the data-set. Section 1.5 introduces
the empirical strategy for the analysis of the impact of business taxes on
the number of MNEs locating in a municipality. Section 1.6 summarizes the
empirical ﬁndings from both cross-section and panel data analyses. The last
section provides some concluding remarks.
1.2 The German municipal business tax
German municipalities have autonomy in determining the local business tax
rate (Gewerbesteuer), levied on proﬁts of companies.5 The local business
5For exceptions, see §3 of the German business tax law.
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tax rate is one of the most important policy instruments at a municipality’s
discretion, because it represents their main source of revenue. The tax base
is deﬁned by the federal tax law which applies uniformly in all municipali-
ties. What municipalities may actually choose is the so-called Hebesatz (or
multiplier) which is a factor that is measured in percent and applied on the
constant Steuermesszahl (or base) of 5 percent for corporate entities in all
municipalities.6 The tax rate on corporate proﬁts in municipality 푖 with a
multiplier 퐻푖 is determined as 푡푖 = 퐻푖 × 0.05/[(100 + (퐻푖 × 0.05)].7 For
instance, a multiplier of 200 means that the business tax rate determined by
the municipality amounts to 9 percent. To avoid detrimental eﬀects of tax
competition, the federal Gewerbesteuergesetz GewStG (business tax law; §16
Abs. 4 S. 2 GewStG.) determined a ﬂoor of 200 percent for the multiplier
from 2004 onwards. Hence, municipalities may only choose a multiplier of
200 or higher. If they do not specify a multiplier, a value of 200 percent (i.e.,
a business tax rate of 9 percent) is set by default. Before 2004, municipalities
were free to set a business tax rate of less than 9 percent, but only a very
small fraction of municipalities did so. Tax exemptions to attract ﬁrms are
illegal (see Glanegger and Gu¨roﬀ, 1999, p. 929).
To some extent, proﬁt-shifting between plants in an attempt to escape the
local business tax is limited by formula apportionment: ﬁrm proﬁts to be
taxed are apportioned to each municipality according to the share of payroll
6In 2008 the Steuermesszahl for corporate entities was changed to 3.5 percent for all
municipalities.
7The tax payments are deductible from the tax base.
Chapter 1 – How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity 10
paid there.8 By German tax law, all proﬁts associated with a legally inde-
pendent (domestically- or foreign-owned) ﬁrm in Germany are attributed to
the controlled entities within Germany according to the respective wage bill
shares. Suppose a ﬁrm 푓 is located in municipality A and has two branches,
one in municipality B and one in C. Total proﬁts in those locations are
휋푓 = 휋푓퐴 + 휋푓퐵 + 휋푓퐶 and the total wage bill is 푤푓 = 푤푓퐴 + 푤푓퐵 + 푤푓퐶 .
With tax rate 푡푖 in municipality 푖 ∈ {퐴,퐵,퐶}, proﬁt tax revenue in 푖 is then
푡푖(푤푓푖/푤푓 )휋푓 .
As mentioned in the introduction, other tax parameters such as taxes on
income are levied at the national level and thus identical across German
municipalities. The variability of the eﬀective proﬁt tax rate across munici-
palities is brought about by the variability in business tax rates alone while
other determinants of the tax base such as depreciation allowances, or in the
speciﬁc case of foreign-owned ﬁrms the method of double taxation relief or
withholding tax rates, are homogeneous across municipalities.
1.3 Determinants of MNE activity abroad
In our empirical analysis, we estimate parsimonious models of the number of
foreign MNEs locating in German municipalities. As suggested by previous
research on the impact of proﬁt (or capital) taxation on lumpy investment
8However, formula apportionment can be avoided by a strategic choice of the organi-
zation structure of ﬁrms and location decisions about their incorporation.
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decisions by MNEs, we expect higher business tax rates levied by municipali-
ties to exert a negative impact on the number of foreign MNEs locating there.
To the extent that foreign MNE location entails real activity, we expect the
same to hold for MNE employment and real assets. However, to isolate the
role of business taxes on MNEs’ location decisions, we have to control for
other key explanatory variables suggested by the literature. These are the
following.
According to a sizable body of work in theoretical international economics,
knowledge-capital embodied in skilled workers is one of the key determinants
of MNE activity (see Markusen, 2002). In accordance with that line of rea-
soning, empirical research identiﬁed a key role of the local supply of skilled
labor to play for the location MNEs (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003). While
previous evidence is available for investment (and foreign aﬃliate sales) at
the national level, similar arguments ought to hold for the location within
a country. Our skill measure is the share of workers with tertiary school
education per municipality.
A second key factor determining MNE activity according to previous re-
search is host country location size (see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti
and Venables, 2004). Using country (or country-pair) data in previous em-
pirical work, host market size is typically controlled for by variables based
on gross domestic product (GDP). However, GDP is not available (as well
as endogenous) at regionally very disaggregated levels. For this reason, we
include population density, the independency ratio of the population (i.e.,
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the number of people aged between 15 and 65 years as a fraction of total
population in the region) and geographical area.9 Notice that – once in-
cluding log geographical area as well – we may interpret the coeﬃcient of
log population density as reﬂecting the elasticity with respect to population
size. The independency ratio is the best measure available to capture the
relative size of the working-age population in a region. Including log area
along with population density also provides a measure of the relative abun-
dance of land as such, which may be used relatively intensively in some of
the sectors MNEs operate in.10,11
Research at the aggregate level has further pointed to the role of physical
capital for MNEs’ plant set-up (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Since
data on capital stocks are not available at the regional level, the best we
can do to proxy for capital is to include the log gross investment share (in
total expenditures) of a municipality. In line with previous theoretical work,
we expect that larger gross investments – reﬂecting bigger local stocks of
9One might think of distance to a metropolitan area as a further possible determinant.
However, this is highly correlated with geographical area and population in the cross-
section, and it is wiped out by the method applied with panel data. Therefore, we do not
include this variable.
10There are various ways of specifying these inﬂuences. For instance, including log pop-
ulation and log area obtains identical results to those where we use population density
and log area. This has to do with the chosen functional form of the regression models.
Similarly, using the area covered with buildings and streets (instead of log total geograph-
ical area) along with the log share of area reserved for building obtains similar results.
However, the models we propose later on are less prone to multi-collinearity than the latter
one.
11Another strand of research includes market potential – i.e., some inverse-trade-cost-
weighted average of market size of other regions as a determinant of ﬁrm location (see
Head and Mayer, 2004). However, due to the lack of data on municipality-level GDP, we
may not employ such a measure here.
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capital in equilibrium – positively aﬀect the inclination of foreign MNEs to
locate in a German municipality. For similar reasons, we include the fraction
of land area covered with infrastructure (buildings and streets). We also
include the log land price per square meter in Euro to proxy for the quality
of infrastructure.
Finally, we may be concerned about structural diﬀerences between Western
and Eastern German municipalities in their ability to attract foreign MNEs.
To capture the latter, we include an indicator variable which takes a value
of zero for municipalities in the former Western Germany and a value of one
for municipalities in the New La¨nder.12 Since the available infrastructure in
Germany’s New La¨nder was and still is of a lower quality, on average, than
in the Old La¨nder in the sample period, we expect the parameter of this
variable to take a negative sign.
1.4 Data
The data on MNE activity come from Deutsche Bundesbank’sMicro-Database
Direct Investment (MiDi). All German ﬁrms with a balance sheet total of
more than 3 million Euro in which foreign investors hold 10% or more of the
12Overall, Germany consists of 16 La¨nder. Of those, the following 11 are located in the
former Western German part of the country (the Old La¨nder): Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Bay-
ern, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-
Pfalz, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. The following 5 La¨nder are located in the for-
mer Eastern German part of the country (the New La¨nder): Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thu¨ringen.
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shares or voting rights are required by law to report to Deutsche Bundes-
bank balance sheet information as well as information on the sector, legal
form, and number of employees.13 Indirect participating interests are to be
reported whenever nonresidents hold more than 50% in a domestic ﬁrm and
these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the shares or
voting rights in other domestic enterprises. An appealing feature of this
data-set is that it comprises the universe of inward FDI (above the reporting
threshold) undertaken in Germany. For each foreign-owned, legally indepen-
dent ﬁrm, we know its location (municipality) in Germany. The number of
MNEs located in a municipality is our ﬁrst measure of MNE activity. Two
additional measures capture the size of the ﬁrms’ operations in terms of their
employment and ﬁxed assets. Note that employment and ﬁxed assets are re-
ported as part of the Germany-wide balance sheet of legally independent
foreign-owned ﬁrms and thus refer to their activity not only at the main
location, but possibly also at further (legally dependent) locations across
Germany (if there are any).14
13The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
For details and a documentation on the micro-level data set MiDi see Lipponer (2008).
14Each legally independent ﬁrm that is owned abroad is associated with one address in
MiDi. The address in Germany notiﬁed to Deutsche Bundesbank either refers to a unit of
a foreign MNE with only a single plant in Germany or one with other legally dependent
locations in case of a multi-plant structure in Germany. If a foreign investor owns several
legally independent aﬃliates in Germany, we observe the location of each one. To give an
example, if the Austrian controlled Egger Inc. with headquarters in Munich owns 100% in
Merlo Ltd. and Merlo Ltd. is a legal entity of its own, Merlo Ltd. also needs to report. In
contrast, legally dependent branches of a foreign-owned ﬁrm report no separate balance
sheet information. Note that diﬀerent aﬃliates and branches can be located within the
same town (for instance, Siemens has many diﬀerent units in Munich), in which case the
same tax rate applies.
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The fact that MNE employment and ﬁxed assets cannot be fully attributed
to the location of the legally independent unit poses a challenge with regard
to multi-location ﬁrms. Unfortunately, the MiDi data do not reveal which
MNEs are single-location ﬁrms and which are multi-location ﬁrms, so we
cannot run separate regressions for the two groups of ﬁrms.
We therefore have to address the issue of multi-location ﬁrms diﬀerently. To
do so, we draw additional information from the Monthly Survey of Plants
in Manufacturing and Mining (own translation of Monatsbericht fu¨r Betriebe
im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sowie Bergbau und Gewinnung von Steinen und
Erden) in Germany that is held at the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce
in Wiesbaden. This survey covers both national ﬁrms as well as MNEs in
MiDi.15 At the descriptive level, this survey reveals that the vast majority of
manufacturing ﬁrms with more than 20 employees in Germany (more than
three quarters of all ﬁrms) are single-plant ﬁrms. Only 16.4% of ﬁrms have
plants in two (or more) of the 16 German states. Admittedly, we cannot
exclude the possibility that MNEs are more likely to be multi-location ﬁrms
than the average ﬁrm.16 Multi-location ﬁrms are of interest for a second
reason: the German tax law stipulates formula apportionment: ﬁrm proﬁts
to be taxed are apportioned to each municipality according to the share of
payroll paid there.17
15German law does not allow us to merge, at the ﬁrm level, the survey data with the MiDi
data. Hence, we can only draw information on “representative ﬁrms” per municipality.
16However, we know from German MNEs’ outbound activity that the median German
MNE hosts a single foreign aﬃliate per country in every year since 1996, and 80.6% of the
ﬁrms run only a single foreign aﬃliate per country. Hence, we conjecture that a similar
pattern prevails for inbound MNE activity.
17See the German business tax law, in particular, §29 GewStG (Gewerbesteuergesetz).
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We address the issue of multi-location ﬁrms and formula apportionment by
computing a municipality-speciﬁc formula-apportioned tax rate (FATAX) of
the representative multi-location ﬁrm in each municipality. We deﬁne the
latter as the average business tax rate paid by a representative ﬁrm located
in municipality 푖 which takes account of the structure and distribution of
production activities across municipalities in Germany. To obtain the FA-
TAX of municipality 푖 in year 푡 on the basis of the Monthly Survey of Plants
in Manufacturing and Mining in Germany, we proceeded as follows. First,
we identiﬁed all ﬁrms with a production plant in municipality 푖 and year 푡.
Second, we identiﬁed the set 퐽푖푡 of all municipalities which hosted ﬁrms with
one or more plants in municipality 푖 at time 푡. Let us use acronym 푤푓푖푗푡 ≥ 0
with the following deﬁnition: 푤푓푖푗푡 = 0 for any ﬁrm which does not have a
production site in 푖 at time 푡 and 푤푓푖푗푡 ≥ 0 is ﬁrm 푓 ’s wage bill in 푗 otherwise.
All ﬁrms with a production site in 푖 have a wage bill 푤푓푖푖푡 > 0 there. All
ﬁrms which have a plant in 푖 and possibly elsewhere but not in 푗 ∕= 푖 have
푤푓푖푗푡 = 0. Then, 퐵푖푗푡 =
∑
푓 푤푓푖푗푡 is the total wage bill of all 푖-based ﬁrms
across municipalities 푗 in year 푡. It may be viewed as the 푖푗-th entry of an
푁 ×푁 matrix 퐵푡 for year 푡, where 푁 is the number of municipalities. Deﬁne
푊푖푗푡 = 퐵푖푗푡(
∑
푗
∑
푓 푤푓푖푗푡)
−1 as the 푖푗-th element of the 푁×푁 matrix푊푡 and
note that 푊푡 may be viewed as a row-sum-normalized counterpart to 퐵푡. All
elements in a row sum up to unity and, hence, the entries across columns in
a row of 푊푡 reﬂect shares of the wage bill of all ﬁrms with plants in 푖 across
municipalities 푗 in year 푡. If there were only single-plant ﬁrms in Germany,
both 퐵푡 and 푊푡 would be diagonal matrices. More speciﬁcally, 푊푡 would
then be an identity matrix of size 푁 . In the data, these matrices do have
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positive oﬀ-diagonal elements and neither of them is symmetric. We use 푊푡
to premultiply the 푁 × 1 vector of original business tax rates across munic-
ipalities, 푇퐴푋푡, to generate the 푁 × 1 vector 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푡 = 푊푡푇퐴푋푡 whose
typical element is 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡. 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푡 is a vector of weighted tax rates
consistent with formula apportionment for the representative ﬁrm in 푖 and
year 푡. We will generally provide results based on 푇퐴푋 and, alternatively,
퐹퐴푇퐴푋.
Data on variables capturing other determinants of MNE location are drawn
from several further sources. Municipality-level data on the qualiﬁcation of
employees were compiled on special request based on the universe of German
social-security records of the German Federal Labor Agency (Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit). The observations are the universe of workers registered for un-
employment insurance, representing around 80% of the German workforce.18
Our skill measure is the share of workers with tertiary school education in
municipality 푖 and year 푡.
Municipality-level data on business tax rates, population, geographical area,
the independency ratio, the fraction of land area covered with buildings and
streets (a measure of available infrastructure), and gross investments are pro-
vided by diﬀerent federal statistical oﬃces of the 16 German states (La¨nder)
in the database Statistik Lokal distributed by the German Statistical Oﬃce
(Statistisches Bundesamt).
18Coverage includes full- and part-time workers of private enterprises, apprentices, and
other trainees, as well as temporarily suspended employment relationships. Civil servants,
student workers, and self-employed individuals are excluded and make up the remaining
20% of the formal-sector labor force.
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As mentioned before, there are two advantages of looking at location choices
at the sub-national level. One is that ﬁrms face a much more homogeneous
institutional setting across municipalities within a country than at the inter-
national level. Another advantage of using sub-national data is that one may
account more accurately for the heterogeneity of locations. Cross-country
data use national averages that might suﬀer from aggregation bias.19 By
looking at the smallest regional unit (municipalities), aggregation bias is
ruled out.
In Germany, there are over 12, 000 municipalities. For 11, 200 of those, we
have a panel data-set of the dependent and explanatory variables over the
period 2001 to 2005 with at least two consecutive observations in the sample
period.20 Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the whole panel data-
set covering annual data over 2001-2005. Altogether, one obtains 39, 124
observations after eliminating ones where explanatory variables are missing.
As indicated before, for each of the covered 11, 200 municipalities at least
two consecutive years are available. Across all years, only 6, 073 observations
– or somewhat less than 16% – pertained to municipality-year dyads with
a positive number of foreign MNEs (i.e, where 푦푖푡 > 0 independent of the
outcome considered).
19Consider two countries A and B with identical national averages. For instance, country
A might have a skilled labor force but a bad infrastructure in one half of the country
and a good infrastructure but unskilled labor in the other half of the country. Country
B, in contrast, might have both skilled labor and a good infrastructure in one half of the
country and neither skilled labor nor a good infrastructure in the other half of the country.
These sub-national diﬀerences might matter for aggregate outcomes, but are washed out
in national aggregates.
20The diﬀerence between the total number of more than 12,000 municipalities and the
smaller one in the panel data-set accrues to lacking data on some of the explanatory
variables for municipalities in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (except for the six
Kreisfreie Sta¨dte – i.e., larger cities – in that state: Greifswald, Neubrandenburg, Rostock,
Schwerin, Stralsund, and Wismar).
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Figure 1.1 shows a histogram of the number of legally independent foreign-
owned ﬁrms across all municipalities in 2005. Whereas 86% of the municipal-
ities did not host a single foreign MNE, six municipalities (Hamburg, Munich,
Frankfurt, Du¨sseldorf, Berlin, and Cologne) hosted more than 200 each in
that year. Altogether, the latter six municipalities hosted almost one-third
of all foreign-owned ﬁrms in Germany in that year. Figure 1.2 illustrates the
geographical distribution of foreign MNEs using a map of Germany.21
21For reasons of conﬁdentiality and as mentioned in the notes to Figure 1.2, we may
only display data for municipalities with three or more MNEs. For that reason we decided
against a representation of data on employment or ﬁxed assets in terms of a map.
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of number of foreign aﬃliates in a municipality
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Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). See main text for
details.
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Figure 1.2: Geographical distribution of foreign aﬃliates
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Note: For reasons of conﬁdentiality, we may only display data for municipalities with
three or more headquarters. Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase Direct
Investment (MiDi). See main text for details.
For the same cross section of our panel data-set in 2005, we may visualize the
simple correlation between the presence of foreign MNEs, employment, and
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ﬁxed assets with the business tax rate in German municipalities unconditional
on other determinants of location by means of simple scatter plots.
In Figure 1.3 a, c, and e we consider the relationship for all municipalities,
including ones with no foreign MNEs (푦푖푡 = 0). In Figure 1.3 b, d, and f we
illustrate it only for municipalities with a positive number of foreign MNEs
(푦푖푡 > 0). Irrespective of which of the ﬁgures we look at, the unconditional
relationship between business tax rates and outcome looks to be weakly pos-
itive, if anything. Do municipalities with higher business tax rates attract a
larger number of foreign-owned ﬁrms? This sounds counter-intuitive. How-
ever, conditional on other factors – such as the availability of skilled workers,
region size, a relatively large fraction of population in working-age, etc. –
high business tax rates may well be harmful for MNE location, irrespective
of the unconditional relationship in Figure 1.3. We may refer to the source
of the positive relationship between the number of foreign-owned ﬁrms and
the local business tax rate in Figure 1.3 as one of endogeneity of business tax
rates – i.e., their correlation with observable or unobservable determinants
of the number of foreign-owned ﬁrms, as well as their employees, and their
assets held per municipality. To reduce or avoid this endogeneity bias, we
now turn to various forms of multivariate regression analysis.
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Figure 1.3: Scatter plots
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1.5 Econometric issues
Regarding the econometric analysis of the dependent variables of interest,
two issues of the data are particularly relevant. First, there is a large num-
ber of zeros across municipalities in every given year. Hence, a randomly
drawn municipality has a low chance (14 percent) of attracting one or more
foreign-owned ﬁrms. Second, municipalities may set their taxes speciﬁcally
to attract foreign ﬁrms. The former requires estimation of models which can
deal with disproportionate amounts of zeros in the data and the latter call for
an approach which avoids or at least reduces the endogeneity bias of business
tax rates on the outcome.
We address these problems in a number of ways. First, we estimate cross
section models for count data using the last available year of data, 2005.
Second, we estimate ﬁxed eﬀects panel data models which exploit the time
variation in the outcome variables within each municipality. In both cases we
allow for endogenous municipal taxes, which are instrumented by weighted
averages (within a certain distance radius) of characteristics of the neighbor-
ing municipalities.22 Empirical tax competition models unequivocally model
tax rates in some unit 푖 as a weighted function of tax rates in non-푖 units.
Such models may be referred to as spatial econometric frameworks, where ob-
servations are cross-sectionally dependent. The corresponding reduced form
of tax rates can then be portrayed as a nonlinear weighted function, where
22A detailed description of the instruments used in each regression is found in sections
1.6.1 and 1.6.2
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푖’s tax rate depends on characteristics of 푖 as well as of weighted character-
istics of non-푖 units (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Kelejian, Prucha, and
Yuzefovich, 2004).
1.5.1 Cross section models for count data
The number of foreign-owned ﬁrms is in fact a count variable. The most
frequently applied count data model is the Poisson regression model.23 It is
obtained by assuming that each realization of the count dependent variable
푦푖 for cross-sectional observation 푖 is drawn from a Poisson distribution with
parameter 휆(푥푖; 훽) = 푒푥푝(푥푖훽), where 푥푖 is a 1 × 퐾 vector of explanatory
variables (which includes 푇퐴푋푖푡 or, alternatively, 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡) and 훽 the cor-
responding 퐾×1 vector of regression parameters. The conditional mean and
variance are simultaneously determined by the parameter 휆(푥푖; 훽):
퐸(푦푖∣푥푖) = 푉 푎푟(푦푖∣푥푖) = 푒푥푝(푥푖훽).
This last feature of the Poisson distribution (referred to as equi-dispersion, or
equality of mean and variance) renders the Poisson regression model often too
restrictive in applications. In particular, the model tends to under-predict the
frequency of zeros and of large counts for data in which the actual variance is
larger than the mean (referred to as over-dispersion). In our application, we
have both a large number of zeros and a few very large counts so that over-
23For a thorough discussion of the count data models described in this section, see
Winkelmann (2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
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dispersion is likely a problem. A possibly suitable model in this case is the
negative binomial model (NB). This model is obtained by setting 휆푖 = 휇푖휈푖,
where 휇푖 = 푒푥푝(푥푖훽) and 휈푖 > 0 is a gamma-distributed disturbance term
with 퐸(휈푖) = 1 and 푉 푎푟(휈푖) = 훼. The conditional mean and variance of the
NB model are24
퐸(푦푖∣푥푖) = 휇푖 푉 푎푟(푦푖∣푥푖) = 휇푖(1 + 훼휇푖)
thus allowing for over-dispersion and providing a good ﬁt to many types of
data.
For data like ours, with 86% of zero observations in 2005, a zero-inﬂated
(ZI) model – which assumes an extra proportion of zeros additionally to the
zero observations arising from the count data distribution – should ﬁt the
data even better. Zeros are allowed to occur as an outcome of two diﬀerent
regimes. In one regime the outcome will always be zero and in the other
one the standard count process is at work resulting in either zero or positive
values.25
24The model with this particular parametrization is known as NB type-II model (see
Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
25The model combines a binary variable describing the probability of extra zeros with
a standard count variable. The probability function is given by
푓(푦푖) =
{
휔푖 + (1− 휔푖)푔(푦푖 = 0) if 푦 = 0 ,
(1− 휔푖)푔(푦푖 ∣ 푦푖 > 0) if 푦 ≥ 1,
where, for instance, 휔푖 can be a logit and 푔(푦푖) a NB density. In our application, the binary
process reﬂects the economic suitability of a municipality for hosting a foreign MNE at
all, and the conditional mean of the count process describes the number of foreign-owned
ﬁrms that are actually attracted given a municipality’s general suitability for foreign MNE
location.
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Such models (including Poisson, NB, and ZI versions thereof) can be esti-
mated by the maximum likelihood method. Both the NB model and the
ZI-NB model assume that business tax rates are exogenous. If the average
municipality altered business tax rates to attract foreign MNEs, assuming
exogeneity could be hardly tenable.26 Mullahy (1997) derives moment con-
ditions for generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of count data
models with endogenous regressors and valid instruments. We use Mullahy’s
approach with cross-sectional data under the assumption of endogenous tax
rates.
1.5.2 Fixed eﬀects panel data models
Eventually, one might doubt the possibility to circumvent the endogeneity
problem in a cross section at all. In particular, one could push things further
and assume that any information contained in the stock of legally indepen-
dent foreign-owned ﬁrms hosted in a municipality could lead to endogeneity.
Focusing on new headquarters could help reducing the endogeneity bias in
tax rates signiﬁcantly. For this, we resort to ﬁxed eﬀects panel data analysis.
The corresponding models for municipality 푖 in year 푡 about outcome 푦푖푡 may
26Notice that this is more than to say that municipalities use business tax rates to
attract ﬁrms in general. In our application, the average municipality is not able to attract
any foreign MNEs. This may be seen as an indication that the attraction of such ﬁrms is
not the most important (or even an impossible) policy objective of the average German
municipality. Hence, we expect the endogeneity issue as subordinate, here. However, we
mention and apply suitable methods for completeness and as a robustness check to the
conventional count data models.
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be characterized as
푦푖푡 = 푥푖푡훽 + 휇푖 + 푢푖푡 (1.1)
where 푖 is an index for municipalities, 푡 = 1, ...푇 is an index for time with
푇 = 5 denoting the number of years our panel covers (2001-2005), 푥푖푡 is
a 1 × 퐾 vector of explanatory variables (one of them being 푇퐴푋푖푡 or, al-
ternatively, 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡), 훽 is a corresponding 퐾 × 1 parameter vector, 휇푖
is a ﬁxed municipality-speciﬁc eﬀect, and 푢푖푡 is a time-variant idiosyncratic
disturbance term.27
Fixed eﬀects estimation of (1.1) identiﬁes the parameter vector 훽 by exploit-
ing the time variation in 푦푖푡. In general, the model in (1.1) will be based only
on municipalities for which 푦푖푡 ∕= 푦푖푠 at least for one tuple 푡, 푠. Furthermore,
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation of (1.1) is immune against correlation of the elements
in 푥푖푡 with 휇푖 + 푢푖푡 as long as this correlation involves only 휇푖 but not 푢푖푡.
Hence, that model reduces problems of endogeneity of 푇퐴푋푖푡 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡
by allowing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with
the tax variables.
While some of the panel data regressions involve the strictly nonnegative 푦푖푡
as dependent variable, others will be based upon ln 푦푖푡.
28 In the former case,
the number of covered observations will be much larger than in the latter
27In principal, ﬁxed eﬀects model estimation is possible with nonlinear models such as
Poisson, NB, or ZI versions thereof. However, it turns out that pooling cross-section and
time-series data in a short panel such as ours leads to convergence problems with maximum
likelihood estimation. Since we are mostly interested in conditional means, we therefore
employ linear models and truncated models with sample selection in this case.
28In our context the problem of a large mass of zeros in the data is greatly reduced for
estimation of 훽 in models involving ln 푦푖푡 instead of 푦푖푡.
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case. The parameters are not directly comparable between models using
푦푖푡 and those using ln 푦푖푡. In the latter case, the parameters on 푇퐴푋푖푡 and
퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡 are semi-elasticities,
29 while in the former case they are not.30 In
any case, log-transformation of 푦푖푡 leads to a truncated sample about which
– given that the number of zeros in 푦푖푡 is relatively large – the assumption
of random selection of municipalities into positive numbers of foreign-owned
ﬁrms may be called into question.
Although the bias associated with either sample selection or endogeneity of
푇퐴푋푖푡 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡 is mitigated to some extent by ﬁxed eﬀects estimation
of (1.1), it is unlikely fully removed. For this reason, for models with 푦푖푡 as
dependent variables, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects two-stage least squares model
assuming that 푇퐴푋푖푡 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡 is correlated with 푢푖푡 (see Baltagi, 2008).
When using a truncated sample in models which involve ln 푦푖푡 instead of 푦푖푡,
we follow an established literature in econometrics that model participation
(the process of 푦푖푡 = 0 versus 푦푖푡 > 0) and outcome (the process of 푦푖푡 > 0)
by a bivariate model (see Wooldridge, 2002, or Cameron and Trivedi, 1998,
for an overview).31 Speciﬁcally, we follow the approach of Wooldridge (1995)
as adapted for endogenous regressors by Semykina and Wooldridge (2005)
to account for endogeneity of 푇퐴푋푖푡 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋푖푡 in the ﬁxed eﬀects model
(1.1) based on ln 푦푖푡.
29Then, a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate induces a one-hundredth change
in ln 푦푖푡.
30Then, a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate induces a one-hundredth change
in 푦푖푡.
31An alternative to a selection model which rests on somewhat stronger assumptions
would be a two-part approach which models zero-versus-positive 푦푖푡 and positive 푦푖푡 as
two independent processes.
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1.6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we will analyze the determinants of the location of foreign-
owned ﬁrms across municipalities in Germany. We will primarily focus on
numbers of such ﬁrms per municipality as an outcome in cross section and
ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regressions. However, in an extension we will consider
other outcomes such as employment or ﬁxed assets of foreign-owned ﬁrms.
1.6.1 Cross section models
We start by estimating models on the cross-sectional data-set and assume
that the matrix of explanatory variables includes – apart from 푇퐴푋 or
퐹퐴푇퐴푋 – the following variables: 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿 (the log share of employees with
a tertiary education), 푃푂푃퐷퐸푁 (the log population density), 퐴푅퐸퐴 (the
log total area of the municipality in square kilometers), 퐼퐷퐸푃푅퐴푇 (the log
independency ratio, deﬁned as the population aged 15-64 divided by the to-
tal population), 퐵푈퐼퐿푇 (the log fraction of area in a municipality which is
covered by buildings and streets), 퐼푁푉 (the log share of investment expendi-
tures of the municipality in total expenditures), 퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸 (the log land price
per square meter in Euro), and 퐸퐴푆푇 (a dummy for municipalities located
in the New La¨nder, i.e., in the former Eastern German part of the country).
While Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the covariates included in
the analysis across all years 2001-2005, the ones for the cross section of 2005
as used in this subsection are very similar.
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We generally use once-lagged values of the explanatory variables in the econo-
metric models. Hence, we employ values for 2004 on the right-hand side of
all cross-section models. This is to avoid any bias associated with contem-
poraneous shocks in the dependent and the explanatory variables. Since all
explanatory variables except for 푇퐴푋 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 and 퐸퐴푆푇 are in logs,
all but those variables’ parameters can be interpreted as elasticities. Table
1.3 summarizes the corresponding regression results.
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The numbers in Table 1.3 indicate that the over-dispersion parameter is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Hence, the negative binomial model is better
suited for the data and speciﬁcation at hand than the Poisson model (see
Winkelmann, 2003; and Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). With the fairly large
fraction of zeros in the dependent variable, a separate modeling of the zero
threshold is recommended.
Regarding the covariates, we ﬁnd that larger municipalities (퐴푅퐸퐴) with
a greater population density (푃푂푃퐷퐸푁), a higher skill endowment ratio
(푆퐾퐼퐿퐿), and a larger fraction of infrastructure (퐵푈퐼퐿푇 ) are more suc-
cessful in attracting foreign MNEs. These eﬀects are consistent with pre-
dictions from the theoretical literature on MNE location (Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Barba
Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Given everything else, German municipali-
ties in the Old La¨nder are more successful in attracting foreign MNEs than
municipalities in the New La¨nder (East). In contrast to our expectations,
land prices (퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸) and MNE activity are positively correlated. This
could be interpreted in two ways: 퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸 could reﬂect the quality of
infrastructure, which we do not have good controls for; or 퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸 is en-
dogenous to foreign MNE location. However, the latter is not quite likely,
since the average exposure of municipalities to foreign-owned ﬁrms is quite
low. Other covariates except tax rates do not display an important impact
on foreign MNE location.32
32One might add spatially lagged control variables to the models estimated. However,
this strategy leads to convergence problems in the nonlinear cross section models, arguably
due to multicollinearity with the tax rates (tax rates are a function of spatially lagged
exogenous variables in nonlinear tax competition models such as ours), and they would be
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Table 1.3: Cross section 2005
Zero-Inﬂated
Negative Binomial Negative Binomial IV Poisson
No. FO ﬁrms (S) No. FO ﬁrms (S) No. FO ﬁrms (S)
TAX -12.893*** - -6.825** - -59.738*** -
(2.407) (2.730) (22.273)
FATAX - -6.522** - -5.465* - -49.220***
(2.510) (3.253) (23.590)
SKILL 0.588*** 0.590*** 0.730*** 0.739*** 0.643*** 0.511***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.081) (0.081) (0.219) (0.164)
POPDEN 0.879*** 0.816*** 0.269** 0.242* 0.693*** 0.597***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.122) (0.125) (0.239) (0.225)
AREA 1.190*** 1.154*** 0.792*** 0.761*** 1.507*** 1.517***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.049) (0.045) (0.131) (0.136)
IDEPRAT 1.192 1.199 1.128 1.030 -3.717 -3.468
(0.868) (0.886) (1.189) (1.191) (2.865) (2.726)
BUILT 0.959*** 1.003*** 1.060*** 1.076*** 1.849*** 2.024***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.178) (0.180) (0.304) (0.294)
INV 0.324 0.049 -0.042 -0.040 -0.040 -0.006
(0.045) (0.045) (0.054) (0.054) (0.147) (0.141)
LPRICE 0.298*** 0.320*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.240 0.396**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.192) (0.154)
EAST -0.500*** -0.465*** -0.968*** -0.952*** 0.384 0.513
(0.126) (0.128) (0.133) (0.134) (0.431) (0.408)
푐표푛푠푡푎푛푡 -6.384*** -6.927*** -2.488*** -2.399*** -1.929 -3.914
(0.730) (0.738) (0.766) (0.797) (3.353) (3.355)
Wald 4,712.880 4,566.290 1,601.590 1,663.300
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood -5,379.003 -5,437.092 -5,255.841 -5,259.002
Observations 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048
Nonzero obs. 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates of the respective regression models. Robust standard er-
rors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All explanatory variables are lagged once. In columns 5 and 6, TAX and FATAX instrumented.
The instruments used are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets,
the share of agricultural area, and the total area (all in logs) for (i) all municipalities within a
radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given municipality and for (ii) all municipalities
within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given municipality. The lower part of the
table reports the Wald (휒2) test statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors and its p-value,
the pseudo log-likelihood, the number of observations, and the number of groups (municipalities).
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In all models of Table 1.3, 푇퐴푋 and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 exert a negative impact on the
outcome. Hence, controlling for the suggested determinants of foreign MNE
location eliminates a large part of the bias in the unconditional relationships
portrayed in Figures 1.3. In Table 1.3, the estimated parameter of inter-
est is unambiguously statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at least at
10% conventional levels. In the zero-inﬂated negative binomial model, the
parameter estimates on 푇퐴푋 and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 are lower than in the simple neg-
ative binomial models. However, this should be interpreted with care, since
now extra weight is given to zero outcomes relative to the simple negative
binomial models. However, the parameters on 푇퐴푋 and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 diﬀer in
both the negative binomial and the corresponding IV Poisson models.33 In
every one of the estimated models in Table 1.3 is the parameter on 퐹퐴푇퐴푋
lower than its counterpart on 푇퐴푋. This could be consistent with a lower
inclination of foreign-owned ﬁrms to have a multi-plant organization across
municipalities in Germany than this is the case for average German ﬁrms.
Among the cross section models, we consider the IV Poisson model to be the
preferred approach, since it addresses the potential endogeneity of business
tax rates.34 With univariate models assuming an exogeneity of tax rates,
insigniﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data models.
33The identifying instruments behind the reduced-form models used for 푇퐴푋 and
퐹퐴푇퐴푋 are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets, the
share of agricultural area, and the total area (all in logs) for (i) all municipalities within a
radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given municipality and for (ii) all mu-
nicipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given municipality. They
are individually and jointly signiﬁcant at the one percent level in all ﬁrst-stage models.
This is not surprising, since what we estimate there is a reduced-form version of a tax
competition model which is known to work well at the national and sub-national level.
34We are not aware of IV versions of the NB and ZI-NB models, hence we only present
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one might expect that the estimated responsiveness of outcomes to tax rates
overestimates the true causal impact. For instance, this would be the case, if
municipalities competed over MNEs via low tax rates, and MNEs successfully
lobbied for low tax rates in a municipality which they would have picked
anyway for reasons other than local taxes. However, the direction of the
endogeneity bias is generally unclear in a multivariate setting as ours. With
the data and speciﬁcations at hand, the point estimates suggest that the
tax responsiveness is biased towards some positive value in models assuming
exogeneity of tax rates in Table 1.3.
How big is the impact of business tax rates on outcomes? For this, consider a
one-percentage-point change in 푇퐴푋 of the negative binomial model. Such
a change induces an outcome response by about 12%. The unconditional
mean of the number of aﬃliates is 0.772. Of that, 12% is about 0.09. Hence,
the average municipality would have to reduce its tax rate by about 11 (of an
average level of 14) percentage points to attract a single foreign-owned ﬁrm.
The IV Poisson model suggests that MNEs are somewhat more responsive
than that. There, a one-percentage-point reduction in 푇퐴푋 raises the stock
of MNEs by about 60 percent, i.e., by 0.45 legally independent foreign-owned
ﬁrms. Hence, the average municipality would have to reduce its business tax
rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its average level.35 From
IV Poisson models.
35Notice that such a municipality would (so far) earn all of its business tax revenues
from domestic ﬁrms. Hence, it would have to forego 15% of its tax revenues from such
ﬁrms in exchange for additional tax revenues of a single foreign-owned unit. Later on,
we will provide estimates suggesting that a 2.2 percentage-point reduction in the business
tax rate would raise employment in foreign-owned ﬁrms by less than 157. Hence, the tax
revenue loss from domestic ﬁrms would unlikely balance the tax revenue gains from the one
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that perspective, it seems remarkably diﬃcult for the average municipality
to attract foreign ﬁrms. However, this is consistent with the fact that most
municipalities indeed do not attract foreign MNEs at all.
1.6.2 Fixed eﬀects panel models
We start by estimating linear models on the panel data-set involving out-
comes in levels, 푦푖푡, as well as sample selection models as proposed by Se-
mykina and Wooldridge (2005) involving ln 푦푖푡 as the dependent variable.
The former avoids dropping zero values of the outcome while the latter con-
trols for selection and truncation. With 푦푖푡 as the dependent variable, the
parameters of log-transformed variables represent the impact of a unitary
log-change on the level of the outcome. With ln 푦푖푡 such parameters repre-
sent elasticities.36 We are primarily interested in the impact of business tax
rates (푇퐴푋 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋) on outcomes. These tax rates are measured as
ratios. Hence, a one-percentage point increase in 푇퐴푋 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 leads to
a response of 푦푖푡 by one-hundredth of the parameter value and to one of ln 푦푖푡
by one percent (a semi-elasticity). Table 1.4 summarizes the results for the
two linear and the sample selection panel data models using the numbers of
foreign-owned ﬁrms per municipality in 푦푖푡 and ln 푦푖푡.
new foreign-owned ﬁrm, even when assuming that there is no substitution in employment
between foreign-owned and domestic ﬁrms.
36Since inverse Mills ratios are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, we may refrain
from discussing issues with the nonlinearity of selection models and the corresponding
nonlinearity of marginal eﬀects. Rather, we may interpret the parameter in the outcome
equation as to directly reﬂect the impact of 푇퐴푋 or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 on the conditional mean of
the outcome of interest.
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Table 1.4: Panel 2001-2005
Fixed-eﬀects IV Sample selection IV
No. FO ﬁrms (N) ln(No. FO ﬁrms (N))
TAX -19.490* - -227.784*** -
(11.016) (83.183)
FATAX - -21.591 - -62.021**
(13.172) (24.605)
SKILL -3.5e-04 4.1e-04 0.590** 0.149
(0.018) (0.018) (0.306) (0.200)
POPDEN -0.027 -0.042 -3.239 -1.863
(0.145) (0.146) (2.267) (1.366)
IDEPRAT -0.032 -0.022 -10.961* -7.534
(0.249) (0.250) (6.218) (5.096)
BUILT -0.024 -0.020 2.712** 0.837
(0.081) (0.082) (1.285) (1.026)
INV -1.6e-04 -1.3e-04 -0.088 -0.053
(0.005) (0.005) (0.104) (0.069)
LPRICE -0.006 -0.006 0.112 -0.034
(0.014) (0.014) (0.159) (0.096)
IMR -0.046 0.165
(0.566) (0.366)
Wald 860.880 848.390 84.620 139.910
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen 5.841 6.141 0.946 2.069
p-value 0.119 0.105 0.814 0.558
Observations 39,124 39,124 941 941
Groups 11,200 11,200 680 680
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates of the respective regression models.
TAX and FATAX are instrumented. The instruments used are the averages
of the share of area covered with buildings and streets, the share of agricul-
tural area, the independency ratio, and the skilled labor share (all in logs) for
all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given
municipality. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio from a pooled probit model for
the probability of the dependent variable being positive, results upon request.
The probit model includes the share of agricultural area of the municipality
as an instrument that aﬀects selection. All regressions include time dummies.
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged once.
The lower part of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test statistic for joint signiﬁ-
cance of the regressors and its p-value, the Sargan-Hansen statistic for the null
hypothesis of validity of the excluded instruments and its p-value, the number
of observations, and the number of groups (municipalities).
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All second-stage models involve – apart from 푇퐴푋 (the simple business tax
rate) or 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 (the formula-apportioned business tax rate) – the following
explanatory variables: 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿 (the log share of employees with a tertiary
education), 푃푂푃퐷퐸푁 (the log population density), 퐴푅퐸퐴 (the log total
area of the municipality in square kilometers), 퐼퐷퐸푃푅퐴푇 (the log inde-
pendency ratio, deﬁned as the population aged 15-64 divided by the total
population), 퐵푈퐼퐿푇 (the log fraction of area in a municipality which is
covered by buildings and streets), 퐼푁푉 (the log share of investment expen-
ditures of the municipality in total expenditures), and 퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸 (the land
price per square meter in Euro). Mean and standard deviation for these as
well as the outcome variables are provided in Table 1.2.
The regressors in these models display a high level of joint signiﬁcance. The
identifying instruments behind the reduced-form models used for 푇퐴푋 and
퐹퐴푇퐴푋37 are individually (except for the weighted share of buildings) and
jointly signiﬁcant at less than one percent in any ﬁrst-stage model. The
reported over-identiﬁcation tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid.38
The numbers in Table 1.4 suggest the following results. First, recall that
the data underlying these models pertain to new locations of foreign-owned
37The instruments used are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and
streets, the share of agricultural area, the independency ratio, and the skilled labor share
(all in logs) for all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a
given municipality. In the sample selection model we include the share of agricultural area
of the municipality in the selection equation.
38That is, that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and
correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
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ﬁrms and they wipe out all time-constant factors (e.g., that a municipality is
regularly able to attract such ﬁrms for measurable or unmeasurable reasons).
As a consequence, this renders most of the independent variables insigniﬁcant
for such location decisions from year to year across municipalities. However,
this radical strategy is capable of reducing the bias from endogeneity of 푇퐴푋
and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 to a minimum. This is true for numbers of aﬃliates as well as
numbers of employees.
The covariates are not only insigniﬁcant because the between variation is
wiped out and they do not vary much over time. There is also some multi-
collinearity, since the covariates (after conditioning out the ﬁxed eﬀects) have
a jointly highly signiﬁcant impact on outcome 푦푖푡 and ln 푦푖푡. Interestingly,
the variation in 푇퐴푋 and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 is diﬀerent enough from the other re-
gressors to exhibit a signiﬁcant eﬀect in all models. The reason for the latter
is that these variables do not change continuously and gradually as 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿,
퐿푃푅퐼퐶퐸 or other regressors, which facilitates identiﬁcation of their eﬀect
on the outcome.
The panel data models do not suggest any qualitative change in the impact of
tax rates on location choice of foreign ﬁrms within Germany, relative to the
cross-section models. How does the quantitative impact of tax rates compare
with the cross-section results? For this, it is easiest to use the parameters
in the ﬁrst column of Table 1.4, since the selection models are nonlinear in
nature and the inverse Mills ratio terms are insigniﬁcant (suggesting that
selection is not important). According to the ﬁrst column of Table 1.4, if a
municipality wanted to attract one additional MNE, it would have to lower
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its tax rate by about 19.490−1 ≃ 5 percentage points or more than one-third
of the average level of 푇퐴푋 in the sample. This is about twice as much as
the eﬀect estimated from the IV Poisson model in Table 1.3. However, the
cross-section IV Poisson results may be viewed as responses that pertain to
the long run where we could expect MNEs to display a greater response to
tax rates than from year to year.
1.6.3 Sensitivity and extensions
In this subsection, we summarize the eﬀects from a variety of alternative
regressions. In particular, we use models for alternative types of MNEs (small
versus large units; ﬁrms which are held in countries with a tax credit system
versus all ﬁrms; non-holding and directly-held non-holding units instead of
all types of MNEs combined) as well as models with alternative outcomes. To
keep the discussion as short as possible, we only summarize the corresponding
coeﬃcients on 푇퐴푋 and 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 in Table 1.5.
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The upper panel of Table 1.5 pertains to cross section estimates so that
coeﬃcients should be compared to the last pair of columns in Table 1.3,
while the lower panel of Table 1.5 refers to panel data estimates and should
be compared to the last two columns in Table 1.4. The six columns refer
to six types of sensitivity checks. The ﬁrst four columns reﬂect parameter
estimates for sub-samples of diﬀerent MNE types, namely units with below-
median employment in the sample, units which are held in countries applying
a tax credit system, non-holding units, and directly-held non-holding units.
As in the previous tables, the outcome variable in these columns is a count
of foreign MNEs of the speciﬁc type in a municipality.
The last two columns display tax parameter estimates for two alternative
outcomes, namely employment and ﬁxed assets. Akin to the counts, we
use Poisson-type models for these outcomes in the cross section estimates
to avoid dropping zeros from the data. However, now these models are
pseudo-maximum-likelihood models. Again, we use selection models with
panel data, but the results are very similar to the ones of Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood models due to the lack of important correlation between
the latent process underlying the extensive municipality margin equation of
inward investment in Germany and the intensive margin model.
The ﬁgures in Table 1.5 suggest the following conclusions. First, the point es-
timates of the tax parameters are in almost all cases negative. The qualitative
insights from the models focusing on ﬁrms with below-median employment
are unchanged from the previous estimates.39 The results for ﬁrms which are
39Notice that the parameters should not be directly compared to the earlier estimates
Chapter 1 – How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity 45
held in tax credit countries are much less clear-cut than those for all ﬁrms.
One reason for that is that there are only 16 economies which unilaterally
apply a tax credit system and hold ﬁrms in Germany. Hence, there is a
considerably smaller fraction of municipalities with a positive foreign-owned
ﬁrm count in comparison to the original estimates. Moreover, following Hines
(1996) we would expect that ﬁrms originating from such countries should be
less sensitive to foreign taxation than others.
The point estimates for the number of foreign-owned non-holding and directly-
held non-holding units in the cross section are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Yet, the point estimates are somewhat smaller but also not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the ones based on the sample of all ﬁrms in the last pair of
columns of Table 1.3. The main reason for their insigniﬁcance relates to
the drop in the number of observations with positive outcomes so that these
models are harder to estimate than the ones in Table 1.3. When consider-
ing panel data estimates in the lower panel of Table 1.5, we ﬁnd, e.g., that
the parameter estimates for non-holding companies are quite similar to their
counterparts in the last two columns of Table 1.4. The point estimates diﬀer
slightly more (but not statistically so) when using directly-held non-holding
units with panel data.
Similar to counts of ﬁrms, the point estimates for employment and ﬁxed
assets for all types of MNEs are negative. However, only the one for employ-
ment when using 푇퐴푋 is estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the
cross section. With panel data, the eﬀects of business taxation on employ-
since the average number of such ﬁrms per municipality is much smaller than before.
Chapter 1 – How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity 46
ment or ﬁxed assets are better identiﬁable.
With the exception of the number of directly-held non-holding units as out-
come, the point estimates of 퐹퐴푇퐴푋 are smaller in absolute value than the
ones of 푇퐴푋. The latter may indicate that a municipality’s own tax may
be more important for the location decision even of multi-plant ﬁrms than
the one of other locations where units are based. This may be rationalized
as follows. First, we can expect foreign ﬁrms to typically enter the German
market with one unit and, eventually, to start forming a local tree of units
from that ﬁrst location so that mainly the ﬁrst location’s tax rate and less
so those of the branches are relevant for the location of legally independent
foreign-owned ﬁrms.40 Second, legally independent foreign-owned ﬁrms often
carry out important tasks and services not only for them but also for legally
dependent branches. Such tasks tend to involve high-skilled labor and sizable
wage bills so that the weight of independent units through formula apportion-
ment may be relatively high. Then, the business tax rate at the location of
an independent unit should be relatively important independent of whether
it is a stand-alone unit or it has independent subsidiaries attached to it.
One further extension would be to shed light on the variability of the esti-
mated tax (semi-)elasticities with observable determinants such as munici-
pality size, population density, or other determinants of MNE location. This
could be achieved by including interaction terms of business tax rates and
40MNEs tend to set up one aﬃliate at a time (see Egger, Fahn, Merlo, and Wamser,
2011). The unit by which ﬁrms explore a market upfront may likely develop the function
of a regional headquarter in the course of the development of a bigger foreign aﬃliate
network.
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other fundamentals. We have attempted to shed light on this matter by
involving municipality area and, alternatively, population density in inter-
action terms with TAX or FATAX. However, we encountered two problems
with this strategy. First, interaction terms between business tax rates and
other covariates are highly correlated with the main eﬀects of the interacted
variables since the latter tend to vary more strongly than business tax rates
do (see Table 1.1). Second, interaction terms which involve an endogenous
variable (such as business tax rates) are endogenous as is the main eﬀect of
TAX or FATAX. Hence, the number of endogenous variables which have to
be instrumented in a ﬁrst stage increases. Both issues lead to a dramatic loss
of precision so that neither the parameter on the main eﬀect of TAX or FA-
TAX nor the one on the interactive term can be estimated at conventionally
accepted signiﬁcance levels.
1.6.4 Estimated tax eﬀects in comparison to other work
Two fundamental diﬀerences between this paper and other work on proﬁt
tax eﬀects on MNE activity are the following. First, we focus on location
decisions or activity at the micro-regional level rather than the country or
macro-regional (such as state) level. Second, we mainly focus on the extensive
margin of activity in terms of numbers of ﬁrms that are held by foreign MNEs
rather than foreign direct investment.
By and large, the descriptive statistics and estimates provided in this paper
suggest that micro-regional units such as municipalities have to reduce tax
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rates on proﬁts much more dramatically to be able to attract any foreign-
owned ﬁrms than estimates at the country (see Hines, 1999; de Mooij and
Ederveen, 2003, 2006, 2008, for an overview) or even the macro-regional
level (see Slemrod, 1990; Hines, 1996) would suggest. Aggregate bilateral
FDI activity of MNEs is known to display a semi-elasticity of between -1 and
-3.5 according to the aforementioned work. Elasticities estimated from sub-
national macro-regional data are higher than those obtained at the aggregate
level (see Slemrod, 1990; Hines, 1996, for examples and de Mooij and Ed-
erveen, 2003, for pointing to this fact). In comparison to both country-level
and macro-regional work, the estimated business tax elasticities on foreign
investments in this paper are relatively high.
However, using regional data with a ﬁner granularity unveils that there is
an enormous heterogeneity in regional entities with regard to their ability to
attract foreign ﬁrms, which display a very high degree of subnational spatial
concentration. In spite of the high estimated tax elasticity, most German
municipalities would have to reduce their business tax rates for the sake of
attracting only a single foreign ﬁrm to an extent that does not seem ﬁnan-
cially viable. The latter suggests that tax competition for lumpy investments
is a game for a small number of municipalities. Our ﬁndings indicate that a
marginal reduction of business tax rates in the average municipality is not
enough to attract foreign MNEs. Municipality size and the availability of
workers, especially skilled workers, are important. Only those municipalities
which have a suﬃciently attractive non-tax environment for foreign MNEs
will be able to attract such ﬁrms by reasonable reductions in their tax rates.
Municipalities with less favorable non-tax environments would have to trade
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these oﬀ with unrealistically large reductions in the business tax rate. For
instance, the IV Poisson estimates in Table 1.3 imply that a one-percent re-
duction in business tax rates increases the number of foreign-owned ﬁrms in
a region by about 0.45. Hence, the preferred model indicates that the aver-
age municipality has to reduce its tax rate by about 15% (or 2.2 percentage
points) to attract a single such ﬁrm. The average municipality may not want
to do so, since the associated losses in tax income from national ﬁrms may
easily outweigh the expected raise of tax income collected from the foreign
MNE.
The elasticities on employees and ﬁxed assets in the upper block of Table
1.5 suggest that a 2.2 percentage-point reduction of the tax rate would raise
employment in foreign-owned ﬁrms by about 157 and ﬁxed assets by about
6.28 million Euro. For the average municipality not hosting a foreign-owned
ﬁrm prior to the reduction of the tax rate, these ﬁgures would represent
the stock of employees and ﬁxed assets of foreign-owned ﬁrms after the tax
reduction.
Suppose one would apply estimates of tax semi-elasticities (on FDI) as found
in country-level or macro-regional work in the literature, say, of −3.3 as in
de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) in order to predict numbers of foreign MNEs
in Germany. Recall that the corresponding semi-elasticity was about −60 in
the IV Poisson model. Then, a municipality would have to lower its business
tax rate by almost 40 percentage points or about 280% (i.e., way below zero;
corresponding to a business tax subsidy) in order to attract a single foreign-
owned ﬁrm. Even when applying this concept to ﬁxed assets rather than ﬁrm
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number counts, such an exercise clearly suggests that semi-elasticities which
are relatively robust across country-samples, time, and methods applied are
not applicable when considering micro-regional location decisions of foreign-
owned ﬁrms.
1.7 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence on the impact of proﬁt taxation for the location
of foreign-owned ﬁrms using data for more than 11, 000 German municipali-
ties. We link data on local public ﬁnance and other municipality characteris-
tics available from the German Statistical Oﬃce and the Federal Employment
Agency with ﬁrm-level data from the German Central Bank about inbound
foreign direct investments in Germany for the years 2001-2005.
One advantage of this data-set is that institutional characteristics and the
taxation of other factors are much more homogeneous across municipalities
within a country than in cross-country studies. Moreover, the number of mu-
nicipalities foreign MNEs may locate in is larger by more than one order of
magnitude than the number of countries for which proﬁt taxes are typically
available. So, the impact of proﬁt taxes on the location of legally indepen-
dent foreign-owned ﬁrms may be identiﬁed much more precisely than in an
international context.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the business tax rate levied by a municipality nega-
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tively aﬀects the number of MNEs it can attract as well as their employment
and ﬁxed assets invested. This impact is found after controlling for other
important determinants of a foreign MNE’s location decision. Irrespective
of whether we assume that business tax rates are endogenous or not, the
elasticities of numbers and magnitudes of investments to business tax rates
are reasonably high. As a matter of fact, the average German municipality
was not able to attract any legally independent foreign-owned ﬁrm at all
over the years covered by our data. Such a municipality would have to lower
its business tax rate by about 15 percent (or 2.2 percentage points) to lure
only one foreign MNE into its jurisdiction, according to our results. It is
very likely that the associated gains in taxes collected from the foreign MNE
would be lower than the losses the average municipality encountered from
foregone business tax revenues collected from national enterprises.
Obviously, most municipalities do not ﬁnd this attractive, since foreign cap-
ital is not the only important proﬁt tax base to consider. However, larger
municipalities with an abundant workforce, especially of skilled workers, may
attract foreign MNEs by much smaller changes in their tax rates. Implicitly,
these results suggest that municipalities with generally favorable environ-
ments for ﬁrm location should be able to use their tax rates more successfully
to attract foreign MNEs than those with less favorable environments.
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Abstract∗
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are one of the few policy instruments
countries can use to directly attract foreign investment. Previous research
aimed at a quantiﬁcation of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment
at aggregated levels only. By contrast, this paper delivers an anatomy of
BITs’ eﬀects on multinational activity at the micro level. We hope that
this strategy will improve our understanding of the precise channels through
which BITs determine aggregate investment. Using data on the foreign activ-
ity of the universe of German multinationals, we provide descriptive evidence
on changes in intensive and extensive margins of multinational ﬁrm activity
around the adoption of BITs. The results of multivariate empirical models
broadly support the hypotheses derived from a parsimonious model of het-
erogeneous ﬁrms on the eﬀects of BITs on diﬀerent margins of investment:
BITs raise the number of multinational ﬁrms active in a particular host coun-
try and have a positive eﬀect on the number of plants per ﬁrm, as well as on
FDI stocks and ﬁxed assets per ﬁrm.
2.1 Introduction
While tax policy and even trade policy are known to have an indirect im-
pact on multinational ﬁrms’ (MNEs’) location decisions, bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) constitute an instrument which is directly targeted towards
foreign investors. As with other bilateral agreements – such as modern pref-
erential trade agreements or environmental agreements – the cradle of BITs
lies in the 1950s: the ﬁrst BIT was adopted in 1959 between Germany and
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger. The corresponding paper “BITs
Bite: An Anatomy of the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Multinational Firms”
is forthcoming in Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Pakistan.1 Since then, BITs have been signed and ratiﬁed seemingly at an
exponential rate of growth which has not yet come to a halt: UNCTAD
(2000, p. 1) reports the number of BITs to be 165 by the end of 1979 and
1,857 at the end of 1999; almost 2,500 BITs have been concluded until the
end of 2005 (UNCTAD, 2006), in 2006 – on average – more than one BIT
was concluded per week (see Sauvant, 2008), and by the end of 2007 the total
number of BITs signed in the past was a stunning 2,608 (UNCTAD, 2008).
By June 2007, six countries had adopted 100 BITs or more, and this list
was headed by Germany with 135 BITs concluded (see Sachs and Sauvant,
2009a).
The matter of BITs is by now an intensively-studied topic.2 Yet, practi-
cally everything we know about their quantitative impact on the target they
aim for – foreign investments – is based on aggregate levels of analysis (see
Sauvant and Sachs, 2009b, for an overview and Hallward Driemeier, 2003;
1Just one year before that, in 1958, the Treaties of Rome entered into force among
the six members of the European Economic Community (EEC), EURATOM, and the
European Community on Steal and Coal (ECSC) which were the predecessors of today’s
European Union (EU). The ﬁrst multilateral environmental agreement has been concluded
in 1960 among 8 countries.
2The last years have seen a number of books on BITs and their role for foreign investors
(see UNCTAD, 1998, 2000, 2006; Chiswick-Patterson and Sauvant, 2008; Sauvant and
Sachs, 2009b). The number of articles in academic journals tells a similar story. A search
conducted on March 9, 2010, about the terms “Bilateral investment treaties” across all
journals and years covered by JSTOR gave 1,545 hits for all disciplines (211 hits for
economics only). Most of them pertained to articles published within the last decade.
A reﬁned search for an overlap of “Bilateral investment treaties” and “Foreign direct
investment” still gave 1,107 hits in all disciplines. Of those, 164 pertained to economics,
657 to political science, and 198 to law (obviously, these categories are not mutually
exclusive). A similar search for such an overlap in Google Scholar even gave 3,080 hits.
Even when considering all the problems associated with such crude routines, these numbers
are indicative of the broad research interest in the topic.
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Egger and Pfaﬀermayr, 2004; Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman, 2005; for recent examples).3
From a theoretical point of view, bilateral investments of MNEs should in-
crease with the adoption of BITs (see UNCTAD, 2000, 2006; Elkins, Guzman,
and Simmons, 2006; and others). According to Sachs and Sauvant (2009a, p.
36-37) the basic purpose of BITs from the perspective of capital-importing
countries is to “help to attract FDI ” while their purpose from the viewpoint
of capital-exporting countries is to “protect investors from political risks and
instability and, more generally, safeguard the investments made by its nation-
als in the territory of the other state.” Broadly speaking, empirical evidence
at the level of bilateral aggregate stocks of foreign investments on the eﬀects
of BITs is mixed (see Sauvant and Sachs, 2009b, for an overview). A host
of questions related to the detailed eﬀects of BITs on extensive margins of
foreign investment (e.g., the number of a parent country’s ﬁrms or plants per
host country in response to the adoption of BITs) or intensive margins of for-
eign investment (e.g., the amount of investments or the number of employees
per ﬁrm) commemorates a gaping hole in the debate about the consequences
of BITs for investors and investments.
This paper aims at contributing to the debate by providing micro-level evi-
dence on the eﬀects of BITs on the bilateral activity of MNEs. Among the
advantages of a micro-level study of the impact of BITs on MNE activity are
3Similar conclusions apply for other bilateral agreements such as tax treaties (see,
e.g., Blonigen and Davies (2004), preferential trade agreements (see, e.g., Globerman and
Shapiro, 1999; Levi Yeyati, Stein, and Daude, 2003), or environmental agreements (see,
e.g., Naughton, 2007).
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(i) the possible distinction of eﬀects on the aforementioned various extensive
margins of investment and (ii) the opportunity of guarding against hetero-
geneity across ﬁrms and the associated aggregation bias which may conceal
possibly countervailing eﬀects of BITs at various margins of ﬁrm activity.
We investigate eﬀects of BITs on foreign investments by German ﬁrms, us-
ing the data-set Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank.4 The data-set accounts for all foreign investments
of German individuals or companies abroad – by host country and sector –
above a certain balance sheet total.5 Our ﬁrst goal is to provide descriptive
evidence on changes in extensive and intensive margins of investment around
events of an adoption of new BITs. In particular, we shed light on such
changes with host countries where BITs were adopted and control countries
where no BITs had been adopted at the time.
Apart from providing exploratory descriptive evidence, we estimate multi-
variate empirical models to quantify eﬀects of BITs on various margins of
investment. We rationalize the expected results of BITs on the number of
ﬁrms in a country and on the diﬀerent outcomes per ﬁrm with a parsimonious
model of heterogeneous ﬁrms. To the extent that BITs reduce ﬁrm and plant
ﬁxed costs of investing in a particular host country, we should expect BITs
to raise the number of MNEs active in that country as well as the number
4The German Central Bank. The data-set is made available under strict conditions
and for clearly deﬁned academic research purposes and can be used exclusively at Bank’s
Research Center.
5A detailed description of the data and the reporting requirements is found in Section
4.
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of plants per ﬁrm. The derived hypotheses are broadly supported by the
regression results. Signing and ratifying BITs raises the number of ﬁrms in
the average host country and year in our sample by 26 units. On average,
these ﬁrms will open only a single plant. The inception of a BIT reduces the
ﬁxed costs of investing in a typical host country and year by about 3.7 mn.
Euro.
We will proceed by highlighting key features and expected eﬀects of BITs on
investment in the next section. In section 2.3 we sketch a simple model of het-
erogeneous MNEs to illustrate the expected eﬀect of BITs on the number of
ﬁrms active as well as the number of plants per ﬁrm and on sales per ﬁrm and
host country. Section 2.4 presents the data-set and summarizes the ﬁndings
from descriptive evidence. In section 2.5 we strive for a quantiﬁcation of the
eﬀects of BITs on extensive margins of investment such as numbers of ﬁrms,
in intermediate margins of investment such as the number of sectors ﬁrms
operate in a particular host country, and in intensive margins of investment
such as ﬁrm size in terms of numbers of plants, foreign direct investments,
ﬁxed assets, total assets, or employment. The last section concludes with a
summary of the main ﬁndings.
2.2 The Aim and Content of BITs
BITs are the main international instrument used to protect and promote
investments by nationals or companies of one contracting party in the ter-
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ritory of the other contracting party.6 By providing protection to foreign
investments under international law, BITs reduce the political risks of the
foreign investor in the host country and may promote FDI to signatory host
countries by improving their investment climate.7
Although they vary across countries, all BITs cover four main areas: admis-
sion of foreign investments, treatment, expropriation, and dispute settlement.
The ﬁrst BITs signed focused on the protection of investments. Only later on
BITs started emphasizing the promotion of investments, claiming that BITs
– through such investments – would increase the economic development and
prosperity of the contracting parties.8
BITs stipulate standards of treatment that foreign investments are to receive
in the host country. The principal general standards cover fair and equi-
table treatment, national treatment, and the most favored nation (MFN)
standard.9 BITs also include provisions dealing with the free transfer of
6Past eﬀorts to reach a multinational agreement on investment didn’t succeed. For
example in the framework of the Havana Charter in 1947 which never entered into force,
and in failed negotiations in the 1990s within the OECD. For an account on the history
of international investment agreements see Vandevelde (2009).
7UNCTAD (1998).
8The contracting countries usually state their intentions and objectives in a preamble,
which is important for the interpretation of the treaty (e.g., see the preamble of the BIT
between Germany and Bangladesh). Recently, the increase in the number of investment
disputes led in some cases to the explicit formulation that the promotion and protection
of investments should not be sought at the expense of public interests such as health,
national security, environment and labor (see UNCTAD 2006, p.3).
9For an assessment of each one of those in the context of BITs, see Muchlinski (2009).
Most BITs include some exceptions to the MFN standard, excluding privileges granted to
third states by virtue of membership in a customs union, a common market or free trade
area, or a double taxation agreement.
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payments, conditions under which an expropriation is considered lawful, and
compensations in case of expropriation, armed conﬂict, or internal disorder.
Most importantly, BITs include dispute settlement provisions. These ensure
the eﬀective implementation and enforcement of the treaty, so as to reduce
uncertainty to foreign investors, and “constitute one of the key elements in
diminishing the country risk, and thus encourage investors of one contracting
party to invest in the territory of the other” (UNCTAD, 2006, p.99).
In short, BITs provide transparency with respect to all non-commercial risks
investors face when investing abroad, and thus lower the ﬁxed costs of such
investments. For example, the right given to investors to initiate arbitral pro-
ceedings against a state (one of the most powerful devices of BITs), relieves
investors from the need to use that country’s domestic courts, and from the
related costs that would follow suit.10
2.3 Theoretical Background
To illustrate the expected eﬀect of BITs on on various ﬁrm margins, we sketch
a simple model of heterogeneous ﬁrms and associate the conclusion of a BIT
with a reduction in the ﬁxed costs of investing in a foreign market.
10While arbitration in an international tribunal is costly, those costs are easier to antic-
ipate than the ones related to a dispute at domestic courts of a host country with weak
law enforcement and legal institutions.
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Assume that households may be characterized by a love of variety and ﬁrms
generally engage in monopolistic competition. Firms are heterogeneous and
diﬀer with regard to their productivity 휑푖 (as in Melitz, 2003), and the
amount of labor needed to produce 푞 units of output is 퐿푖푗 =
푞푖푗
휑푖
+ 퐹푖푗,
where 퐹푖푗 are ﬁxed costs associated with production in foreign market 푗.
Each monopolist ﬁrm faces a demand curve 푥푖푗 = 푝
−휎
푖푗 푌푗푃
휎−1
푗 with constant
elasticity 휎, where 푝푖푗 is the price at which the ﬁrm sells its output to con-
sumers in country 푗, and 푌푗 and 푃푗 are aggregate demand and the consumer
price index in the sector ﬁrm 푖 operates in at market 푗. Firms charge the
same markup 휎
휎−1 over marginal costs, setting the price 푝푖푗 =
휎
(휎−1)휑푖 , where
we normalize the wage rate to one.
Suppose that proﬁts of horizontal MNEs in some parent country may be
decomposed additively into the proﬁts across plants ℓ at home and abroad.11
We assume 퐹푖푗 = 푓ℓ푛푖푗 + 푓푗, where 푓ℓ is the cost of setting up a plant in
country 푗, 푛푖푗 the number of plants ﬁrm 푖 has in country 푗, and 푓푗 are ﬁxed
costs of entering foreign market 푗. Then, ﬁrm 푖 makes proﬁts 휋푖푗 in market
푗 according to
휋푖푗 = 푝푖푗푥푖푗 − 푥푖푗
휑푖
− 푓ℓ푛푖푗 − 푓푗. (2.1)
With free entry, the marginal ﬁrm will earn exactly zero proﬁts with the ﬁrst
11Allowing for more complex integration strategies such as export-platform MNEs (see
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007) would unnecessarily complicate the subsequent
analysis for our purpose which is primarily to provide empirical evidence on the conse-
quences of BITs for MNEs at the micro level.
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plant. Then, the marginal ﬁrm’s output is determined as
휋푖푗 = 0⇒ 푥휋=0푖푗 = 휑∗(휎 − 1)(푓ℓ + 푓푗), (2.2)
and is associated with the minimum productivity level 휑∗ required to enter
foreign market 푗.
Now, assume there is a maximum plant size that can be maintained. Let
푥ℓ denote the maximum plant size and 푓ℓ = 푓
∗
ℓ if 푥푖푗 < 푥ℓ, while 푓ℓ = ∞ if
푥푖푗 ≥ 푥ℓ. This assumption establishes the notion of optimal plant size in the
most parsimonious way. Also, it is consistent with monitoring costs for plant
managers getting excessive beyond a certain plant size. If demand exceeds
푥ℓ, the ﬁrm has to decide whether to sell 푥ℓ or set up a second aﬃliate
(or several ones) in market 푗, provided it can cover the ﬁxed costs of the
additional plant(s) with the respective sales.12
Suppose ﬁrm 푖 faces demand of 푛푖푗푥ℓ > 푥푖푗 > (푛푖푗 − 1)푥ℓ in market 푗. It will
then either operate (푛푖푗 − 1) plants and produce (푛푖푗 − 1)푥ℓ units of output
or set up 푛푖푗 plants and produce 푥푖푗. In case it sets up (푛푖푗 − 1) plants, its
proﬁts are
휋푛−1푖푗 = (푝푖푗 −
1
휑푖
)푥ℓ(푛푖푗 − 1)− 푓ℓ(푛푖푗 − 1)− 푓푗,
12Unlike in most other models of MNEs (see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004), this will lead to MNEs with multiple plants in one market.
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and if it sets up 푛 plants, proﬁts become
휋푛푖푗 = (푝푖푗 −
1
휑푖
)푥푖푗 − 푓ℓ푛푖푗 − 푓푗.
The corresponding diﬀerence in proﬁts amounts to
휋푛푖푗 − 휋푛−1푖푗 = [푥푖푗 − 푥ℓ(푛푖푗 − 1)](푝푖푗 −
1
휑푖
)− 푓ℓ. (2.3)
Hence, ﬁrm 푖 will set up 푛푖푗 plants in 푗 whenever
휋푛푖푗 − 휋푛−1푖푗 ≥ 0⇔ [푥푖푗 − 푥ℓ(푛푖푗 − 1)](푝푖푗 −
1
휑푖
) ≥ 푓ℓ, (2.4)
that is, if the extra revenue achieved by opening the next plant is enough to
cover the extra ﬁxed costs associated with it.
Actual supply of ﬁrm 푖 with 푛푖푗 plants in country 푗 in equilibrium will then
be
푥˜푖푗 =
⎧⎨⎩ (푛푖푗 − 1)푥ℓ + 푥ℓ if 휋푛푖푗 − 휋푛−1푖푗 ≥ 0푛푖푗푥ℓ if 휋푛+1푖푗 − 휋푛푖푗 < 0
Where 푥ℓ is the output of the last plant, which has not reached its maximum
plant size. If the ﬁxed costs of opening the last plant can not be covered,
푥ℓ will not be produced and denotes the diﬀerence between demand and the
actual supply of ﬁrm 푖. Of course, bounded ﬁrm size complicates the analysis
of models with MNEs (in general and even in partial equilibrium). However,
when associating the existence of BITs with a reduction of 푓ℓ (and 푓푗) in such
a framework, the above parsimonious framework is helpful to shed light on
most of the testable hypotheses investigated below in a straightforward way,
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without delivering a full-blown analysis of the model in general equilibrium.
2.3.1 Eﬀects of BITs on the Extensive and Intensive
Foreign Firm Margin:
Associate the inception of a BIT between the parent country of foreign ﬁrm
푖 with a proportional reduction of 푓푗 and 푓ℓ and consider the eﬀects on the
number of ﬁrms in country 푗 (extensive margin), and on the number of plants,
proﬁts and sales of ﬁrm 푖 in country 푗 (intensive margin).
Lower market entry costs 푓푗 and plant ﬁxed costs 푓ℓ (associated with the
inception of a BIT) will reduce the minimum productivity 휑∗ required to
enter foreign market 푗 and, hence, sales of the marginal ﬁrm. The marginal
ﬁrm after inception of a BIT will make zero proﬁts but the marginal ﬁrm as
of before inception of a BIT will make positive proﬁts with a BIT in place.
Therefore, a BIT will cause new ﬁrms to enter 푗. Equation (2.3) suggests
that a reduction in the ﬁxed costs of setting up a plant in 푗, induced by
the implementation of a BIT, will increase the proﬁt diﬀerence 휋푛푖푗 − 휋푛−1푖푗 at
any 푛푖푗. Given the distribution of productivity 휑푖, there will always be some
ﬁrms for which any given reduction in 푓ℓ will make it proﬁtable to set up a
new plant and expand production. Hence, there will be entry of new plants
and expansion of production both by ﬁrms already present in 푗 prior to the
BIT and by new MNEs who set up their ﬁrst plant in that market.
These eﬀects are depicted in Figure 2.1. The corresponding ﬁgure contains
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Figure 2.1: Proﬁts of a multinational ﬁrm in host country 푗, before and after
the inception of a BIT
two nonmonotonic schedules, one reﬂecting a proﬁt function prior to a BIT
(at the outer right) and one reﬂecting a proﬁt function after the inception
of a BIT (at the outer left). This illustrates that the eﬀects on the plant-
speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc output diﬀer across brackets of the ﬁrm productivity
distribution. At productivity levels 휑∗,BIT푖 ≤ 휑푖 < 휑∗,no BIT푖 , inception of a
BIT has an eﬀect on the extensive margin, causing ﬁrm as well as plant entry.
To the right of 휑∗,no BIT푖 , adjustments on the intensive margin of ﬁrm activity
will raise per-ﬁrm output and may imply an increase or a decline of per-plant
production.
At productivity levels 휑푖 ∈ [퐵
1
휎−1 , 퐶
1
휎−1 ), 휑푖 ∈ [퐹
1
휎−1 , 퐺
1
휎−1 ), etc., there
Chapter 2 – BITs Bite 71
would be plant entry along with an expansion in production: output, sales,
and proﬁt per ﬁrm would increase while output, sales, and proﬁt
per plant would decline. At productivity levels 휑푖 ∈ [휑∗,no BIT푖 , 퐴
1
휎−1 ), 휑푖 ∈
[퐷
1
휎−1 , 퐸
1
휎−1 ), 휑푖 ∈ [퐻
1
휎−1 , 퐼
1
휎−1 ), etc., the number of ﬁrms and number of
plants remain constant but plant-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc output, sales, and
proﬁts change: they increase both at the ﬁrm level (per ﬁrm) and at the
plant level (per plant). Finally, at productivity levels 휑푖 ∈ [퐴
1
휎−1 , 퐵
1
휎−1 ),
휑푖 ∈ [퐸
1
휎−1 , 퐹
1
휎−1 ), etc., there would be no change whatsoever.
Overall, in response to the inception of a BIT between a parent and a host
country, we expect an increase in the number of ﬁrms and in the number
of plants (both aggregate and per-ﬁrm) of a given parent country in host
market 푗. We also expect an increase in aggregate output and revenue, and
in proﬁts of a subset of the ﬁrms as well as for the average existing MNE of
a given parent country in host market 푗.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
To shed light on the eﬀects of BITs on the diﬀerent margins of MNE activity,
we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) data-set provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank which comprises the universe of outward FDI (above
the reporting threshold) undertaken by German MNEs. All German ﬁrms
holding 10% or more of shares or voting rights in foreign ﬁrms with a balance
sheet total of more than 3 mn. Euro are required by law to report to Deutsche
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Bundesbank their balance sheet information as well as information on the
sector, legal form, and number of employees.13 Indirect participating interests
are to be reported whenever residents hold more than 50% in a foreign ﬁrm
and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the shares
or voting rights in other foreign enterprises. Our sample period covers 1996-
2005.
Before turning to regression analysis, let us shed light on the evolution of
MNE activity around BIT (signature or ratiﬁcation) events. For this, con-
sider the number of German MNEs per country, and the number of plants
per ﬁrm and country around such events. In particular, we inspect the evolu-
tion of MNE activity in the average host country with a treatment (signature
or ratiﬁcation of a BIT) within the sample period as compared to a control
group (i.e., ﬁrms in countries which never got treated or did so before 1996).
Notice that BIT treatment (irrespective of signature or ratiﬁcation) is un-
equally spaced in time. Hence, some countries signed or ratiﬁed BITs at the
beginning and others in the center or the end of the sample period. To align
units of observation properly, we center them around an artiﬁcial treatment
time zero when a BIT was signed or ratiﬁed. Then, we follow the evolution
of MNE activity in treated countries (referred to as Treated in subsequent
ﬁgures) up to two years before and after treatment. We do so also with MNE
activity in untreated countries in the same years (referred to as Controls in
subsequent ﬁgures).
13The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
Reporting thresholds have been changed in the past, for details and a documentation on
the micro-level data set MiDi see Lipponer (2009).
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Figure 2.2: Number of ﬁrms at the country level around signature of a BIT
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Figure 2.3: Number of ﬁrms at the country level around ratiﬁcation of a BIT
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Figure 2.4: Number of aﬃliates by ﬁrm and country around signature of a
BIT
In Figures 2.2 and 2.3 we focus on the number of ﬁrms in a host country,
which most closely reﬂect decisions at the extensive margin as discussed in
Section 2.3. While Figure 2.2 suggests a discontinuity in average outcome
around the time of signature of a BIT, Figure 2.3 indicates that there is
a trend in outcome – with a diﬀerent slope – around treatment time zero
which looks similar before and after treatment. Altogether, these two ﬁgures
suggest that BIT signatures lead to an increase in the number of ﬁrms active
in a host country around treatment, but we should not expect an eﬀect of
similar magnitude for ratiﬁcation afterwards.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 display the number of plants per ﬁrm and host country.
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Figure 2.5: Number of aﬃliates by ﬁrm and country around ratiﬁcation of a
BIT
We focus on a constant number of ﬁrms around treatment in each ﬁgure.14
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that, at the intensive ﬁrm margin, a clear increase
in the number of foreign aﬃliates per ﬁrm and host country happens around
the ratiﬁcation but less so around the signature of BITs. graphical inspection
unconditional on other inﬂuences and can not provide causal evidence about
the eﬀect of BITs on outcome.15 Therefore, we move on to an econometric
14Changes at the extensive ﬁrm margin as in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 could not have an
impact on Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
15Also, recall that BITs with many of the important host countries of Germany had been
signed before the sample period. The countries with new BITs are among the smaller
recipients of German investment abroad. It is impossible to infer external validity of
the eﬀect of BITs for the past and, hence, the ones with Germany’s most important
host countries. Yet, high-quality, census-type micro-data on MNEs are available only for
relatively recent time spans in any developed country we know of.
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exploration which has the greater potential of isolating causal eﬀects of BIT
treatment. In our benchmark regressions, we treat the binary BIT indicator
as exogenous conditional on a set of covariates, as we expect the average
ﬁrm investing abroad to take the inception of a BIT as given. Beyond that,
we consider some regressions in a subsample of treated and control countries
which are similar in terms of their propensity of signing a BIT with Germany.
The latter is capable of reducing a potential bias of the average BIT treatment
eﬀect on outcome accruing to self selection. In the appendix, we present
results which suggest that there is no evidence of such a bias with the data
and speciﬁcations at hand so that we may interpret the estimate eﬀects as
causal ones.
2.5 Regression Analysis
2.5.1 Econometric Model
In this section we proceed by running multivariate empirical models to quan-
tify eﬀects of BITs. We are interested in the partial eﬀects of the signature
and ratiﬁcation of BITs on the conditional mean of diﬀerent outcomes of ﬁrm
푖 in host country 푗. In particular, we look at the number of aﬃliates held,
number of employees abroad, FDI stock,16 ﬁxed assets, turnover, and the
number of sectors ﬁrm 푖 operates in. We estimate multiplicative individual-
16Measured according to the IMF/OECD method.
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eﬀects models for the conditional mean of the form
퐸[푦푖푗푡∣x′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗] = 푒푥푝(x′푗,푡−1휷)휈푖푗
where 푦푖푗푡 is the outcome of ﬁrm 푖 in host country 푗, 푖푗 = 1, ..., 푁 in year
푡 = 1, ..., 푇 , x푗,푡−1 is a 퐾 × 1 vector of variables dated at time 푡 − 1 which
vary across both host countries and years, 휷 is a corresponding 퐾× 1 vector
of parameters to be estimated, and 휈푖푗 is a permanent scaling factor for the
individual, ﬁrm-by-host-country speciﬁc mean – an unobservable variable.
We can consistently estimate the parameter vector 휷 even if unobserved
components in 휈푖푗 are correlated with the regressors x
′
푗,푡−1 by using a Poisson
conditional maximum likelihood estimator (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches,
1984).
The advantage of the Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects estimator pertains to the sum of
the outcomes in the panel being a suﬃcient statistic for 휈푖푗: after conditioning
on
∑
푡 푦푖푗푡 the conditional likelihood does not depend on 휈푖푗, and 훽 can be
estimated consistently. With the conditional mean correctly speciﬁed, the
Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is consistent regardless of whether the data
are Poisson distributed or not (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Since all
elements in x′푗,푡−1 vary across host countries and time but not ﬁrms, we
correct the covariance matrix for clustering (see Wooldridge, 1999).
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2.5.2 Speciﬁcation and Data
The vector 푥푗,푡−1 of determinants of ﬁrm 푖’s activity in host country 푗 includes
the following variables. In particular, 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1 and 퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 are at
the heart of our analysis. These are dummy variables which indicate whether
Germany signed or ratiﬁed a BIT with country 푗 in year 푡−1, respectively.17
We collect information about signature and ratiﬁcation of BITs by and with
Germany from the online database of the United Nations’ Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
There is clear-cut evidence that host country market size matters (see Bloni-
gen, Davies, and Head, 2003). Therefore, we include 퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1, the log of
real GDP of host country 푗 in year 푡 − 1.18 Data on 퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 are collected
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2009 (with 2000 as
the base year). Similarly, a broad line of research indicates that skilled la-
bor endowments are important for foreign plant set-up (see Carr, Markusen,
17Firm outcome observed in period 푡, such as the number of aﬃliates held, foreign
employment, FDI, and ﬁxed assets should respond in general to economic fundamentals
observed in the previous period, 푡 − 1, rather than to contemporaneous values. The
statutory corporate tax rate could however be anticipated by the ﬁrm. Yet, the results
remain unchanged if we use the contemporaneous tax rate instead of the lagged one. We
ran regressions which enforced contemporaneous eﬀects of all variables and those were
smaller on average than the ones based on period 푡− 1.
18Some work suggests that market potential should be included instead or – as far as
third-country foreign market potential is concerned – along with 퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 (see Head and
Mayer, 2004). However, for the data at hand, foreign market potential – an inverse-
distance weighted or trade-ﬂow weighted version of 퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 across third host countries
– does not exhibit much host-country-speciﬁc time variation so that the corresponding
parameter estimate would be insigniﬁcant. Employing sector-level data would lead to a
tremendous loss of observations (service output and even manufacturing output by sector
is not available for as large a host country sample as the one considered here) so that we
dismiss their use.
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and Maskus, 2001; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003), and so are capital-
labor ratios (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). To control for such inﬂu-
ences, we include 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1, the tertiary school enrollment rate in country
푗 and year 푡−1 (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators), and
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1, the capital-labor ratio (from Bergstrand and Egger, 2007).
A number of empirical studies suggested that statutory tax rates of a host
country aﬀect MNE activity there (see, e.g., Mutti and Grubert, 2004).
Therefore, we include 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1, the statutory corporate tax rate in coun-
try 푗 at time 푡 − 1, as a control variable (from the Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation). Similarly, there is work on the role of double taxation treaties
for MNE activity (see Blonigen and Davies, 2004, for an analysis at the ag-
gregate level and Davies, Norba¨ck, and Tekin-Koru, 2009, for micro-level
evidence). Accordingly, we include 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 in our speciﬁcation – a dummy
variable indicating whether Germany had a double taxation treaty in force
with country 푗 in year 푡− 1 or not (information about 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 stems from
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance). Finally, some empirical work sug-
gests that the existence of a free trade area with a host country fosters FDI of
a parent there and vice versa (see Blomstro¨m and Kokko, 1997; Levi Yeyati,
Stein, and Daude, 2003). Accordingly, we control for 푃푇퐴푗,푡−1, a dummy
indicating if there is a costums union or a free trade agreement in place with
country 푗 at time 푡−1 (information about 푃푇퐴푗,푡−1 is collected from various
sources and comes from Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch, 2009).
Table 2.1 provides the ﬁrst and second moment of the distribution of the de-
pendent and independent variables for the ﬁrm-by-country-level data and for
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the country-level data. The ﬁrst one covers 15, 728 ﬁrm-host pairs and 99, 322
observations, while the second one covers 86 host countries and 699 observa-
tions. Altogether, our sample covers 5, 616 unique ﬁrms and 86 unique host
countries. So, for the sample period of 1996-2005, there are 86 ⋅ 10 = 860
possible data points about numbers of ﬁrms across host countries and years
(including zeros), 5, 616 ⋅ 86 = 482, 976 possible ﬁrm-by-host-country dyads,
and 4, 829, 760 ﬁrm-by-host-country-by-year observations. However, the con-
trol variables (especially, the statutory corporate tax rate) are not available
for all host countries and years which leads to a drop in the number of usable
host-country-by-year observations from 860 to 699. Moreover, in the regres-
sion analysis, we can only estimate parameters from cross-sectional units
whose outcome changes (i.e., all permanent zero investments are deleted).
The latter leads to a drop of usable ﬁrm-by-host-country dyads from 482, 976
to 15, 728 (for the number of foreign aﬃliates) so that the number of usable
observations drops to 99, 322.
Let us discuss a few selected descriptive statistics and leave the rest to the
interested reader. The ﬁgures in the table suggest that, on average, a ﬁrm
holds 0.778 aﬃliates per host country. This number is below unity, since
we use a complete design matrix: the data used in the regressions cover all
possible ﬁrm-by-host-country dyads where some change occurred during the
sample period (all other ﬁrm-by-host-country dyads are dropped by condi-
tioning out the ﬁxed eﬀects). There are ﬁrms which did not hold an aﬃliate
in a particular host country at the beginning of but set one up during the
sample period. Hence, there are numerous zeros for ﬁrms prior to investing
in a host country during the sample period. Those zeros and the fact that
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many MNEs run only one plant in a host country reduces the average num-
ber of aﬃliates to less than one for the average ﬁrm, host country, and year.
Firms operate in less than one sector per host country and year for the same
reason. However, the average number of sectors (0.735) is smaller than the
average number of aﬃliates (0.778). This points to the fact that multiple
foreign aﬃliates of one parent company in a host country tend to operate in
the same or at least in overlapping sectors. The average number of ﬁrms per
host country is somewhat less than 113.
Furthermore, in the average host country and year, a German MNE holds a
stock of FDI of slightly more than 11 mn. Euro which corresponds to about
7.5 mn. Euro of ﬁxed assets.19 On average, there are about 126 employees
per ﬁrm, host country, and year who generate sales of, on average, almost 32
mn. Euro.
The independent variables suggest the following pattern. First, about 32%
(27%) of the host countries the average German MNE in the sample invests
in, in an average year, has signed (ratiﬁed) a BIT with Germany. In the left
bloc of the table, all statistics are by ﬁrm, host country and year. Hence,
the higher numbers for BITSIG and BITRAT in the right bloc of the table
suggest that German MNEs display less presence in host countries with BITs
than otherwise. This has to do with the fact that regulations in some pref-
erential trade agreements (such as European Union membership) establish
19As indicated by the table footnote, FDI stocks, ﬁxed assets, and turnover are expressed
in 100, 000 Euro.
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investor protection so that enacting a BIT would be superﬂuous.20 Accord-
ing to the statistics in the table, Germany signed (ratiﬁed) a BIT with 68%
(56%) of the host countries in the sample.21 With respect to double taxation
treaties and preferential trade agreements it is the other way round: German
multinationals are present with higher frequency in countries Germany has
taxation or trade agreements with. German MNEs even seem to invest with
slightly higher probability in high-tax countries than in low-tax economies.
2.5.3 Regression Results
Let us move on to Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects QML regressions which may be in-
terpreted as to reﬂect structural forms of the expressions of the extensive
and intensive margins in a model as the one outlined in Section 2.3.22 These
regressions condition on the potential impact of other covariates whose im-
pact on ﬁrm activity could conceal or at least bias the role of BITs for the
20OECD member countries attract the majority of German FDI stocks. These countries
typically do not conclude BITs among each other.
21Table 2.4 lists all countries in the sample and the year of eventual signature and
ratiﬁcation of a BIT with Germany.
22The extensive and the intensive margins may be formulated as log-linear functions of
market size, trade costs, production costs, ﬁxed costs (see Chaney, 2008), and proﬁtability
through proﬁt taxes. We model host country market size as being proportional to host
country GDP (as said before, market potential as a possible alternative measure does not
vary enough in our panel data models), trade costs as a function of PTA membership
(time-invariant trade costs are controlled for by ﬁxed eﬀects), production costs as being
proportional to GDP, skilled labor ratios, and capital-labor ratios), and ﬁxed costs by
BITs signing and ratiﬁcation as well as the existence of double taxation treaties which
inter alia determine the deductibility of ﬁxed costs from the tax base time-invariant ﬁxed
set-up costs are controlled for by ﬁxed eﬀects), and proﬁtability is co-determined by proﬁt
tax rates and double taxation treaties.
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relevant outcome. Let us summarize our ﬁndings in Table 2.2 for the exten-
sive ﬁrm margin and in Table 2.3 for the extensive aﬃliate margin and other
outcomes. From a ﬁrm’s perspective, we consider all outcome variables in
Table 2.3 as to reﬂect dimensions of the intensive margin.
In Table 2.2, the dependent variable reﬂects the number of ﬁrms per host
country and year. Accordingly, the cross-sectional dimension in that table
are the 86 host countries covered. In this case, there are 699 observations
altogether (see Subsection 2.5.2). The parameter estimates suggest the fol-
lowing conclusions.
First, all of the statistically signiﬁcant estimates are aligned with our expec-
tations. Higher host country statutory tax rates reduce a ﬁrm’s propensity
of investing there, larger market size (GDP) and the availability of skilled
labor raise the propensity of investing there. The main reason for why capital
labor ratios do not turn out signiﬁcant is their high correlation with GDP
and skilled labor endowments in the sample. There is also an explanation
for why double tax treaties and preferential trade agreements do not display
a signiﬁcant positive impact: most of the countries German multinationals
changed their investments in (by investing or divesting there) over the sample
period already had such agreements with Germany prior to 1996.
This is diﬀerent for BIT signature and ratiﬁcation. Controlling for the ob-
servable variables, we are able to estimate parameters on both 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1
and 퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Unlike in Fig-
ures 2.2 and 2.3, we are able to identify a signiﬁcant positive impact of both
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Table 2.2: Number of firms per country (whole sample)
Poisson ﬁxed-eﬀects QML estimation
Dependent variable
푓푖푟푚푠
퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1 0.100**
(0.046)
퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 0.112***
(0.039)
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -1.287***
(0.497)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.040
(0.040)
푃푇퐴푗,푡−1 -0.005
(0.051)
퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 1.598***
(0.376)
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 0.740***
(0.203)
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 -0.062
(0.158)
Wald 3354
p-value 0.000
Log Likelihood -1779
Observations 699
Host countries 86
Notes: The regression includes time dummies. Robust standard errors reported in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower
part of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors
and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the number of observations, and
the number of groups (host countries).
BIT signature and ratiﬁcation on the number of ﬁrms investing in a host
country. Hence, omitting changes in explanatory variables from Figures 2.2
and 2.3 mars the impact of treatment on the number of ﬁrms in treated
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versus untreated host countries there. Interestingly, the point estimate of
퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 is even somewhat bigger than the one of 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1. Yet,
signature of BITs seems to generate non-trivial anticipation eﬀects.
What is the impact of BITs on the number of ﬁrms in the average host
country and year? Notice that, with the adopted approach, this ques-
tion can not be answered in the usual way. According to Subsection 2.5.1,
퐸[푦푖푗푡∣x′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗] = 푒푥푝(x′푗,푡−1휷)휈푖푗. Hence, the model prediction
퐸[푦푖푗푡∣x′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗] requires an estimate not only of 휷 but also of the ﬁxed
eﬀects 휈푖푗. Unlike with linear models, the latter can not easily be retrieved
since they are conditioned out. However, without making any assumption
on 휈푖푗, the model implies that 훽푘 and (푒
훽푘 − 1) can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities in the case of a continuous and a discrete explanatory variable
푥푘,푡−1 respectively .23
The coeﬃcient of 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1 in Table 2.2 tells us that the signature of a
BIT is associated with a 10% increase in the number of German ﬁrms active
in the average host country and year. Lets consider this eﬀect on the sample
mean. In the sample, the average number of German ﬁrms active in the
average host country and year amounts to 112.57. Signature of a BIT with
23The marginal eﬀect of a continuous variable 푥푘,푡−1 is ∂퐸[푦푖푗푡∣x′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗 ]/∂푥푘,푡−1 =
훽푘 × 퐸[푦푖푗푡∣x′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗 ], so 훽푘 can be interpreted as an elasticity. A one-unit increase in
푥푘,푡−1 is associated with a 훽푘 proportionate increase (or a 100 × 훽푘 increase in percent)
in the conditional mean of the dependent variable. The eﬀect of a discrete change in
a binary variable, such as 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1 or 퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1, on the conditional mean of
the dependent variable is 퐸[푦푖푗푡∣z′푗,푡−1, 푥푘,푡−1 = 1, 휈푖푗 ] − 퐸[푦푖푗푡∣z′푗,푡−1, 푥푘,푡−1 = 0, 휈푖푗 ] =
푒푥푝(z′푗,푡−1휷+훽푘)휈푖푗−푒푥푝(z′푗,푡−1휷)휈푖푗 = (푒훽푘−1)×퐸[푦푖푗푡∣z′푗,푡−1, 휈푖푗 ] where z′푗,푡−1 denotes all
the regressors other than the 푥푘,푡−1. The discrete change in a binary variable is associated
with a 100×(푒훽푘−1) percentage change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable.
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Germany would increase that number from 112.57 to 123.83. Subsequent
ratiﬁcation of that BIT would ceteris paribus further increase the number
of ﬁrms in the average host country from 123.83 to 137.70.24 Notice that it
would take a reduction of the average host country’s statutory corporate tax
rate by almost 8.2 percentage points to achieve the same eﬀect as signature
of a BIT, and it would take a reduction of the corporate tax rate in these
countries of about 18.35 percentage points to achieve the eﬀect of signature
and ratiﬁcation of a BIT. But, clearly, this is not surprising when we think
BITs reduce the risk of expropriation – and, hence, ﬁxed market entry costs
– from a high level in a signiﬁcant way.
24Table 2.2 shows that the ratiﬁcation of a BIT is associated with a further 11.2%
increase in average number of German ﬁrms.
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In Table 2.3, we consider a variety of margins of adjustment from a ﬁrm’s
perspective. With regard to the number of aﬃliates per ﬁrm, host country,
and year, we obtain the same qualitative result as for the extensive ﬁrm
margin in Table 2.2: signature of a BIT raises the number of plants per ﬁrm,
host country, and year and ratiﬁcation of a BIT has an even bigger eﬀect on
top of signature. Notice that the design of the data for Table 2.3 is such that
ﬁrms are included if, during the sample period, they set up new or close down
existing plants. Hence, an increase at the plant margin (or other margins in
Table 2.3) can but need not entail a change at the extensive ﬁrm margin.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is somewhat larger in Table 2.3 than in
Table 2.2. What do these coeﬃcients imply for plant numbers per ﬁrm, host
country, and year? Again, we can resort to the logic applied to quantifying
eﬀects of BIT signature and ratiﬁcation on the extensive ﬁrm margin.
According to Table 2.3, signature of a BIT alone raises the number of aﬃliates
by a factor of 푒푥푝(0.089) − 1 ≃ 0.093 and subsequent ratiﬁcation of a BIT
ceteris paribus raises it again by a factor of 푒푥푝(0.119) − 1 ≃ 0.126 from
there. The average number of foreign subsidiaries in a host country and year
in the sample was 0.778 in Table 2.1. That number is raised to about 0.958
with signature and ratiﬁcation of a BIT.
We can not discern eﬀects of BIT signature from ratiﬁcation for FDI stocks,
ﬁxed assets, or turnover, but – except for turnover – all intensive margin
outcomes in Table 2.3 display a positive response to ratiﬁcation of a BIT
which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. One reason for why we are not able
to identify eﬀects on turnover is that BITs aﬀect ﬁxed rather than variable
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production costs and it takes time to set up production and generate turnover
after setting up aﬃliates and hiring employees.25
The regressions for FDI stocks and ﬁxed assets allow for an approximation of
the ﬁxed cost equivalent of BITs. For this, set the parameter of 퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1
to zero for convenience and calculate the eﬀect of BITs on outcome by using
the parameter of 퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1. According to the model for FDI stocks and
information on average FDI stocks per host country and year from Table 2.1,
the impact of a BIT on FDI stocks amounts to about 5 mn. Euro. The one
on ﬁxed assets amounts to about 3.7 mn. Euro. Fixed assets are supposed
to be a better measure of ﬁxed costs than FDI stocks. In terms of the above
model, we may conclude that a BIT ceteris paribus reduces ﬁxed costs due
to the reduction in uncertainty of foreign investments by approximately 3.7
mn. Euro in the average host country and year in our sample.
One could investigate the sensitivity of the above results in a number of
ways, and we have aimed at doing so. For instance, rather than using GDP
to measure market size, one could use market potential. Yet, market poten-
tial exhibits much less time variation than GDP and so its impact is harder
to discern from the one of other covariates and the ﬁxed eﬀects in the model.
Also, one could use sector-speciﬁc output rather than GDP. With a Cobb-
Douglas upper utility function and Constant Elasticity of Scale lower utility
functions at the sector level, the obtained coeﬃcient of GDP would reﬂect
25At least, this argument should hold for greenﬁeld investment projects. Unfortunately,
the data at hand do not allow for a distinction of greenﬁeld from brownﬁeld investment
projects.
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the response to an increase in the average sector’s market size. However,
sector-level data (as available from United Nations Industrial Development
Organization’s Industrial Statistics Database) lead to an enormous loss of
observations in both the time and the cross-sectional dimension so that con-
vergence of the adopted procedures could not be achieved. Finally, the pa-
rameters in the model about the extensive ﬁrm margin in Table 2.2 could be
aﬀected by self-selection of countries into BITs with Germany. Self-selection
bias could be avoided by restricting the sample to comparable countries (see
the Appendix for details). The corresponding results are similar to those in
Table 2 but the eﬀect of BITs on the number of ﬁrms in a host country is
smaller by about one-ﬁfth and signiﬁcant at 10% rather than at 5%.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper provides novel insights on the impact of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) at the ﬁrm level. Using the universe of German multinational
activity abroad for the period 1996-2005, we provide evidence that BITs seem
to bite at various margins of the multinational ﬁrm. BITs – as a means of
reducing the ﬁxed costs of investment in (risky) host countries – should aﬀect
the number of ﬁrms active as well as the number of plants and sales per ﬁrm
and host country.
These hypotheses are broadly conﬁrmed by our evidence from panel data of
one of the biggest foreign investing countries around the world, Germany.
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Data availability forces us to focus on a relatively recent period where BITs
have been signed by Germany with countries that are certainly not the prime
targets of its outward investment (this would be the case for other countries’
ﬁrm-level data-sets, too). Yet, we are conﬁdent that our analysis provides
novel evidence on the impact of BITs on ﬁrm activity which hitherto has
been conﬁned to the aggregate level only. We are able to quantify the ﬁxed
cost equivalent of BITs which amounts to about 3.7 mn. Euro in the typical
host country and year. Signing and ratifying BITs raises the number of ﬁrms
in the average host country and year in our sample by 26 units. On average,
treated ﬁrms will open only a single plant. The FDI generated by signing
and ratifying a BIT amounts to about 5 mn. Euro per ﬁrm and, hence, 130
mn. Euro per host country on average.
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Table 2.4: List of countries in the sample and date of BIT sig-
nature and ratification
Host Country Signed Ratiﬁed Host Country Signed Ratiﬁed
Algeria 1996 2002 Latvia 1993 1996
Argentina 1991 1993 Lebanon 1997 1999
Armenia* 1995 2000 Lithuania 1992 1997
Australia - - Macedonia, FYR 1996 2000
Austria - - Malaysia 1960 1963
Azerbaijan 1995 1998 Mauritius 1971 1973
Bangladesh 1981 1986 Mexico 1998 2001
Belarus 1993 1996 Moldova 1994 2006
Belgium - - Morocco 2001 -
Bolivia 1987 1990 Netherlands - -
Brazil 1995 - New Zealand - -
Bulgaria 1986 1988 Nicaragua 1996 2001
Cambodia* 1999 2002 Norway - -
Cameroon 1962 1963 Pakistan 1959 1962
Canada - - Panama 1983 1989
Chile 1991 1999 Paraguay 1993 1998
China 2003 2005 Peru 1995 1997
Costa Rica 1994 1998 Philippines 1997 2000
Cote d’Ivoire 1966 1968 Poland 1989 1991
Croatia 1997 2000 Portugal 1980 1982
Czech Republic 1990 1992 Romania 1996 1998
Denmark - - Rwanda* 1967 1969
Dominican Republic - - Russian Federation 1989 1991
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 - Saudi Arabia 1996 1999
El Salvador 1997 2001 Senegal 1964 1966
Estonia 1992 1997 Slovak Republic 1990 1992
Finland - - Slovenia 1993 1998
France - - South Africa 1995 1998
Georgia 1993 1998 Spain - -
Ghana 1995 1998 Sweden - -
Greece 1961 1963 Switzerland - -
Guatemala 2003 2005 Tanzania 1965 1968
Honduras 1995 1998 Thailand 2002 2004
Hong Kong, China 1996 1998 Trinidad and Tobago 2006 -
Hungary 1986 1987 Tunisia 1963 1966
India 1995 1998 Turkey 1962 1965
Indonesia 2003 - Uganda 1966 1968
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2002 2005 Ukraine 1993 1996
Ireland - - United Arab Emirates* 1997 1999
Italy - - United Kingdom - -
Japan - - United States - -
Jordan* 1974 1977 Uruguay 1987 1990
Kazakhstan 1992 1995 Uzbekistan 1993 1998
Kenya 1996 2000 Venezuela, RB 1996 1998
Korea, Rep. 1964 1967 Vietnam 1993 1998
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 2006
Notes: * These countries appear in the ﬁgures but are dropped in the regressions.
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Appendix
In Table 2.5, we provide information on the same regression as in Table
2.2, but reducing the control group to a subset of countries by means of a
propensity score-matching procedure. We do this as a robustness check in
which we seek to take into account possible selection into treatment. Note
that since we have panel data and the treatment varies over time, as long as
the treatment is uncorrelated with time-varying unobservables that aﬀect the
outcome, the ﬁxed eﬀects method we use allows us to consistently estimate
treatment eﬀects (See Wooldridge 2002, p.638). Still, we can exploit further
information at the country level which we do not use in the main regressions
which determine the likelihood of a country signing a BIT with Germany.
We estimate annual probits for the probability of a country signing a BIT
with Germany 26. Given the estimated propensity scores, we match treated
countries –i.e. countries that signed a BIT with Germany previous or during
our sample period– with untreated countries with a similar mean propensity
score over the years. To select the control set we deﬁne a propensity score
radius and use all comparison units within the radius 27.
26The speciﬁcation of the probability of signing a BIT with Germany in a given year
includes following dependent variables: Bilateral GDP sum, GDP similarity, GDP per
capita similarity and its square, log bilateral distance, a dummy for a border with Germany,
a dummy for being in the same continent, a dummy for a free trade agreement, a measure
of remoteness, diﬀerence in capital labor ratio to the rest of the world, and a dummy for
membership to the OECD. Regression results available upon request.
27The radius is deﬁned as the interval between the minimum and maximum propensity
score of all the treated countries.
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Treated countries
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Algeria, Egypt,
Arab Rep., Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hon-
duras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iran, Islamic Rep., Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Korea, Rep., Lebanon, Lithuania, Latvia, Mo-
rocco, Moldova, Mexico, Macedonia, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pak-
istan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, El Salvador, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa.
Control group - Whole sample
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United
States.
Control group - Radius matching
Dominican Republic, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago.
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Table 2.5: Number of firms per country (Subsample)
Poisson ﬁxed-eﬀects QML estimation
Dependent variable
푓푖푟푚푠
퐵퐼푇푆퐼퐺푗,푡−1 0.088*
(0.048)
퐵퐼푇푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 0.031
(0.054)
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -2.004***
(0.566)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.029
(0.074)
푃푇퐴푗,푡−1 -0.082*
(0.049)
퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 0.951**
(0.443)
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 0.476
(0.334)
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 0.146
(0.171)
Wald 4884
p-value 0.000
Log Likelihood -1362
Observations 605
Host countries 75
Notes: Regression as in Table 2.2, after reducing the sample to a subset of countries by
means of a propensity score-matching procedure. The regression includes time dummies.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower part of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test
statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood
function, the number of observations, and the number of groups (host countries).
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Abstract∗
This paper analyzes the impact of statutory corporate tax rates on proﬁts
and of double taxation treaties (DTTs) on multinational ﬁrm (MNE) activity
at the micro level. It provides an assessment of the eﬀects of these proﬁt tax
instruments on the extensive and the intensive margin of activity. In par-
ticular, we estimate two-part quasi-maximum likelihood models using panel
data on the foreign activity of German MNEs in the decade 1996-2005 and
ﬁnd that statutory tax rates aﬀect MNE activity negatively both at the ex-
tensive and the intensive margin of investment, while DTTs primarily induce
a positive eﬀect at the extensive margin.
3.1 Introduction
Proﬁt tax parameters should be among the most important policy instru-
ments to attract mobile ﬁrms in the modern era, much more so than trade
policy instruments. The reason is that tariﬀs have declined tremendously
in the aftermath of World War II and taxing income – in particular from
the taxation of labor and, more recently, of value added, but also of proﬁts
of incorporated ﬁrms – now remains almost the only reasonable source to
generate revenues for governments.
While tax rates on labor and value added tend to remain relatively constant
over long periods of time, there is much more action in tax rates on corporate
proﬁts. First of all, with the break-down of the former Soviet Union and
the opening up of the former member countries of the Council for Mutual
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger. The corresponding paper “Statu-
tory Corporate Tax Rates and Double Taxation Treaties as Determinants of Multinational
Firm Activity” is published in FinanzArchiv.
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Economic Aid (COMECON), a new source of pressure on the taxes on mobile
ﬁrms’ proﬁts has surfaced in Western Europe, which led to a sequence of
associated tax rate reductions since the early 1990s there (see Overesch and
Rincke, 2009, for a documentation of the decline in corporate proﬁt tax
rates in Western Europe). Second, unlike taxes on value added and much
less so than taxes on labor, proﬁt taxation has a considerable international
component through the activity of multinational ﬁrms (MNEs).1
In general, international aspects of proﬁt taxation root in the taxation of
foreign-earned proﬁts of MNEs abroad (and sometimes even at home) and in
the existence of double taxation treaties (DTTs). DTTs have three primary
goals: ﬁrst, they specify the mode of double taxation relief which is relevant
unless a unilateral approach is taken by the parent country;2 second, they
specify tax parameters of interest at the bilateral level such as the withholding
tax rate;3 third, in some cases they establish an agreement about information
exchange so as to limit the scope of tax avoidance. The number of double
1First of all, multi-country activity renders MNEs’ proﬁts taxable in more than just
one economy. Moreover, tax law itself contains bilateral components by the virtue of
the conclusion of double taxation treaties (DTTs). We admit that the taxation of labor
abroad may involve a bilateral component of personal income taxation. But there is much
less of a change in that than in the taxation of proﬁts, and there tends to be less of a
variance in the treatment of expatriates across countries than of proﬁts of MNEs across
host countries.
2However, some countries such as Germany apply unilateral exemption of MNEs’ proﬁts
earned abroad from domestic taxation. Then, the primary dimension of international
taxation of MNEs’ foreign-earned proﬁts accrues to proﬁt taxation at the level of host
countries.
3Notice that there are exceptions from that rule. For instance, withholding tax rates are
waved for proﬁts associated with foreign investments of MNEs headquartered in European
Union (EU) member countries in other EU countries by virtue of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive applying within the EU.
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taxation treaties (DTTs) concluded has been rising steadily since the early
1960s up to 2,805 by the end of 2008 (UNCTAD 2009, p. 33). The ﬁrst
treaties were signed primarily between developed countries, which are still
leading the list of countries in terms of the number of DTTs signed (see Sachs
and Sauvant 2009, p. xlv).
Theoretically, the impact of proﬁt taxation on ﬁrm-level behavior is well
understood (see the next section for further details). While a large body of
empirical literature is available on the impact of taxation on MNEs at the
aggregate level (see de Mooij and Ederveen 2003, 2006; for a survey and the
next section for more details), much less seems to be known about the role of
proﬁt taxes at the level of the individual ﬁrm (see Hogg, Mintz, and Slemrod,
1993; Grubert and Mutti, 2000; Weichenrieder and Ramb, 2005; Buettner
and Wamser, 2009; Buettner et al. 2009; Davies, Norba¨ck, and Tekin-Koru,
2009; Egger and Loretz, 2009; Overesch and Wamser 2009, 2010a,b; Bellak
and Leibrecht, 2010 for some exceptions).
This paper aims at delivering a panel data analysis of the impact of host-
country statutory corporate tax rates and DTTs for the outbound activity of
German MNEs. This analysis is not unprecedented (see Weichenrieder and
Ramb, 2005; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; Buettner et al. 2009; Overesch and
Wamser 2009, 2010a,b, for a few examples). However, we pursue a diﬀerent
route of empirical modeling and focus on the impact of host-country statutory
tax rates and DTTs by explicitly distinguishing between the extensive versus
intensive margin of activity. In particular, we argue that – in an analysis of
bilateral MNE activity at the ﬁrm level – empirical researchers should account
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for the main set of options and alternatives of investment for MNEs. Hence,
when considering the extensive margin of investment, one should consider all
main locations where ﬁrms could have invested rather than only those where
we actually observe investment. With MNEs that typically run aﬃliates in
only one host country or a small number of host countries, this means that
zeros feature prominently in the data. The latter requires methods which
are suitable for an analysis of nonlinear models with an excessive amount
of zeros and a relatively small amount of positive outcome at the ﬁrm level.
The latter is what we propose in this project. In doing so, we ﬁnd that host
country statutory tax rates aﬀect both the extensive as well as the intensive
margin of investment and other outcomes. DTTs mainly aﬀect the extensive
margin, and they exhibit a positive eﬀect on German MNE activity abroad.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sum-
marizes insights from previous work on the impact of statutory tax rates on
corporate proﬁts abroad and on DTTs on MNE activity. Section 3.3 provides
some information about the data on German MNEs we employ in this study
and the estimation methods applied in order to distinguish between eﬀects
of proﬁt taxation on the intensive and extensive margins of MNE activity.
Section 3.4 summarizes estimation results and provides a quantiﬁcation of
the role of the considered corporate proﬁt tax instruments on all margins
and outcomes of MNE activity we focus on. The last section concludes with
a summary of the most important insights.
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3.2 The Eﬀect of Foreign Statutory Tax Rates
and Double Taxation Treaties on Multi-
national Activity
A large body of theoretical work studies the consequences of proﬁt taxation
on ﬁrm-level behavior, especially, that of MNEs (see, e.g., Janeba, 1995,
1996, 1998; Devereux and Griﬃth 1998; Hines 1996; Raﬀ and Srinivasan,
1998; Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999; Hauﬂer and Schjelderup, 2000; Davies,
2003, 2004, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard 2003; Hauﬂer and Pﬂu¨ger, 2004;
Raﬀ, 2004; Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005; Fuest and Becker, 2010; for recent
examples; Wilson, 1999; Gresik, 2001; and Devereux, 2008; provide excellent
surveys of associated work). Clearly, there are two main channels through
which host country statutory corporate proﬁt tax rates aﬀect MNEs. First,
they determine the attractiveness of a location as compared to other locations
for MNE production for that and other markets by co-determining after-
tax proﬁts. Second, their impact might be aggravated through the double
taxation of foreign-earned proﬁts in the parent country.
Of course, even with unilateral tax exemption as in Germany, higher statu-
tory tax rates on proﬁts in a country reduce the incentive of foreign MNEs to
locate their subsidiaries there. The latter is a statement about the extensive
margin of investments and we would expect the probability of an investment
and the number of subsidiaries investors of a given parent country locate in
a host economy ceteris paribus to decline with an increase in the statutory
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corporate tax rate applied there. For a given number of subsidiaries in a
market, we also expect the extent of activity ceteris paribus to decline in
response to an increase in the statutory corporate tax rate of the host econ-
omy. The latter accrues to substitution of actual or recorded (e.g., through
proﬁt shifting) activity among host countries. There is a large body of ev-
idence at the aggregate level that higher (eﬀective or statutory) corporate
proﬁt tax rates tend to aﬀect MNE activity negatively (see Be´nassy-Que´re´,
Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil, 2005; Grubert and Mutti, 2004; and Egger,
Loretz, Pfaﬀermayr, and Winner, 2009; for a few examples). Also some of
the work on ﬁrm-level eﬀects (see the introduction for references) points in
that direction although it seems harder to identify eﬀects with micro data.
The impact of DTTs on MNE activity is less clear-cut, especially, if a parent
country applies tax exemption of foreign-earned proﬁts on a unilateral basis
as Germany does (see Egger, Larch, Pfaﬀermayr, and Winner, 2006). There
are two model conventions most DTTs are based on: the OECD and the
United Nations model conventions. The former is the one used mostly be-
tween developed countries – among which tax treaties were concluded ﬁrst –
and emphasizes the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of ﬁscal
evasion. However, with unilateral tax exemption, double taxation of foreign-
earned proﬁts is not an issue anyway so that the task of preventing ﬁscal
evasion and, otherwise, establishing transparency about the taxation of for-
eign proﬁts are dominant aspects. The United Nations model was developed
to promote the conclusion of DTTs with developing countries by addressing
their asymmetric situation as net importers of capital, which meant a one-
sided revenue sacriﬁce under the OECD draft model. Both models stress
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the importance of “removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to
the development of economic relations between countries”(OECD 2008, p. 7)
and the United Nations model further points to the “desirability of promot-
ing greater inﬂows of foreign investment to developing countries” (United
Nations 1999, p. vi). Clearly, the spirit of both models assumes a positive
eﬀect of the conclusion of tax treaties on FDI ﬂows. By specifying the mode
of taxation relief and agreeing on maximum levels of withholding tax rates,
DTTs reduce uncertainty about after-tax proﬁts and can indeed be expected
to foster foreign investment. However, other features of tax treaties such as
the exchange of information to limit transfer pricing and restrict tax eva-
sion, might rather discourage FDI. So a priori it is not clear if the eﬀect of
DTTs on foreign investment will be positive, especially, for a parent country
which applies unilateral tax exemption. In the light of these arguments, it is
hardly surprising that empirical evidence on the role of DTTs for FDI is not
conclusive (see Davies, 2004, for a review).
3.3 Data and Estimation Method
Our goal is to shed light on the importance of host country statutory tax
rates on corporate proﬁts as well as double taxation treaties (DTTs) on MNE
activity at the micro level. Broadly speaking, at the ﬁrm level, tax policy
instruments may have two types of eﬀects, namely at the extensive and at
the intensive margin of investment. The former relates to entry or exit of
ﬁrms in particular host countries in response to changes in statutory tax
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rates or the conclusion of DTTs, and the latter refers to changes in the level
of activity such as the number of subsidiaries per ﬁrm (which could also be
interpreted as an extensive margin), employment, foreign direct investment
or foreign assets.
Obviously, aggregate eﬀects of tax policy conceal possibly diﬀerential eﬀects
at the extensive and intensive margins of investment. If we are interested
in such a distinction, we need to retreat to micro-level data analysis and
apply models which support an analysis of tax eﬀects at both the extensive
and the intensive margins of MNE activity. We propose estimating two-part
quasi-maximum likelihood models, using panel data of MNE activity at the
ﬁrm level. The advantage of these models is that they combine a binary
part – referring to the investment versus no-investment case for a given ﬁrm,
host country, and year – with a continuous part. Moreover, such models
are less restrictive about the structure and form of the error term in the
continuous part than log-linear or sample-selection models. Finally, they
are quite easy to implement and interpret (see Egger, Larch, Staub, and
Winkelmann, 2010; for a discussion of the trade-oﬀ between two-part and
sample selection models).4
4In the health economics literature there is a long and ongoing debate on the suitability
of two-part models vs. sample selection models (for a review see Jones, 2000). The
choice of any model requires assumptions. Which set of assumptions is more restrictive
is arguable. Linear speciﬁcation of outcome with a sample selection model will be prone
to bias of estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities while two-part estimation with a
nonlinear outcome equation will be unbiased with heteroskedasticity and conditionally
uncorrelated errors (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Consistent estimation in the
presence of sample selection on unobservables relies on relatively strong distributional
assumptions. If selection is due only to time-invariant characteristics of the ﬁrm (within
the sample period), then, a ﬁxed-eﬀects approach controls perfectly for sample selection.
We exploit the panel structure of the data and pursue a ﬁxed-eﬀects approach, including
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3.3.1 The MiDi Data-Set
The Deutsche Bundesbank provides ﬁrm-level data on the universe of Ger-
man multinationals and their activity abroad through the Microdatabase Di-
rect Investment (MiDi) (above the reporting threshold).5 All German ﬁrms
and households which hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights in
a foreign enterprise with a balance sheet total of more than 3 million Euro
are required by law to report to the Deutsche Bundesbank balance sheet
information as well as information on the sector, legal form, and number of
employees of the investment object.6 Altogether, our sample comprises 6,915
ﬁrms over the period 1996 to 2005 which hold foreign aﬃliates in at least one
of 51 host countries (see the Appendix for a list of possible host countries).
This data-set allows us to analyze possible eﬀects of statutory tax rates on
corporate proﬁts abroad and of DTTs on the diﬀerent margins of investment
ﬁrm-by-country as well as ﬁrm-by-time ﬁxed eﬀects. We prefer a much more ﬂexible two-
part model with a nonlinear outcome equation that is robust to heteroskedasticity to a
linear sample selection model. That model allows the participation and outcome equations
to be generated by diﬀerent densities and makes no distributional assumptions.
5The data-set is made available under strict conditions and for clearly deﬁned academic
research purposes and can be used exclusively at the Research Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
6Indirect participating interests are to be reported whenever residents hold more than
50% in a foreign ﬁrm and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the
shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises. The reporting requirements are set
by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation. The reporting threshold was changed in
2002. Up to that year, a German ﬁrm had to report its international activities whenever
it owned 50% of shares or voting rights of a foreign company with a balance sheet total
of more than 1 million DM. As of 2002, those thresholds were changed into 10% and 3
million Euro respectively (see Lipponer, 2009). To get a uniform cutoﬀ, we restrict the
sample to those ﬁrms with a balance sheet total of 3 million Euro and an ownership of at
least 50%. We exclude indirectly held aﬃliates, as they might be held through enterprises
located in a third country.
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between 1996 and 2005 at an annual basis. Also, we are able to examine
their impact on diﬀerent aspects of multinational activity. In particular,
we consider possible eﬀects on the following ﬁrm-level outcomes of German
MNEs in a host country: the total number of aﬃliates held, the total number
of employees, the stock of direct investment,7 and ﬁxed assets. By using this
data-set, rather than exploiting aggregate bilateral data on MNE activity,
we should be able to gain a much better understanding of the exact channels
through which the considered proﬁt tax instruments aﬀect the behavior of
MNEs.
3.3.2 Determinants of MNE Activity
We model MNE activity as a function of the following regressors. First of
all, there are two tax instruments of primary interest to us: 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 (the
statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts in host country 푗 and year 푡− 1) and
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 (a binary variable indicating whether a DTT applies to investments
in 푗 and year 푡−1).8 Otherwise, the 푁푇 ×퐾 matrix of explanatory variables
includes the following covariates: 퐷퐸푃푗,푡−1 (the depreciation allowance on
an average investment in the host country), 퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 (the log of real host
country GDP), 퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 (the log of the capital-labor ratio in the host
country), 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 (the log of the tertiary school enrollment rate in the
7As calculated by the Deutsche Bundesbank according to the IMF/OECD method; see
Lipponer (2009, p.15).
8We assume that the ﬁrm outcomes in period 푡, such as number of aﬃliates held, em-
ployees, investment and ﬁxed assets are aﬀected by the tax instruments and economic
fundamentals, observed in the previous period, 푡− 1. Regressions using the contempora-
neous tax rate instead of the lagged tax rate are available upon request. The main results
remain unchanged.
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host country), 푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 (the average turnover of other ﬁrms in ﬁrm 푖’s sector
and host country 푗), 푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 (ﬁxed assets per employee of other ﬁrms in
ﬁrm 푖’s sector),9 as well as ﬁrm-year and ﬁrm-host-country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The choice of the control variables is motivated by the theory of MNEs and
trade which suggests, apart from (over a short time horizon as ours mostly
time-invariant) trade and investment costs, two key determinants of multi-
national activity (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Davies, 2005; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007):
market size, skilled-to-unskilled labor endowments, and capital-labor-ratios.
These determine the prevalent type of multinational ﬁrms in the host coun-
try, large-market-seeking horizontal multinationals that produce the same
product at home and abroad and low-production-cost-seeking vertical ones
that produce headquarter services in skill-abundant economies and goods in
skill-scarce ones. We proxy market size with the host country’s GDP and
availability of skilled labor by tertiary school enrollment ratio. Bergstrand
and Egger (2007) point to the role of physical capital for MNEs’ plant set-
up. We include the capital-labor ratio of the host country. Our data-base
comprises starkly heterogenous ﬁrms active in numerous sectors. We lack in-
formation on sectoral gross product or capital stock at the country level for
all the year coverage, therefore, we include assets per employee and average
turnover of all other German ﬁrms in the same sector in the host country to
capture that heterogeneity.
9The variables 푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 and 푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 were constructed taking the average turnover
and assets per employee respectively over all German MNEs except ﬁrm 푖 in the same
sector, host country, and year.
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Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics and a deﬁnition of the variables.
The data on DTTs signed by Germany are available from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The data on statutory
taxes (푇퐴푋푗,푡−1) and depreciation allowances (퐷퐸푃푗,푡−1) were collected in
Egger, Loretz, Pfaﬀermayr, and Winner (2006). The data on real GDP,
capital-labor ratio, and tertiary school enrollment come from the 2007 edition
of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data on capital-labor
ratios were taken from Bergstrand and Egger (2007). Finally, 푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 and
푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 were constructed on the basis of information contained in theMiDi
data-set.
3.3.3 Speciﬁcation and Estimation of Two-Part
Models
Location decisions of MNEs will be aﬀected by time-invariant (regulatory,
geographical, institutional) as well as time-variant (economic) conditions. In
particular, we would expect proﬁt tax instruments to change these decisions
indirectly but have a qualitatively diﬀerent impact on decisions about the
extent of investment and other outcomes. We thus expect the proﬁt tax
instruments we focus on – i.e., statutory tax rates on corporate proﬁts and
DTTs – to aﬀect lumpy foreign investment decisions at the extensive margin,
namely the probability of an MNE to set up an aﬃliate in a particular host
country, and, at the intensive margin, the extent of an MNEs’ activity there
conditional on some investment diﬀerently.
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A two-part model (TPM) allows us to disentangle these two eﬀects by letting
the zeros and positive outcomes be generated by diﬀerent densities. The ﬁrst
part of the TPM is a binary outcome model and the second part describes
the distribution of the outcome conditional on the outcome being positive.
Deﬁne a binary indicator variable 퐼푖푗푡 = 1 if a ﬁrm 푖 holds a foreign aﬃliate in
host country 푗 at time 푡 (for pairs 푖푗 = 1, . . . , 푁 and 푡 = 1, . . . , 푇 ) and 퐼푖푗푡 = 0
otherwise. Let 푦푖푗푡 be the outcome of ﬁrm 푖 in host country 푗 at time 푡, x푖푗,푡−1
a 1×퐾 vector of ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc explanatory variables (including
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 the statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts in host country 푗 at
time 푡− 1, 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 a dummy variable indicating if there is a DTT in place
between Germany and country 푗 at time 푡 − 1, and the control variables),
and 훼푖푗 a time-invariant ﬁrm-host speciﬁc eﬀect. The TPM for 푦푖푗푡 is then
given by
푓(푦푖푗푡∣.) =
⎧⎨⎩푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 0∣x푖푗,푡−1, 훼푖푗) if 푦푖푗푡 = 0푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 1∣.)푓(푦푖푗푡∣퐼푖푗푡 = 1,x푖푗,푡−1, 훼푖푗) if 푦푖푗푡 > 0
We estimate the eﬀect of statutory corporate tax rates DTTs on the partic-
ipation decision 퐼푖푗푡 (the extensive margin) by specifying 푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 1∣.) as a
probit for whether or not a ﬁrm 푖 holds an aﬃliate in country 푗 at time 푡.
퐼푖푗푡 = 1 whenever ﬁrm 푖 owns any aﬃliate in a given host country 푗 in year
푡, no matter how many or which ones. A change in the industry aﬃliation
of an aﬃliate would thus not change 퐼푖푗푡. However, if the extent of activities
is below the reporting thresholds, 퐼푖푗푡 = 0. If the activity of ﬁrm 푖 in 푗 is
above the reporting threshold in year 푡− 1, below it in year 푡, and above it
in year 푡+1, this would be considered as exit in 푡 an re-entry in 푡+1. Notice
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that we may not include dummy variables for ﬁxed ﬁrm-host-country eﬀects
since all model parameters would be biased due to the incidental parameter
problem, then. However, we may still control for ﬁxed ﬁrm-host-country ef-
fects (and, similarly, for ﬁxed ﬁrm-year eﬀects) by inserting respective means
of all covariates in the corresponding dimensions, following Mundlak (1978),
Chamberlain (1982, 1984), and Wooldridge (2002).10 As indicated in the pre-
vious subsection, we include ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects apart from (individual)
ﬁrm-host-country ﬁxed eﬀects to capture exhaustively common eﬀects in the
time and cross-sectional dimensions (note that we have therefore ruled out a
possible bias of the omission of aggregate time-variant variables for Germany
as well as the one of time-invariant eﬀects such as distance between Germany
and host country 푖, etc.).
We make no distributional assumptions about the second part of the model,
푓(푦푖푗푡∣퐼푖푗푡 = 1, .), and specify it as an exponential regression model.11 The
latter copes with potential mis-speciﬁcation of the error term by transforming
the model log-linearly (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, for arguments in
a diﬀerent context), and obtains the eﬀect of the tax instruments of interest
on the intensive margin 푦푖푗푡. Similar to the ﬁrst part, we include individual
eﬀects 훼푖푗 by specifying 퐸(훼푖푗∣x푖푗) = x¯′푖푗휋 where 푥¯푖푗 are the ﬁrm-host-country
means of the regressors (see Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1982, 1984; and
10Alternatively, one could estimate annual probit models by allowing the parameters of
the covariates to vary across the years. However, this would come at the expense of not
being able to control for ﬁrm-host-country ﬁxed eﬀects but only for separate ﬁrm and host
country eﬀects.
11See Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) for a Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model using passive assets
as the dependent variable. However, in contrast to ours, their model does not represent a
two-part approach.
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Wooldridge, 2002). By convention, the same regressors are allowed to and,
in our application, do appear in both parts of the model.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We present the results of our empirical analysis in two parts. First, we
summarize parameter estimates of covariates, in particular, of statutory tax
rates on corporate proﬁts and DTTs, on bilateral MNE activity at the ﬁrm
level. As mentioned before, we use the number of aﬃliates, the number of
employees, the FDI stock, and ﬁxed assets as alternative outcomes and ana-
lyze eﬀects on the extensive and the intensive margin of activity separately.
Then, we discuss eﬀects of 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 and 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 by taking the nonlinear
nature of the estimated models into account.12 Also, we quantify impact
eﬀects of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 on outcome by means of comparisons of predicted eﬀects
and counterfactual predictions which are based on changed 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1.
12In principal, 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 and 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 could be endogenous. However, this is very
unlikely for the following reasons. First, the unit of observation is an individual ﬁrm in
a host country and year. These units will unlikely aﬀect aggregate government decisions.
Moreover, these variables are lagged by one year. Furthermore, we include ﬁrm-year
and ﬁrm-country ﬁxed eﬀects so that any endogeneity bias would have to come from the
remaining variation in the disturbances. If the selection bias of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 is time-invariant,
or there is no impact of future ﬁrm activity (the dependent variables) on lagged 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1,
the estimated parameters are free of selection bias.
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Table 3.2: Estimation results Poisson QML (whole sample)
Poisson QML
푎푓푓푖푙푖푎푡푒푠 푒푚푝푙표푦푒푒푠 퐹퐷퐼 푎푠푠푒푡푠
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -1.175*** -3.797*** -4.069*** -5.322***
(0.194) (0.754) (1.153) (1.549)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.062** 0.184* 0.253** 0.270**
(0.027) (0.104) (0.101) (0.122)
퐷퐸푃푗,푡−1 -0.347*** -0.251 -0.288 -0.162
(0.122) (0.270) (0.498) (0.542)
퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 0.817*** 0.697* 1.432** 1.021
(0.119) (0.381) (0.580) (0.690)
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 0.516*** 0.920*** 0.816*** 0.992**
(0.053) (0.196) (0.286) (0.415)
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 0.059 -0.129 0.104 -0.134
(0.051) (0.137) (0.255) (0.306)
푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(1.8e-04) (5.1e-04) (6.9e-04) (9.8e-04)
푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 3.7e-05*** 7.7e-05*** 2.2e-05*** 1.5e-06
(4.3e-06) (2.9e-05) (8.0e-06) (5.5e-06)
Marginal Eﬀects
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -0.035*** -20.044*** -13.883*** -13.547***
(0.006) (4.087) (3.880) (3.776)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.002** 0.921* 0.801*** 0.636**
(0.001) (0.491) (0.296) (0.255)
Wald 13,548 3,541 3,723 2,383
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log.L. -260,152 -46,661,315 -40,504,794 -31,801,667
Obs. 1,485,711 1,485,711 1,485,711 1,485,711
Groups 332,714 332,714 332,714 332,714
Notes: All regressions include ﬁrm-host and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors clustered by
ﬁrm-host pair reported in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **, and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower third of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test
statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the
number of observations, and the number of groups (ﬁrm-host pairs). Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the
sample mean.
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In Table 3.2, we report the results of a Poisson QML model using the whole
sample of ﬁrms. There, we estimate the eﬀect of statutory tax rates and
DTTs on the conditional mean of outcome 푦푖푗푡, irrespective of whether the
ﬁrm actually operates an aﬃliate there or not. In principal, the associated
econometric model is identical to the second part of a two-part model, except
that one does not condition on positive outcome. By assumption, that model
copes with a proportionate but not an excessive amount of zero outcome in
the data.
The four columns of Table 3.2 refer to the outcomes number of aﬃliates,
number of employees, FDI stock, and ﬁxed assets, respectively. After con-
trolling for the aforementioned economic fundamentals, statutory corporate
tax rates display a negative impact on any of the outcomes while DTT gen-
erally exerts a positive eﬀect. In any case, the parameter estimates of the
two proﬁt tax variables of interest are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The estimated semi-elasticities of host-country statutory tax rate on corpo-
rate proﬁts range from -1.17 to -5.32, a magnitude which is comparable to
previous ﬁndings, mostly for aggregate data (see de Mooij and Ederveen,
2006, for a meta-analysis where they ﬁnd a typical semi-elasticity of -2.1;
Overesch and Wamser, 2009, using the same data-set and a count-data anal-
ysis ﬁnd a semi-elasticity of -2.17).13 The estimated eﬀect of a DTT ranges
13In the Poisson model, as in any model with an exponential conditional mean
퐸(푦∣x) = 푒푥푝(x′훽), the regression coeﬃcients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities since
the marginal eﬀect 푀퐸푘 = 퐸(푦∣x)× 훽푘, so 훽푘 =푀퐸푘/퐸(푦∣x). The eﬀect of the discrete
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from 6.4% (on the expected number of aﬃliates) to 31% (on the expected
volume of ﬁxed assets). The point estimates for a host country’s deprecia-
tion allowances turns out to be negative, which is counter-intuitive, but the
corresponding estimate is almost always insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
While the semi-elasticities in Table 3.2 are interesting, they are not conducive
to a quantiﬁcation at ﬁrst glance. Therefore, we report marginal eﬀects of
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 and 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 in the lower part of the table. The corresponding
eﬀects suggest that an increase in the statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts
of the average host country and year 푡 − 1 by one percentage point reduces
employment, stocks of outbound FDI, or total assets there by about 0.2 em-
ployees, 14,000 Euro of stocks of FDI, and 14,000 of assets, respectively. It
reduces the number of aﬃliates by about 0.0004 on average. The correspond-
ing eﬀect of concluding a DTT where there was none before is considerably
less important.
Regarding the non-tax location determinants, we ﬁnd that both a larger host
country market-size (measured by GDP) and the availability of skilled labor
have a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on the activity of a ﬁrm in that country. The
capital-labor ratio, on the other hand, does not seem to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on any ﬁrm outcome, after controlling for relative endowments with
skilled relative to unskilled labor.
The results described in Table 3.2 reveal that statutory corporate tax rates
change in a binary variable such as DTT would be 푀퐸푘 = 푒푥푝(x
′훽 + 훽푘) − 푒푥푝(x′훽) =
(푒훽푘−1)푒푥푝(x′훽) meaning a percentage change of 100×(푒훽푘−1) (see Cameron and Trivedi,
2005).
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have a signiﬁcant negative and tax treaties a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on foreign investment in a given host country, but are not informative about
the extent to which these tax instruments aﬀect the location decision of
ﬁrms (i.e., the extensive margin of MNE activity) or the outcomes of ﬁrms
conditional on location in a host country (i.e., the intensive margin of MNE
activity). To shed light on this matter, we turn to the results of the two-part
model in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.3 reports the probit estimates of the
eﬀect of the tax variables of interest on the probability of a ﬁrm to set up an
aﬃliate in a host country (the extensive margin), and Table 3.4 shows their
eﬀect on the extent of a positive outcome (the intensive margin) by means of
a Poisson QML regression, i.e., conditional on the ﬁrm to having set up an
aﬃliate in host country 푗 in year 푡 or before that. All dependent variables are
once-lagged and all regressions include ﬁrm-host and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The probit estimates in Table 3.3 suggest that the statutory tax rate of the
host country deters lumpy foreign investment there. On the other hand,
the conclusion of a DTT has indeed a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability of a ﬁrm to set up an aﬃliate in the host country. All of that is
in line with our expectations from a theoretical point of view. There is no
signiﬁcant (indirect) eﬀect of depreciation allowances in the host country on
investment there.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the Poisson QML model which – unlike in
Table 3.2 – is run on the subsample observations with a positive outcome
푦푖푗푡. As said before, the corresponding parameter estimates reﬂect the eﬀect
of the tax variables of interest and the other covariates on ﬁrm outcomes
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of two-part models I
Probit
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -0.627***
(0.085)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.025**
(0.010)
퐷퐸푃푗,푡−1 -0.070
(0.047)
퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 0.425***
(0.052)
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 0.239***
(0.020)
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 -0.013
(0.022)
푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 -0.001***
(1.67e-04)
푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 1.7e-05***
(2.6e-06)
Marginal Eﬀects
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 -0.039***
(0.005)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 0.002**
(0.001)
Wald 11,288
p-value 0.000
Log.L. -235,100
Obs. 1,485,711
Groups 332,714
Notes: All regressions include ﬁrm-host and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors clustered by ﬁrm-host pair reported
in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **,
and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The lower third of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test statistic
for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of
the log-likelihood function, the number of observations, and the
number of groups (ﬁrm-host pairs). Marginal eﬀects evaluated at
the sample mean.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of two-part models II
Poisson QML
푎푓푓푖푙푖푎푡푒푠 푒푚푝푙표푦푒푒푠 퐹퐷퐼 푎푠푠푒푡푠
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 0.069 -1.526** -2.277** -3.221**
(0.075) (0.615) (1.005) (1.424)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 -0.003 0.077 0.130 0.149*
(0.011) (0.070) (0.080) (0.089)
퐷퐸푃푗,푡−1 -0.173* 0.075 0.575 0.372
(0.095) (0.401) (0.770) (0.823)
퐺퐷푃푗,푡−1 -0.024 -0.552 1.065 -0.132
(0.079) (0.500) (0.778) (0.978)
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗,푡−1 -0.028 0.352* 0.130 0.339
(0.026) (0.196) (0.288) (0.429)
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗,푡−1 0.073** -0.046 0.019 0.035
(0.031) (0.156) (0.294) (0.344)
푆푇푅푖푗,푡−1 -4.1e-04*** -3.2e-03*** -3.6e-03*** -4.3e-03**
(1.5e-04) (1.0e-03) (1.2e-03) (1.8e-03)
푆퐴퐸푖푗,푡−1 -2.3e-06** 4.0e-05* -1.5e-05*** -2.5e-05***
(1.2e-06) (2.1e-05) (3.8e-06) (3.8e-06)
Marginal Eﬀects
푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 0.075 -251.885* -322.999* -301.849*
(0.081) (103.750) (142.210) (132.940)
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 -0.003 12.417 17.610* 13.180*
(0.012) (11.030) (10.370) (7.535)
Wald 158 769 626 554
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log.L. -68,259 -13,435,736 -14,432,744 -13,588,531
Obs. 63,496 63,496 63,496 63,496
Groups 14,940 14,940 14,940 14,940
Notes: All regressions include ﬁrm-host and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors clustered by
ﬁrm-host pair reported in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **, and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower third of the table reports the Wald (휒2) test
statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the
number of observations, and the number of groups (ﬁrm-host pairs). Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the
sample mean.
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conditional on them being positive (i.e., conditional on the ﬁrm running at
least one aﬃliate in host country 푗 and year 푡). As in Table 3.2, we ﬁnd
a negative eﬀect of statutory tax rates on the level of ﬁrm activity which
is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero after conditioning on positive
investment. The semi-elasticities for the parameter of 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 lie in the
same range as those reported in Table 3.2. However, we do not generally
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of DTTs on outcome any more. Only when using
the volume of ﬁxed assets as outcome is the parameter estimate of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1
positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. Hence,
it seems that DTTs aﬀect the outbound activity of German MNEs mainly
through their eﬀect on the extensive margin of investment.
As in Table 3.2, we report not only semi-elasticities but also marginal eﬀects
of 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 and 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 in Tables 3 and 4. Except for the intensive margin
of the number of foreign aﬃliates in Table 3.4, the sign of the semi-elasticities
as well as the marginal eﬀects is the same in Tables 3 and 4 as in Table 3.2.
However, the marginal eﬀects of the two tax instruments are much larger
in absolute value than they were in Table 3.2. The reason for the latter is
that the semi-elasticities are not much diﬀerent between Tables 3.2 and 3.4,
but we condition on positive outcome in Table 3.4. Notice that the positive
marginal eﬀect of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for FDI stocks
as an outcome even though the semi-elasticity is not. The latter has to do
with the non-linearity of the model.
In Table 3.5, we summarize further insights for a counterfactual change from
no DTT to a DTT if there was any. Again, we summarize the results by
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Table 3.5: Counterfactual effects of DTTs
Poisson QML (whole sample)
푎푓푓푖푙푖푎푡푒푠 푒푚푝푙표푦푒푒푠 퐹퐷퐼 푎푠푠푒푡푠
Predicted 퐸(푦푖푗푡∣.) 0.047 7.809 6.715 4.545
Counterfactual
퐸(푦푖푗푡∣., 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 0) 0.044 6.679 5.362 3.574
퐸(푦푖푗푡∣., 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 1) 0.047 8.029 6.902 4.681
%-change 6.3% 20.2% 28.7% 31%
Probit
Predicted 푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 1∣.) 0.043
Counterfactual
푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 1∣., 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 0) 0.041
푃푟(퐼푖푗푡 = 1∣., 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 1) 0.043
%-change 5.13%
Poisson QML conditional on positive investment
푎푓푓푖푙푖푎푡푒푠 푒푚푝푙표푦푒푒푠 퐹퐷퐼 푎푠푠푒푡푠
Predicted 퐸(푦푖푗푡∣., 퐼푖푗푡 = 1) 1.094 182.727 157.121 106.338
Counterfactual
퐸(푦푖푗푡∣., 퐼푖푗푡 = 1, 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 0) 1.097 171.001 139.767 93.064
퐸(푦푖푗푡∣., 퐼푖푗푡 = 1, 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 = 1) 1.094 184.781 159.245 107.998
%-change 13.93% 16.04%
Notes: % change reported only for outcomes where the estimated eﬀect of 퐷푇푇 is signiﬁcant at the 15%
level.
computing averages across all cross-sectional units and years. We do so for
all models we report results for in Tables 2, 3 and 4. For each model, we
report ﬁrst the mean of the predicted outcome based on observed data and
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1. Moreover, we report the mean of the prediction after setting all
DTTs ﬁrst to zero, and then to one. We also report the corresponding %-
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change for all outcomes where the estimated eﬀect of 퐷푇푇 was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent at 15 percent. At the top of Table 3.5 we report the eﬀect of DTTs
on the mean of the predictions for the model where we do not condition on
positive outcome. The eﬀect ranges from 6.3% (on the expected number of
aﬃliates) to 31% (on the expected volume of ﬁxed assets). Below, we see how
DTTs aﬀect the extensive and intensive margins separately. The predicted
probability of setting up an aﬃliate is 5.13% higher after setting all DTTs
to one. Conditioning on positive outcome, the eﬀect of a change of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1
from zero to one on the expected stock of FDI and volume of ﬁxed assets is
13.93% and 16.04% respectively.
All eﬀects reported in Table 3.5 are average eﬀects. The non-linearity of the
models implies that the eﬀect of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 depends on the value of the regres-
sors. It is therefore interesting to evaluate the eﬀect of DTTs and statutory
tax rates together. In Figures 3.1 to 3.3 we show the eﬀect of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 on
the whole distribution of 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1. We plot the eﬀect of 푇퐴푋푗,푡−1 on the
predicted outcome for the two values of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1. The diﬀerence between
the two curves is the marginal eﬀect of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1.
Figure 3.1 plots the predicted probability of a ﬁrm setting up an aﬃliate in
a host country as a function of the host country statutory tax rate. The
marginal eﬀect of 퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 (the diﬀerence between the two curves) decreases
with the statutory tax rate. The probability that a ﬁrm will set up an aﬃliate
in a host country after the conclusion of a DTT is greater for countries with
lower statutory tax rates. In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we repeat the exercise for
the conditional mean of FDI stock and volume of ﬁxed assets respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Eﬀect of statutory tax rates and 퐷푇푇 on the predicted proba-
bility of setting up an aﬃliate
Again, the increase in the expected outcome associated with a change in
퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 is larger for countries with lower statutory tax rates. In Figure 3.3,
the marginal eﬀect of퐷푇푇푗,푡−1 on the expected average volume of ﬁxed assets
of a ﬁrm in a host country ranges from about 0.7 mn Euro at a statutory tax
rate of 0.53 to 2.8 mn at a tax rate of 0.10%.
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper proposes estimating two-part empirical models for an assessment
of the impact of proﬁt tax policy instruments on outcome measuring bilateral
multinational activity at the ﬁrm level. At the bilateral level, outcome of the
activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is characterized by numerous ze-
ros in the data, since MNEs tend to set up aﬃliates in only a small number
of countries. From an empirical point of view this generates data on bilateral
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Figure 3.3: Eﬀect of statutory tax rates and 퐷푇푇 on the conditional mean
of 푎푠푠푒푡푠
ﬁrm-level MNE activity with numerous zeros and a much smaller number of
positive outcome about numbers of aﬃliates, employment abroad, stocks of
FDI, or total assets abroad per host country. Accordingly, it is impossible
for simple nonlinear models such as non-linear least squares or the Poisson
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Poisson QMLE) to cope with the nu-
merous zeros in the data appropriately. However, the empirical economist
can improve tremendously on empirical model performance by resorting to
a two-part modeling strategy, where one part is binary and about the ex-
tensive margin (zero versus positive outcome per ﬁrm and host country) and
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the other part is continuous and about the intensive margin. The latter can
be estimated by ordinary least squares, nonlinear least squares, or Poisson
QMLE. An advantage of the Poisson QMLE is that it is robust against mis-
speciﬁcation of the error term if a log-transformation of the model is not
appropriate (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
We apply Poisson QMLE with a two-part modeling strategy to ﬁrm-level
data about the activity of German MNEs abroad. In particular, we focus on
the the role of statutory corporate tax rates abroad and of double taxation
treaties (DTTs) signed by Germany on the number of aﬃliates, total employ-
ment, stocks of foreign direct investment, and total assets in the host country.
We employ panel data with annual frequency for the decade between 1996
and 2005 as made available by the Deutsche Bundesbank through its MiDi
database.
We ﬁnd that higher statutory tax rates in a potential host country reduce
the probability of setting up the ﬁrst aﬃliate by a German MNE there signif-
icantly. The latter relates to the extensive margin of investment by German
MNEs. Also, higher statutory tax rates reduce the activity at the intensive
margin, i.e., they tend to reduce the number of aﬃliates (beyond the ﬁrst
one), the number of employees, the value of FDI stocks, and the value of
foreign assets. DTTs tend to raise the incentive of a ﬁrst investment and,
if having any eﬀect at the intensive margin, they raise outbound FDI and
foreign assets. However, the role of DTTs in absolute value is much smaller
than the one of foreign statutory tax rates.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the tax responsiveness of multinationals’ investment
decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing ﬁrms that are able to shift prof-
its (shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters). From a theoretical point
of view, the tax responsiveness of ﬁrms crucially depends on this distinction.
Empirically, however, a ﬁrm’s ability to shift proﬁts is inherently unobserved.
To address this problem, we use a ﬁnite mixture modeling approach which al-
lows us to distinguish shifters from non-shifters stochastically from a mixture
of distributions of the two types of ﬁrms. Using a panel data-set of 38,705
foreign aﬃliates of the universe of German multinationals over the years 1996
to 2007, we ﬁnd that shifters do not respond to host-country proﬁt taxes at
all, as expected, while taxes aﬀect the investment decision of non-shifters.
More speciﬁcally, a one-percentage-point increase in the statutory corporate
proﬁt tax rate of a host country is associated with a reduction of the ﬁxed
assets of non-shifters in the host country by 1.85%.
4.1 Introduction
A vast amount of empirical research on the proﬁt-tax responsiveness of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) suggests a robust negative impact of proﬁt
taxation on the location and size of foreign investments. In a meta-analysis
on the matter, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) ﬁnd that the median semi-
elasticity amounts to −3.3. Hence, a one-percentage-point increase in a host
country’s (corporate) proﬁt tax rate triggers, ceteris paribus, a decline of
(bilateral) FDI by about 3.3% there.1 However, the same study by De Mooij
1A more recent study of De Mooij and Ederveen (2006) ﬁnds a somewhat smaller
median semi-elasticity of −2.1. Hines (1999) suggests an average proﬁt tax elasticity of
FDI of about −0.60.
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and Ederveen (2003) also documents a big variance of the estimated proﬁt
tax elasticities of FDI across studies. Common explanations for the latter
are the diﬀerences in the applied empirical speciﬁcations and the data used.
Yet diﬀerences in tax elasticities may also be rationalized by the speciﬁc
responses of heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Diﬀerences in the characteristics of multinational ﬁrms – such as their geo-
graphical aﬃliate pattern, their ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, their specialization pat-
tern, ﬁrm size, etc. – may not only explain why some ﬁrms enter a speciﬁc
market. Such characteristics crucially determine whether and to what extent
a multinational can reduce its overall tax burden by shifting proﬁts from high-
tax to low-tax countries and, hence, a ﬁrm’s responsiveness to proﬁt taxes. In
a recent paper, Egger, Eggert, and Winner (2010) investigate whether foreign
plant ownership involves lower tax payments than domestic plant ownership.
They ﬁnd that tax payments of foreign-owned ﬁrms are lower than those of
domestic ﬁrms in high-tax countries but higher in low-tax countries, which is
consistent with the presumption that multinationals shift income. Of course,
national ﬁrms are not able to shift income to other countries at all, but nei-
ther are all multinational ﬁrms necessarily capable of shifting proﬁts to an
arbitrary extent.
Which multinationals are able to shift proﬁts, rendering them fairly insensi-
tive to proﬁt taxation? How big is their fraction in all ﬁrms? By how much
diﬀer shifters and non-shifters of proﬁts in their tax responsiveness? Those
appear to be questions of vital interest to economists and policy makers for
the following reasons. First, with a coexistence of shifting multinationals (i.e.
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unresponsive to taxes) and non-shifting multinationals (i.e. highly respon-
sive to taxes), knowledge of an average rate of response of aggregate FDI is
not informative about important margins at the ﬁrm level. In particular, it
conceals eﬀects on the distribution of the two types of ﬁrms. Second, to the
extent that possible shifters and non-shifters diﬀer with regard to economic
characteristics such as average employment or their location within coun-
tries, knowledge of heterogeneous responses of these types of ﬁrms may allow
us to draw conclusions for the responsiveness of speciﬁc economic (regional)
aggregates to tax policy changes.
This paper sheds light on the impact of taxes on the investment decision
of foreign aﬃliates of the universe of German multinationals by allowing
for distinct responses of inherently unobserved shifters and non-shifters of
proﬁts. The logic is straightforward: a ﬁrm which is capable of shifting at
least part of its tax base should be less aﬀected by (i.e., less responsive to)
changes in proﬁt taxes with regard to its foreign investment decisions than
others. By the same token, non-shifters should face higher costs of capital
and, in turn, lower levels of investment in high-proﬁt-tax host countries than
shifters of proﬁts. These arguments are consistent with theoretical work em-
phasizing that restrictions on the opportunities for tax planning may result
in adverse consequences for multinationals’ investment in high-tax countries,
which subsequently may reinforce tax competition (see, for example, Keen,
2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Peralta, Wauthy, van Ypersele, 2006; Bucov-
etsky and Hauﬂer, 2008; Hauﬂer and Runkel, 2008).
The major challenge in analyzing empirically the diﬀerent tax responsiveness
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of shifters and non-shifters is that proﬁt shifting of multinational ﬁrms itself
is inherently unobservable. We approach this issue by using a ﬁnite mixture
model to estimate the diﬀerent tax responsiveness of latent proﬁt shifters
and non-shifters. Finite mixture models are a semiparametric approach to
modeling unobserved heterogeneity. The population of interest – in our case,
all investments of the universe of German multinational ﬁrms – is assumed to
be composed of a ﬁnite number of distinct but unidentiﬁed latent classes or
population components – here, proﬁt shifters and non-shifters. The density
of all units (investments) is modeled as an additive mixture of the subpop-
ulations. Any randomly drawn observation has a given a priori probability
of belonging to one of the groups – shifters and non-shifters of proﬁts. The
unknown prior probability of belonging to either one of the classes is esti-
mated along with the other parameters. That prior probability is assumed
either constant and equal to the proportion of ﬁrms in that group, or it is
parameterized and modeled as a function of observables which vary across
observations.
Finite mixture models have been introduced in the econometrics literature
by Heckman and Singer (1984) and have recently gained popularity in the
health economics literature, where most studies use cross-sectional data (see
Deb and Trivedi, 1997, 2002; Smith Conway, and Deb, 2005; Ayyagari, Deb,
Fletcher, Gallo, and Sindelar, 2009a,b). Finite mixture models have been
applied to panel data by Bago d’Uva (2005, 2006) or Deb and Trivedi (2011).
In this paper we ﬁt ﬁnite mixture models to a panel of foreign aﬃliates
of German multinational ﬁrms, and account for aﬃliate-speciﬁc unobserved
eﬀects by modeling the conditional mean of the unobserved eﬀects following
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the approach of Mundlak (1978) as popularized by Chamberlain (1984) and
Wooldrige (2002).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to investigate whether
and to which extent the investment decisions of multinational ﬁrms in host
countries depend on their unobserved ability to shift proﬁts or not. We iden-
tify two groups of ﬁrms which diﬀer in their average investment levels and
react diﬀerently to corporate proﬁt taxation. The larger group of ﬁrms, asso-
ciated with a lower average investment, is not able to shift proﬁts and reacts
negatively to corporate tax rates. The estimated tax semi-elasticity of these
ﬁrms ranges from -1.85 to -2.32, magnitudes in line with previous ﬁndings.
However, there is a smaller group of ﬁrms, which is characterized by a higher
average investment, that displays no signiﬁcant response to corporate taxes.
In our preferred speciﬁcation, a one-percentage-point increase in the statu-
tory proﬁt tax rate is associated with a 1.85% lower stock of ﬁxed assets of
a non-shifting foreign aﬃliate. This eﬀect amounts to 68,000 Euro for the
average aﬃliate of that kind with an average investment of 3.65 million Euro
in ﬁxed assets. The average shifting aﬃliate has a much higher investment
in ﬁxed assets of about 155 million Euro. If such an aﬃliate were prevented
from shifting proﬁts and were to respond to corporate tax rates in the same
way as the average non-shifting aﬃliate, the estimated semi-elasticity would
imply an eﬀect of 2.88 million Euro of ﬁxed assets per percentage point tax
increase.
The ﬁndings carry implications for tax policy. The consequences for a given
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country of introducing measures to prevent proﬁt shifting will depend on
the composition of aﬃliates investing in that country. To the extent that
a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign investments are carried out
by ﬁrms that shift proﬁts, the adoption of a policy to restrict proﬁt-shifting
opportunities would expose them to tax competition with other countries over
the shifting ﬁrms’ investments. The country would have to lower corporate
proﬁt tax rates signiﬁcantly in order to prevent a signiﬁcant relocation of
plants and capital of investment projects from its jurisdiction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
empirical literature on proﬁt taxation and multinational ﬁrms. Section 4.3
presents a very simple model, brieﬂy demonstrating that the tax elasticity of
capital depends on the extent to which a ﬁrm is able to shift income. Section
4.4.1 describes the econometric model applied. Section 4.4.2 presents the
data we use for the empirical investigation. The results are discussed in
Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 State of the Literature – Empirical Re-
search on Proﬁt Taxes and Multinational
Firms
Our study is related to the empirical literature on the consequences of proﬁt
taxation on multinational ﬁrm behavior, which is basically organized along
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three lines of interest. First, some work focuses on the role of proﬁt taxes
for the location decision of ﬁrms’ lumpy investments (for example, Devereux
and Griﬃth, 1998; Devereux and Griﬃth, 2003; Bu¨ttner and Ruf, 2007; Bar-
rios, Huizinga, Laeven, Nicode`me, 2008; Becker, Egger and Merlo, 2009). A
second line of research is concerned with the question of how taxes aﬀect a
ﬁrm’s level of foreign investment or assets held abroad (for a review and meta-
studies of empirical work see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006, 2008). A
third line of work is interested in the extent of tax avoidance through proﬁt
shifting, debt shifting, or transfer pricing (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines
and Rice, 1994; Swenson, 2001; Clausing, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008;
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me, 2008; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; We-
ichenrieder, 2009; Egger, Eggert, Winner, 2010; Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg,
Winner, 2010). While Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994),
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Weichenrieder (2009) focus on the alloca-
tion of proﬁts, other work investigates speciﬁc strategies that are used to shift
income to low-tax countries. For instance, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me
(2008) and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2009) examine how tax-rate diﬀerentials
aﬀect the use of debt. Swenson (2001) and Clausing (2003) investigate how
ﬁrms manipulate internal transfer prices to reduce taxation.
Other studies analyze how investment decisions of ﬁrms are aﬀected by tax-
planning strategies. Hines (1996) investigates foreign investment in the U.S.
distinguishing between investors from countries that exempt foreign income
and investors from countries that grant foreign tax credits. He shows that
investors operating under tax-credit systems exhibit a lower tax sensitivity
than investors from countries with tax-exemption regimes. Overesch (2009)
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draws indirect conclusions from country characteristics that might determine
the opportunities to shift proﬁts. In particular, investment in a host country
may depend on the tax rate at the location of the direct owner and, hence,
given that ﬁrms shift proﬁts, the cost of capital in the host country may
increase in the tax rate at the direct owner’s location. Overesch and Wamser
(2009) show that the proﬁt tax responses of multinational ﬁrms depend on
ﬁrm characteristics, which may be related to proﬁt-shifting opportunities.
The studies just mentioned suggest that tax bases may be unbundled from
real economic activity, at least to some extent. This has major implications
for decisions of multinational ﬁrms. For instance, proﬁt taxes have a limited
relevance for location and investment decisions. In particular, the ability to
shift proﬁts should reduce the proﬁt-tax responsiveness of ﬁrms’ investments.
However, although some observed characteristics of multinational ﬁrms facil-
itate tax-planning activities, for the most part, whether and to what extent
ﬁrms shift proﬁts is unobserved. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst paper to investigate how the investment decisions of multinational ﬁrms
in host countries depend on their unobserved ability to shift proﬁts.
4.3 Proﬁt Shifting and the Tax Responsive-
ness of Capital
To see how ﬁrms’ investments may diﬀer with respect to their tax elasticities,
consider a very simple model of foreign investment of a multinational ﬁrm.
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The multinational maximizes proﬁts Π of a foreign subsidiary 푖. To keep the
analysis simple, let us assume that capital 퐾푖 is the only factor of production.
Output is determined by the production function 퐹 (퐾푖), which has standard
properties such as 퐹 ′(퐾푖) > 0 and 퐹 ′′(퐾푖) < 0. We further denote the cost
of capital by 푟푖. The proﬁt function is then deﬁned as
Π푖 = 퐹 (퐾푖)− 휏퐹 (퐾푖)(1− 휙푖)− 푟푖퐾푖, (4.1)
where 휏 denotes the local tax rate. The tax base (proﬁt) is determined by
production 퐹 (퐾푖). Without any proﬁt shifting, total tax payments amount to
휏퐹 (퐾푖). The parameter 휙푖, 0 ≤ 휙푖 ≤ 1, captures the degree of proﬁt shifting
(by using transfer pricing, debt shifting, or royalty payment strategies). If
휙푖 = 1, the ﬁrm is able to shift all proﬁts and eﬀectively pays no taxes, i.e.,
휏퐹 (퐾푖) − 휏휙푖퐹 (퐾푖) = 0. The case without proﬁt shifting is described by
휙푖 = 0. Diﬀerentiating this simple problem with respect to 퐾푖 yields
퐹 ′(퐾) =
푟푖
1− 휏(1− 휙) . (4.2)
Given the usual properties of 퐹 (퐾푖), this directly implies that non-shifters
with 휙푖 = 0 require a higher marginal product of capital than shifters. In
contrast, in the extreme case with 휙푖 = 1, the marginal decision does no
longer depend on 휏 . In view of this, the tax elasticity of 퐾푖 can then be
written as
푑퐾푖
푑휏
=
(1− 휙)퐹 ′(퐾푖)
퐹 ′′(퐾푖)[1− 휏(1− 휙)] < 0. (4.3)
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Assuming that a ﬁrm is able to reduce its tax base to zero by shifting all
proﬁts, equation (4.3) implies that the tax elasticity of 퐾푖 is zero, i.e., the
subsidiary will not respond to changes in 휏 . For all positive values of 휙푖 < 1,
the tax response of a ﬁrm is smaller (less negative) compared with the case
of no proﬁt shifting with 휙푖 = 0.
4.4 Empirical Approach
4.4.1 A Finite Mixture Model
We are interested in the tax elasticity of the ﬁxed assets of foreign aﬃliates
of German multinational ﬁrms. We expect tax responses of foreign aﬃliates
that are able to shift taxable income between diﬀerent locations (shifters)
to diﬀer from those of aﬃliates which can not shift proﬁts (non-shifters).
In particular, non-shifters are expected to be aﬀected by corporate proﬁt
taxation, and thus have higher costs of capital and lower levels of ﬁxed assets
than shifters at positive tax rates. However, whether an aﬃliate shifts proﬁts
or not is unobserved. One way to approach this problem empirically is in
terms of a latent class analysis: the population of aﬃliates is considered to
be composed of two underlying latent classes or population components (see
Aitkin and Rubin, 1985). We use a ﬁnite mixture model to estimate the
diﬀerent tax responsiveness of two latent classes of aﬃliates, proﬁt shifters
(푠) and non-shifters (푛푠). In this model, the whole sample of aﬃliates is seen
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as a probabilistic mixture from two subpopulations with diﬀerent densities.2
Let 푦푖푡 denote the stock of ﬁxed assets of aﬃliate 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁 in period
푡 = 1, . . . , 푇 . The outcome 푦푖푡 is characterized by one of two diﬀerent densities
푓 ℓ, ℓ = {푠, 푛푠}, with the same distributional form but diﬀerent parameters 휽ℓ,
depending on whether aﬃliate 푖 is able to shift proﬁts in period 푡 or not. Let
x푖푡 be a 1×퐾 vector of aﬃliate- and country-speciﬁc explanatory variables,
and 푐푖 a time-invariant aﬃliate-speciﬁc eﬀect. The following density deﬁnes
a two-component ﬁnite mixture
푓(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푠,휽푛푠, 푐푖, 휋푛푠) = 휋푛푠푓푛푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푛푠, 푐푖)
+ (1− 휋푛푠)푓 푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푠, 푐푖), (4.4)
where 0 ≤ 휋푛푠 ≤ 1. 휋푛푠 is the fraction of aﬃliates that can not shift proﬁts
in period 푡. Their outcome 푦푖푡 is characterized by 푓
푛푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푛푠, 푐푖). The
fraction 휋푠 = (1−휋푛푠) of aﬃliates is able to shift proﬁts and is characterized
by the density 푓 푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푠, 푐푖).
While the fraction 휋푛푠 is unknown, it can be estimated along with the param-
eters we are interested in, 휽ℓ. In principle, we could treat the probability 휋푛푠
of belonging to the group of non-shifting aﬃliates as an unknown constant.
But since we observe characteristics of the aﬃliates which have an inﬂuence
on that probability, we may parameterize 휋푛푠 by using, e.g., a logistic func-
2The densities diﬀer in their moments but have the same distributional form.
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tion and allow it to depend on observable characteristics. For this, let us
write
휋푛푠 =
푒푥푝(z′푖푡휹)
[1 + 푒푥푝(z′푖푡휹)]
, (4.5)
where z푖푡 is a 1 × 푄 vector of observed characteristics that determine the
probability of proﬁt shifting.
We specify an exponential conditional mean model for an aﬃliate’s ﬁxed
assets 푦푖푡, where the unobserved time-invariant aﬃliate-speciﬁc eﬀect 푐푖 en-
ters multiplicatively, so that 퐸(푦푖푡∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 , 푐푖) = 푐푖푒푥푝(x′푖푡휷ℓ). We fol-
low the approach introduced by Mundlak (1978) and popularized by Cham-
berlain (1984) and Wooldridge (2002), and allow 푐푖 to be correlated with
the individual-speciﬁc averages of the regressors across all periods, x¯푖 =
푇−1
∑푇
푡=1 x푖푡. In particular, we specify 퐸(푐푖∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 ) = 푒푥푝(훾ℓ + x¯′푖흃ℓ),
which implies the conditional mean
퐸(푦푖푡∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 ) = 푒푥푝(훾ℓ + x′푖푡휷ℓ + x¯′푖흃ℓ) (4.6)
by iterated expectations.3
Furthermore, we specify the density 푓 ℓ(푦푖푡∣휽ℓ) as a negative binomial with
3By the law of iterated expectations,
퐸(푦푖푡∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 ) = 퐸[퐸(푦푖푡∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 , 푐푖)∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 ]
= 퐸[푐푖푒푥푝(x
′
푖푡휷
ℓ)∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 ]
= 퐸(푐푖∣푥푖1, . . . , 푥푖푇 )푒푥푝(x′푖푡휷ℓ)
= 푒푥푝(훾ℓ + x′푖푡휷ℓ + x¯′푖흃
ℓ).
See Wooldridge (2002, chapter 19).
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parameters 휇ℓ푖푡 = 푒푥푝(x
′
푖푡휷
ℓ) and 훼ℓ, where 휽ℓ = (휷ℓ, 훼ℓ), ℓ = {푠, 푛푠}.4
Alternatively, we ﬁt a model to the logarithm of ﬁxed assets 푙푛(푦푖푡) and
specify 푓 ℓ(푦푖푡∣휽ℓ) as a normal distribution. The estimation is performed by
maximum likelihood.
The posterior probability that observation 푦푖푡 belongs to the group of non-
shifters is given by
푃푟(푦푖푡 ∈ 푛푠) = 휋
푛푠푓푛푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푛푠, 푐푖)
휋푛푠푓푛푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푛푠, 푐푖) + (1− 휋푛푠)푓 푠(푦푖푡∣x푖푡,휽푠, 푐푖) . (4.7)
Equation 4.7 allows us to classify observations into the groups after estimat-
ing the model.
4.4.2 Data and Speciﬁcation
We use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by Deutsche
Bundesbank (the German Central Bank; see Lipponer, 2009, for a docu-
4The negative binomial distribution is obtained by assuming that the dependent vari-
able 푦푖푡 follows a Poisson distribution with parameter 휆푖푡, and letting 휆푖푡 = 휇푖푡휈푖푡. 휇푖푡
is in our case 푒푥푝(x′푖푡휷) and 휈푖푡 is a gamma-distributed random unobserved component
with parameter 푚 = 1/훼. The marginal distribution of 푦푖푡 conditional on the determin-
istic parameters 휇푖푡 and 훼 is obtained by integrating 휈푖푡 out, which gives 푓(푦푖푡∣휇푖푡, 훼) =∫
ℎ(푦푖푡∣휇푖푡, 훼)푔(휈푖푡∣훼)푑휈 = Γ(훼
−1+푦푖푡)
Γ(훼−1)Γ(푦푖푡+1)
( 훼
−1
훼−1+휇푖푡
)훼
−1
( 휇푖푡휇푖푡+훼−1 )
푦
푖푡. Letting 훼 be a parame-
ter to be estimated obtains the conditional variance 푉 [푦푖푡∣휇푖푡, 훼] = 휇푖푡(1 + 훼휇푖푡), which is
quadratic in the mean allowing for overdispersion in the data. This version of the model
is called negative binomial 2 (NB2). See Cameron and Trivedi (2006) for details. By
choosing a negative binomial model, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity within each
subpopulation (or latent class).
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mentation).5 This data-set contains annual statistics on virtually all foreign
aﬃliates of German multinationals. All German investors holding 10% or
more of shares or voting rights in foreign ﬁrms with a balance sheet total
of more than 3 million Euro are required by law to report to the Deutsche
Bundesbank balance-sheet information as well as information on the sector,
legal form, and number of employees of their foreign aﬃliates. Indirect par-
ticipating interests are to be reported whenever residents hold more than
50% in a foreign ﬁrm and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 50%
or more of the shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises.6
Our sample comprises 38,705 foreign aﬃliates of 9,803 German multinational
ﬁrms investing in 85 countries over the period 1996 to 2007. Altogether,
we have 191,116 observations on the stock of ﬁxed assets of these foreign
aﬃliates.
We are predominantly interested in the eﬀect of the statutory corporate in-
come tax rate of a host country 푗 in year 푡, 퐶퐼푇푅푗푡, on the ﬁxed assets of
foreign aﬃliates. As alternative tax measures, we use the eﬀective average
tax rate, 퐸퐴푇푅푗푡, and the eﬀective marginal tax rate, 퐸푀푇푅푗푡. The ﬁrst
one measures the tax eﬀect on the after-tax net present value of investments,
and the latter reﬂects the tax burden on the cost of capital, i.e., the returns
on a marginal investment. These two measures consider all rules determining
5The data-set is made available only under strict conditions and for clearly deﬁned
academic research purposes and can be used exclusively at the Bank’s Research Center.
6The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
Reporting thresholds have been changed in the past, for details and a documentation on
the micro-level data-set MiDi see Lipponer (2009).
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the tax base (such as depreciation allowances). Previous work suggests that
while the relevant tax measure determining the size of an investment – condi-
tional on the location choice – is the eﬀective marginal tax rate, the eﬀective
average tax rate is what determines discrete (lumpy) investment decisions
and location choice (Devereux and Griﬃth, 1998, 2003). However, these two
alternative tax measures are available only for a subset of the countries in
the sample, leading to a loss of almost 40,000 observations. For this reason
we include 퐶퐼푇푅푗푡 in our preferred speciﬁcation.
7 In any case, we expect a
higher tax rate to raise the cost of capital and aﬀect investment in ﬁxed assets
negatively to the extent that a foreign aﬃliate is unable to avoid taxation by
shifting proﬁts.
The theory of multinational ﬁrms and trade suggests that multinational ﬁrm
activity depends mainly on market size, skilled labor endowments, capital-
labor ratios, factor prices, and trade and investment costs (see Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonin-
gen, Davies, and Head, 2003; and Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Blonigen and
Piger, 2010). This motivates the choice of the remaining variables included
in the vector x푖푡. To capture market size, we include 퐺퐷푃푗푡, the log of real
GDP. The tertiary school enrolment rate, 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗푡, and the log capital-labor
ratio, 퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗푡, reﬂect relative factor endowments. The log of real GDP per
capita, 퐺퐷푃푃퐶푗푡, is a proxy for labor costs; the local lending interest rate,
7Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Overesch and Wamser (2009, 2010) show that the statu-
tory corporate income tax rate is an appropriate alternative to the eﬀective average tax
rate. Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) point out that the eﬀective average tax rate is a
weighted average of the eﬀective marginal tax rate and the statutory tax rate, and it
converges to the latter as proﬁts rise.
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퐿퐸푁퐷푗푡, and inﬂation rate, 퐼푁퐹퐿푗푡, reﬂect capital costs. We also include
a corruption perception index, 퐶푃퐼푗푡, and a measure of banking eﬃciency,
퐹퐼푁퐹푅푗푡, to control for investment costs. Trade costs are usually assumed
to be ﬁxed over a short time span as ours and are captured in our application
(along with every other time-invariant factor) by the aﬃliate-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect 푐푖.
The vector z푖푡 includes determinants of the probability of shifting proﬁts. In
our case, these are the number of aﬃliated enterprises in other countries,
푁푆퐼푆푖푡, and a variable capturing the aﬃliate-speciﬁc tax incentive to shift
proﬁts deﬁned as the average tax rate over all countries with a lower tax
rate in which the aﬃliate has other aﬃliated enterprises, 푃푆퐼푖푡.
8 A larger
number of aﬃliated enterprises abroad should facilitate proﬁt shifting, so
we expect 푁푆퐼푆푖푡 to increase the probability of shifting proﬁts. We expect
푃푆퐼푖푡 to have a negative eﬀect on the propensity to shift proﬁts, since a
higher average tax rate in other locations of the multinational ﬁrm lowers the
incentive of that speciﬁc aﬃliate to shift proﬁts. As robustness checks, we use
alternative speciﬁcations for the probability of shifting proﬁts. We include
following variables alternatively: 퐼퐷푅푖푡, the ratio of internal borrowing over
capital, 푂푆푖푡, the ownership share of the German parent, and 푅&퐷푖푡, a
8To be speciﬁc, the tax incentive of any aﬃliate 푖 of multinational ﬁrm 푘 in country 푗
in year 푡 arises from the tax rates at other locations including the parent country and is
deﬁned as
푃푆퐼푖푡 =
{ ∑푀
푚=1 휏푚푡, if 휏푗푡 > 휏푚푡, 푚 ∕=푗 ,
휏푗푡 otherwise.
푀 is the number of countries other than 푗 in which multinational ﬁrm 푘 holds aﬃliates
(including Germany, the parent country), 휏푚푡 is the corporate tax rate in each of these
countries.
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dummy indicating if the aﬃliate operates in the R&D sector. We expect
a higher internal-debt-to-capital ratio (퐼퐷푅푖푡) to be an indicator of proﬁt
shifting through debt shifting (see, e.g. Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004a).
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004b) point out that while partial ownership is
associated with coordination costs, whole ownership facilitates worldwide
tax planning. Grubert (2003) argues that R&D intensive aﬃliates have more
opportunities to shift proﬁts because they engage in a greater amount of
intra-ﬁrm transactions.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Description Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variable
퐹푖푥푒푑퐴푠푠푒푡푠푖푡 Foreign aﬃliate’s ﬁxed assets 19.360 261.407
in million Euro
Independent Variables explaining Fixed Assets
퐶퐼푇푅푗푡 Statutory corporate income tax rate 0.325 0.071
퐸퐴푇푅푗푡 Eﬀective average tax rate 0.295 0.065
퐸푀푇푅푗푡 Eﬀective marginal tax rate 0.230 0.079
퐺퐷푃푗푡 log(real GDP) 27.505 1.380
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗푡 log(capital-labor ratio) 10.574 0.926
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗푡 Tertiary school enrollment rate 53.547 17.912
퐺퐷푃푃퐶푗푡 log(real GDP per capita) 9.576 0.991
퐿퐸푁퐷푗푡 Lending interest rate 8.627 9.875
퐼푁퐹퐿푗푡 Inﬂation rate 3.186 5.120
퐶푃퐼푗푡 Corruption perception index 6.588 2.004
(0: totally corrupt – 10: corruption free)
퐹퐼푁퐹푅푗푡 Financial freedom index 69.371 18.378
(0: repressive – 100: negligible government inﬂuence)
Independent Variables explaining 휋푛푠
푁푆퐼푆푖푡 Number of aﬃliated enterprises 26.916 56.643
in other countries
푃푆퐼푖푡 Proﬁt-shifting incentive 0.276 0.063
퐼퐷푅푖푡 Internal-debt-to-capital ratio 0.180 0.248
푂푆푖푡 Ownership share of German parent 0.901 0.204
푅&퐷푖푡 1 if aﬃliate operates in the 0.003 0.055
R&D sector, 0 otherwise
Observations 191,116
Notes: Panel of 191,116 observations on 38,705 foreign aﬃliates in 85 countries over the period
1996-2007. The variables EATR and EMTR are available for 152,660 observations.
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Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. All tax data is col-
lected from databases provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal Doc-
umentation (IBFD) and tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and
KPMG. The data on real GDP, capital-labor ratios, 9 tertiary school en-
rollment and lending interest rate come from the 2009 edition of the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. The corruption perception index is
published annually by Transparency International and ranks countries from
10 (corruption free) to 0 (almost totally corrupt) according to perceived lev-
els of corruption determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The
inﬂation rate is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook. The ﬁnan-
cial freedom indicator is published annually by the Heritage Foundation and
measures banking eﬃciency as well as independence from government control
and interference in the ﬁnancial sector, ranking economies from 100 (negli-
gible government inﬂuence) to 0 (repressive). The variables 푁푆퐼푆푖푡, 푃푆퐼푖푡,
퐼퐷푅푖푡, 푂푆푖푡, and 푅&퐷푖푡 are constructed upon information taken from MiDi.
4.5 Results
We provide results of two-component negative binomial mixture models for
the eﬀects of corporate taxes on the ﬁxed assets of foreign aﬃliates, and
compare them with estimates from a simple negative binomial regression for
the preferred speciﬁcation. We then provide, as a robustness check, ﬁnite
9Capital stocks are computed by using the perpetual inventory method as in Bergstrand
and Egger (2007).
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mixture models with an alternative speciﬁcation of the probability equation
and a two-component normal mixture model for the log of ﬁxed assets.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4.2 presents the results of a negative binomial
regression, disregarding the possibility of latent components in the population
of foreign aﬃliates. There, the estimated eﬀect of the statutory tax rate
on the ﬁxed assets of the foreign aﬃliates in our sample is negative but
not statistically signiﬁcant.10 The remaining 4 columns show the results of
two-component negative binomial mixture models. When we allow for two
latent components in the population, we ﬁnd that the tax responses diﬀer
signiﬁcantly across components. Across all speciﬁcations, we identify a larger
component associated with a lower conditional mean for ﬁxed assets which
reacts signiﬁcantly to tax rates, and a smaller one associated with a high
ﬁxed assets mean which seems to be unaﬀected by corporate taxation. We
associate the ﬁrst component with the non-shifter group and the second one
with the shifter group. Let us discuss the results for each group in detail.
10Note that, while previous research using the same data-set and a similar regression
technique do ﬁnd signiﬁcant tax eﬀects, they do so for a smaller sample of ﬁrms than
the one we have here (9,803 parent ﬁrms holding 38,705 aﬃliates in 85 host countries).
Egger and Merlo (2011) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant tax eﬀect on the ﬁxed assets at the parent ﬁrm
level in a poisson regression including only 6915 parent ﬁrms in 51 host countries and
excluding indirectly-held aﬃliates. While there, the exclusion of indirectly-held aﬃliates
was necessary, we explicitly want to have them in this analysis.
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The second column shows a model with a constant prior probability of be-
longing to either component. For the non-shifters (84% of the sample),
the estimated semi-elasticity of the statutory corporate tax rate amounts to
−1.95 and is highly signiﬁcant.11,12 For the shifters, the smaller population
component (about 16% of the sample), the point estimate of the tax vari-
able is also negative, though lower than the estimate for the non-shifters and
statistically insigniﬁcant. In this model, the prior probability of belonging
to the non-shifter group is speciﬁed as constant. Since we have information
on characteristics that aﬀect that probability, we may let it depend on ob-
servables. The third column shows a model where the probability of being
a non-shifter depends on the number of aﬃliated enterprises in other coun-
tries, 푁푆퐼푆푖푡, and on 푃푆퐼푖푡, a variable capturing the aﬃliate-speciﬁc tax
incentive to shift proﬁts deﬁned as the average tax rate over all countries
with a lower tax rate in which the ﬁrm to which the aﬃliate belongs has
other aﬃliated entities. As expected, a higher number of aﬃliated entities
abroad lowers the probability of being in the non-shifter group, and a higher
average tax rate at the location of such aﬃliated entreprises (a lower incen-
tive to shift proﬁts) increases the probability of being a non-shifter. Both
eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant. The non-shifter group is somewhat larger than
in the previous model (89.4% of the sample) and its tax response remains
negative and highly signiﬁcant. The estimated tax semi-elasticity of -1.85
11In any model with an exponential conditional mean 퐸(푦∣x) = 푒푥푝(x′훽), the regres-
sion coeﬃcients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities since the marginal eﬀect 푀퐸푘 =
퐸(푦∣x)× 훽푘, so 훽푘 =푀퐸푘/퐸(푦∣x) (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
12The estimated coeﬃcients of both components are obtained simultaneously through
maximum likelihood estimation using the whole sample. The % of the sample classiﬁed
as non-shifters is obtained after estimation using the calculated posterior probability of
belonging to that group (see equation 4.7).
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is lower than in the previous model, but the conﬁdence intervals overlap.
Table 4.3 reports Akaike’s and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria for
the 3 models discussed above. The negative binomial mixture model with
parametrized probability (FMNB) achieves the smaller values, indicating a
better ﬁt. Table 4.3 also reports likelihood ratio tests for the negative bi-
nomial (NB) model against both the negative binomial mixture model with
constant probability (FMNB-CP) and FMNB, and for the FMNB-CP against
the FMNB. In all cases, the null hypothesis of the constrained model being
true can be rejected. The FMNB model, displayed in the third column of
Table 4.2, is thus the preferred model.
Table 4.3: Satistics for Model Selection
Model Log-Likelihood 푘 AIC BIC
NB -604060.60 31 1208183.20 1208498.18
FMNB-CP -562119.50 63 1124365.00 1125005.12
FMNB -560587.48 67 1121308.96 1121989.72
Likelihood-ratio Test
Null Alternative LR-statistic d.f p-value
NB FMNB-CP 83882.20 32 0.000
NB FMNB 86946.24 36 0.000
FMNB-CP FMNB 3064.04 4 0.000
Notes: The statistics refer to the models displayed in the ﬁrst 3 columns of Table 4.2: the Negative
Binomial (NB), the 2-component Negative Binomial Mixture with constant probability (FMNB-
CP), and the 2-component Negative Binomial Mixture with parametrized probability (FMNB). 푘
is the number of estimated parameters in each model. AIC is Akaike’s information criteria and
BIC is Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria. The lower part of the table reports likelihood ratio
test for the alternative model against the constrained model.
The two population components diﬀer as well in terms of the parameters of
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the remaining variables. In our preferred speciﬁcation, the eﬀect of 퐺퐷푃푗푡
is positive and signiﬁcant for the non-shifter group but insigniﬁcant for the
shifters. The variables 퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗푡 and 푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗푡 have opposite signiﬁcant ef-
fects for each group: positive for the larger group of non-shifters and negative
for the shifters. This results are consistent with a prevalence of large-market-
seeking horizontal multinationals – producing the same product at home and
at the host market – in the non-shifter group and a greater presence of ver-
tical multinational ﬁrms – producing headquarter services in skill-abundant
countries and goods in skill-scarce economies – among the shifters. Given
that vertically integrated ﬁrms may have more opportunities to shift proﬁts
through transfer pricing than horizontal ﬁrms, this makes sense. The variable
퐺퐷푃푃퐶푗푡, which reﬂects labor costs, has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect for
both groups. Both a higher inﬂation rate and higher perceived corruption
have a negative eﬀect on the ﬁxed assets of the non-shifter group but doesn’t
seem to aﬀect the shifters. Table 4.4 reports Wald tests of coeﬃcient equality
across components. The null hypothesis that coeﬃcients across components
are equal can not be rejected for the parameters of the lending rate, the
inﬂation rate and the ﬁnancial freedom index. For the rest of the explana-
tory variables, most importantly in the case of the statutory tax rate, the
estimated parameters diﬀer signiﬁcantly across components.
We can use the predicted posterior probability of belonging to either com-
ponent to classify the individual observations into shifters and non-shifters.
Table 4.5 reports the means of the dependent and explanatory variables for
each component after splitting the sample according to the predictions of our
preferred model. The ﬁrms classiﬁed as shifters invest an average amount
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Table 4.4: Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality Across Compo-
nents
Parameter 휒2 statistic d.f. P-value
퐶퐼푇푅푗푡 3.90 1 0.048
퐺퐷푃푗푡 4.65 1 0.031
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗푡 8.52 1 0.004
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗푡 6.31 1 0.012
퐺퐷푃푃퐶푗푡 6.78 1 0.009
퐿퐸푁퐷푗푡 0.02 1 0.896
퐼푁퐹퐿푗푡 0.68 1 0.411
퐶푃퐼푗푡 6.52 1 0.011
퐹퐼푁퐹푅푗푡 0.46 1 0.497
All coeﬃcients 126.07 29 0.000
Notes: Tests based on the regression displayed in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4.2. The test
of joint equality of all coeﬃcients across components includes the individual means and the year
dummies.
of 155 million Euro in ﬁxed assets, while the non-shifters have an average
investment of just 3.65 million Euro. Even though they constitute only 10%
of the sample, shifters account for 83% of the total stock of ﬁxed assets held
abroad by German multinational ﬁrms. Shifters have on average 82.6 aﬃli-
ated enterprises of the same parent in other countries, non-shifters only 20.4.
The country-speciﬁc explanatory variables, especially the tax measures, show
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across groups.
From the third column of Table 4.2, we know that the means of the predicted
values of ﬁxed assets amount to 3.54 and 77.38 for non-shifters and shifters,
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Figure 4.1: Predicted mixture densities of ﬁxed assets
respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the predicted mixture densities, and reveals
that the estimated component distributions overlap in a wide range of val-
ues. This highlights the fact that the ﬁnite mixture model captures latent
heterogeneity and improves the assessment of diﬀerential tax responses that
could be made relying only on a mere grouping of ﬁrms according to their
investment levels. Figure 4.2 displays the average investment in ﬁxed assets
by quantiles of the distribution of the corporate tax rate, for non-shifters
and shifters. Two things strike our attention. First, the diﬀerences between
average levels of investments across the two components are signiﬁcant, irre-
spective of the tax rate. Second, shifters seem to invest the most, on average,
in high-tax countries.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 165
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
Av
er
ag
e 
Fi
xe
d 
As
se
ts
1 2 3 4 5
Average Fixed Assets by Quantiles of Corporate Tax Rate
ShiftersNon−shifters
Figure 4.2: Average ﬁxed assets by quantiles of corporate tax rate
The two last regressions presented in Table 4.2 use diﬀerent tax measures,
퐸퐴푇푅푗푡, the eﬀective average tax rate, and 퐸푀푇푅푗푡, the eﬀective marginal
tax rate. Although the estimated semi-elasticities for the non-shifters are
lower, the main results remain unchanged. The tax eﬀect is negative and
signiﬁcant for the larger group with the lower conditional mean, and in-
signiﬁcant for the smaller group with the higher mean of ﬁxed assets. Given
that we loose observations when using these alternative measures, we pre-
fer the speciﬁcation with the statutory tax rate 퐶퐼푇푅푗푡. Table 4.6 presents
three models with alternative probability speciﬁcations and a normal mix-
ture model for the log of ﬁxed assets. Adding variables to the speciﬁcation of
the probability of being in the non-shifter group does not change the results.
While a higher internal-debt-to-capital ratio lowers, as expected, the proba-
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bility of being a non-shifter, the ownership share of the German parent and
operating in the R&D sector do not seem to have an inﬂuence, after control-
ling for the number of aﬃliated enterprises and the average tax rate at other
locations. Fitting a normal mixture model for the log of ﬁxed assets produces
similar results concerning the tax eﬀects. The estimated semi-elasticity for
the non-shifter amounts here to -2.32 and is highly signiﬁcant. The tax re-
sponse of the shifter group is now signiﬁcant at the 10% level, but much lower
(-0.65) than that of the non-shifter group. The diﬀerence between both coef-
ﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant at the 2% level.13 In this model the group of
non-shifters associated with the lower predicted mean is still larger than the
shifter group but only marginally (51.56% of the sample). The logarithmic
transformation of the dependent variable is to blame. First, in our sample we
have ﬁrms with zero ﬁxed assets which are dropped. Second, the distribution
is shifted to the right and observations with high values are brought closer
to each other. Probability mass is shifted from the low-mean group to the
high-mean group.
13The 휒2 statistic of the wald test for coeﬃcient equality has a value of 5.17. The null
hypothesis that both coeﬃcients are equal can be rejected at the 2% level.
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Table 4.5: Component Characteristics
Non-shifter Shifter
Observations 171,325 19,791
Aﬃliates 35,725 5,272
% Sample 89.64 10.36
% of total ﬁxed assets 16.93 83.07
Component means
퐹푖푥푒푑퐴푠푠푒푡푠푖푡 3.654 155.320
푁푆퐼푆푖푡 20.480 82.630
푃푆퐼푖푡 0.277 0.268
퐼퐷푅푖푡 0.180 0.182
푂푆푖푡 0.904 0.868
푅&퐷푖푡 0.003 0.005
퐶퐼푇푅푗푡 0.324 0.330
퐸퐴푇푅푗푡 0.295 0.298
퐸푀푇푅푗푡 0.229 0.235
퐺퐷푃푗푡 27.484 27.684
퐾퐿푅퐴푇푗푡 10.563 10.672
푆퐾퐼퐿퐿푗푡 53.269 55.954
퐺퐷푃푃퐶푗푡 9.564 9.688
퐿퐸푁퐷푗푡 8.664 8.313
퐼푁퐹퐿푗푡 3.210 2.973
퐶푃퐼푗푡 6.571 6.738
퐹퐼푁퐹푅푗푡 69.288 70.096
Notes: Classiﬁcation of observations into non-shifters and
shifters according to the posterior probability of belonging to
the non-shifter group calculated upon the regression displayed
in the third column of Table 4.2. % of total ﬁxed assets refers
to the total of ﬁxed assets of all German aﬃliates abroad over
all years in the sample (1996-2007).
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Overall, we ﬁnd evidence for two diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms which react dif-
ferently to corporate taxation. The larger group of ﬁrms is unable to shift
proﬁts and is negatively aﬀected by the corporate tax rate. The estimated
tax semi-elasticity for the non-shifter group ranges from -1.85 to -2.32, a
magnitude in line with previous research. The smaller group of ﬁrms is able
to shift proﬁts and avoid taxation and shows no signiﬁcant response to the
corporate tax rate. In our preferred speciﬁcation a one-percentage-point in-
crease in the statutory tax rate is associated with a decrease by 1.85% in the
stock of ﬁxed assets of a non-shifting foreign aﬃliate. We can quantify that
eﬀect by evaluating it at the sample mean of the component (see Table 4.5).
The average aﬃliate classiﬁed as non-shifter invests about 3.65 million Euro
in ﬁxed assets. Such an aﬃliate would reduce its investment in ﬁxed assets
by about 68,000 Euro in response to a one-percentage-point increase in the
corporate tax rate. We may ask what would happen if countries were able
to prevent all proﬁt shifting. Under the assumption that the ﬁrms in the
shifter group can no longer shift proﬁts and exhibit the same tax elasticity
as the non-shifters, the implied eﬀect given the average investment size of the
shifters of about 155 million Euro would be 2.88 million Euro per percentage
point tax increase.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the tax responsiveness of multinationals’ investment
decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing ﬁrms that are able to shift proﬁts
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(shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters). From a theoretical point
of view, the tax responsiveness of ﬁrms crucially depends on this distinction.
Empirically, however, whether or not a ﬁrm is able to shift proﬁts is basically
unobserved.
We use a ﬁnite mixture model to distinguish the tax responsiveness of invest-
ments made by foreign aﬃliates which are able shift proﬁts and reduce their
tax base from that of aﬃliates which are not able to do so and are thus fully
taxed. Using a panel of 38,705 foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals
over the years 1996 to 2007, we show that while shifters do not respond to
host-country taxes at all, taxes signiﬁcantly aﬀect the investment decision of
non-shifters. We identify a larger group of aﬃliates with a relatively low av-
erage investment which is negatively aﬀected by the local corporate tax rate
on proﬁts. The estimated tax eﬀect for the latter group amounts to 1.85%
less ﬁxed assets, or 68,000 Euro for the average aﬃliate, per percentage point
tax increase. A smaller group of aﬃliates is able to avoid taxation by shifting
its tax base and shows no signiﬁcant response to corporate tax rates. The
aﬃliates in this group have signiﬁcatively higher investments in ﬁxed assets,
so that, were they to be prevented from shifting proﬁts, the implied eﬀect
in Euro of a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate would be 42 times
higher.
To the extent that a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign invest-
ments are carried out by ﬁrms that shift proﬁts, the introduction of anti-
tax-avoidance measures to restrict proﬁt shifting in the pursuit to cash tax
revenue will come at the cost of entering in tax competition with other coun-
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tries for that ﬁrms’ investments. In fact, the broadening of the tax base has
to be accompanied by a policy of cutting the statutory tax burden to avoid
losing real economic activity.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular Heinz Herrmann
and Alexander Lipponer, for granting access to the MiDi database. I am
indebted to Georg Wamser and Peter Egger for many helpful suggestions. I
thank Partha Deb for helpful comments.
References
Aitkin, M., and D. B. Rubin (1985), Estimation and Hypothesis Testing
in Finite Mixture Models, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 47,
67-75.
Ayyagari, P., P. Deb, J. Fletcher, W.T. Gallo, and J.L. Sindelar (2009), Sin
Taxes: Do Heterogeneous Responses Undercut Their Value?, NBER
Working Paper No. 15124.
Bago d’Uva, T. (2005), Latent Class Models for Use of Primary Care: Evi-
dence from a British Panel, Health Economics 14, 873-892.
Bago d’Uva, T. (2006), Latent Class Models for Utilisation of Health Care,
Health Economics 15, 329-343.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 172
Barrios, S., H. Huizinga, L. Laeven, and G. Nicode`me (2008), International
Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions, Oxford Univer-
sity Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper No. 0825.
Becker, S., P. Egger, and V. Merlo (2009), How Low Business Tax Rates At-
tract Multinational Headquarters: Municipality-Level Evidence from
Germany, CESifo Working Paper No. 2517, Munich.
Bergstrand, J.H., and P. Egger (2007), A Knowledge-and-Physical-Capital
Model of International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Foreign
Aﬃliate Sales: Developed Countries, Journal of International Eco-
nomics 73, 278–308.
Blonigen,B.A., R.B. Davies, and K. Head (2003), Estimating the knowledge-
capital model of the multinational enterprise: Comment, American
Economic Review 93, 980–994.
Buettner, T., and M. Ruf (2007), Tax Incentives and the Location of FDI:
Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals, International Tax
and Public Finance 14, 151-164.
Buettner, T., and G. Wamser (2009), The Impact of Non-Proﬁt Taxes on
Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from German Multinationals, In-
ternational Tax and Public Finance 16, 298–320.
Bucovetsky, S., and A. Hauﬂer (2008), Tax Competition when Firms Choose
their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals
be Closed?, Journal of International Economics 74, 188–201.
Cameron, C.A., and P.K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics Methods and
Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Carr, D.L., J.R. Markusen, and K.E. Maskus (2001), Estimating the Knowledge-
Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise, American Economic
Review 91, 693–708.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 173
Chamberlain, G. (1984), Panel Data, in Handbook of Econometrics, ed. by
Z. Griliches and M.D. Intriligator, vol. 2, 1247–1318. North Holland,
Amsterdam.
Clausing, K.A. (2003), Tax-motivated Transfer Pricing and US Intraﬁrm
Trade Prices, Journal of Public Economics 87, 2207-2223.
Conway, K.S., and P. Deb (2005), Is Prenatal Care Really Ineﬀective? Or,
is the ’Devil’ in the Distribution?, Journal of Health Economics 24,
489-513.
De Mooij, R.A., and S. Ederveen (2003), Taxation and Foreign Direct In-
vestment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research, International Tax and
Public Finance 10, 673-693.
De Mooij, R.A., and S. Ederveen (2006), What a Diﬀerence Does it Make?
Understanding the Empirical Literature on Taxation and International
Capital Flows, European Commission Economic Paper. No. 261.
De Mooij, R.A., and S. Ederveen (2008), Corporate Tax Elasticities: A
Readers Guide to Empirical Findings, Oxford Review of Economic Pol-
icy 24, 680-697.
Deb, P., and P.K. Trivedi (2011), Finite Mixture for Panels with Fixed
Eﬀects, Hunter College Working Paper.
Deb, P., and P.K. Trivedi (2007), Demand for Medical Care by the Elderly:
A Finite Mixture Approach, Journal of Applied Econometrics 12, 313–
336.
Deb, P., and P.K. Trivedi (2002), The Structure of Demand for Health Care:
Latent Class versus Two-part Models, Journal of Health Economics 21,
601–625.
Deb, P., W.T. Gallo, P. Ayyagari, J.M. Fletcher, and J.L. Sindelar (2009),
Job Loss: Eat, Drink and Try to be Merry?, NBER Working Papers
No.15122.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 174
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004a), A Multinational Perspec-
tive on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets, The
Journal of Finance 59, 2451-2487.
Desai, M.A., C.F Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004b), The Costs of Shared Owner-
ship: Evidence from International Joint Ventures, Journal of Financial
Economics 73, 323-374.
Devereux, M., and R. Griﬃth (1998), Taxes and the Location of Produc-
tion: Evidence from a Panel of US Multinationals, Journal of Public
Economics 68, 335–367.
Devereux, M., and R. Griﬃth (2003), Evaluating Tax Policy for Location
Decisions, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107-126.
Egger, P., W. Eggert, C. Keuschnigg, and H. Winner (2010), Corporate
Taxation, Debt Financing and Foreign-plant Ownership, European Eco-
nomic Review 54, 96-107.
Egger, P., W. Eggert, and H. Winner (2010), Saving Taxes Through Foreign
Plant Ownership, Journal of International Economics 81, 99-108.
Egger, P., and V. Merlo (2011), Statutory Corporate Tax Rates and Dou-
ble Taxation Treaties as Determinants of Multinational Firm Activity,
FinanzArchiv, forthcoming.
Grubert, H. (2003), Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income
Shifting, and the Choice of Location, National Tax Journal 56, 221-242.
Grubert, H., and J. Mutti (1991), Taxes, Tariﬀs and Transfer Pricing in
Multinational Corporate Decision Making, The Review of Economics
and Statistics 73, 285-293.
Hauﬂer, A. and M. Runkel (2008), Firms Financial Choices and Thin Cap-
italization Rules under Corporate Tax Competition, CESifo Working
Paper No. 2429, Munich.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 175
Heckman, J.J., and B. Singer (1984), A Method for Minimizing the Im-
pact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Dura-
tion Data, Econometrica 52, 271-320.
Hines, J.R. (1996), Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct
Investment in America, American Economic Review 86, 1076-1094.
Hines, J.R. (1999), Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Tax-
ation, National Tax Journal 52, 305-322.
Hines, J.R., and E.M. Rice (1994), Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens
and American Business, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 149-182.
Huizinga, H., and L. Laeven (2008), International Proﬁt Shifting Within
Multinationals: A Multi-country Perspective, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 92, 1164-1182.
Huizinga, H., L. Laeven, and G. Nicode`me (2008), Capital Structure and
International Debt Shifting, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 80-
118.
Janeba, E., and M. Smart (2003), Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harm-
ful Than Its Remedies?, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 259-
80.
Keen, M. (2001), Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less
Harmful, National Tax Journal 54, 757-762.
Lipponer, A. (2009), Microdatabase Direct Investment – MiDi. A Brief
Guide, Deutsche Bundesbank Technical Documentation, Frankfurt.
Markusen, J.R. (2002),Multinational Firms and the Theory of International
Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Markusen, J.R., and K.E. Maskus (2002), Discriminating among Alterna-
tive Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, Review of International
Economics 10, 694-707.
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Proﬁt Shifting 176
Mundlak, Y. (1978), On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data,
Econometrica 46, 69-85.
Overesch, M. (2009), The Eﬀects of Multinationals’ Proﬁt Shifting Activi-
ties on Real Investments, National Tax Journal 62, 5-23.
Overesch, M., and G. Wamser (2009), Who Cares about Corporate Taxa-
tion? Asymmetric Tax Eﬀects on Outbound FDI, The World Economy
32, 1657-1684.
Overesch, M., and G. Wamser (2010), The Eﬀects of Company Taxation in
EU Accession Countries on German FDI, Economics of Transition 18,
429-457.
Peralta, S., X. Wauthy, and T. van Ypersele (2006), Should Countries Con-
trol International Proﬁt Shifting?, Journal of International Economics
68, 24-37.
Swenson, D. (2001), Transaction Type and the Eﬀect of Taxes on the Dis-
tribution of Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., in International
Taxation and Multinational Activity, ed. by J.R. Hines, 89-108. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Wamser, G. (2011), Foreign (In)Direct Investment and Corporate Taxation,
Canadian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Weichenrieder, A. (2009), Proﬁt Shifting in the EU: Evidence from Ger-
many, International Tax and Public Finance 16, 281-297.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit
selbsta¨ndig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen di-
rekt oder indirekt u¨bernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen
sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen
Pru¨fungsbeho¨rde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht vero¨ﬀentlicht.
Mu¨nchen, 27. Juni 2011
Valeria Merlo
Curriculum Vitae
Since 09/2009 Researcher at the Chair of Applied Economics:
Innovation and Internationalization, ETH Zurich
10/2007 – 06/2011 Ph.D. Student at the University of Munich
11/2007 – 08/2009 Junior Researcher at the Ifo Institute for
Economic Research
2006 M.A. in Economics,
University of Munich (LMU)
2004 Licentiate degree in Economics,
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
1995 Bilingual Baccalaureate in Spanish and English,
Bede’s Grammar School, Buenos Aires, Argentina
14.05.1978 Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina
